Khan's third option

Legislative majority in hand, tenures locked in, judiciary executive-ised, architecture of new system of governance

Can he change course?

The world around Adiyala is transforming at a dizzying pace. Khan and his party are staring into a wall of uncertainty that shrouds their future and leaves them with increasingly shrinking options.

This past week was marked by developments that have cemented the new order in Pakistan with greater strength. The 27th amendment is now in full force with Field Marshall Asim Munir officially starting his five-year tenure as Chief of Defence Forces (CDF). The prospects of another five years after that are already being talked about. This coincided with alarming rumours about Imran Khan's well-being. Those concerns appear to have been put to rest by statements from government officials saying he is in good health.

But his party is not. Chief Minister KP Sohail Afridi spent the night outside Adiyala to meet his leader. He has not, yet. Khan's sisters have spent days trying to get permission to see their brother. They have not got it, yet. Party and alliance leaders like Asad Qaisar and Mehmood Achakzai are threatening to launch a street movement. They have failed to actualise their threat, yet. The party's 'resistance' is now confined to press conferences, social media posts and unsuccessful attempts to gain entry into Adiyala jail.

So, what can Khan and his party do to retrieve lost space?

The answer may lie in how they read the prevailing situation. The situation is a direct by-product of the amended system. The system has conceived, designed and constructed a legislative and constitutional steel frame around hybridity. The hybridity has reinforced itself through a combination of muscular military performance, growing national security and counter-terrorism challenges, and stronger parliamentary numbers.

The lesson for all is clear: either you are with the hybrid system, or you are against it.

With legislative majority in hand, tenures locked in, and judiciary executive-ised, the architecture of the new system of governance is in place. PTI now has three choices: first, resist the system with full force in the hope of dismantling it; second, lie low and hope for a black swan event to unravel the status quo; and third, try find space within the system through the strongest leverage it has – popularity.

There is logic for all three options. The first one is the current stated policy. One look at Khan's messages through the official PTI X account and one can see that he is in the process of burning all bridges with the establishment's leadership. The tone and tenor of these posts have in recent times become more harsh, more aggressive, and – perhaps most significantly – more personal. According to these messages, he has called off all attempts to speak or negotiate with anyone. The logic explained by his party colleagues is that Khan will continue to resist while incarcerated, and that every day he spends in jail increases his political stature. But the party is in absolute doldrums, you may ask. So what, comes the reply. The party is just Khan. When he comes out, party will be back in full force.

But this option carries three risks. First, the strength of the present system could outlast the capacity of Khan and his party to resist. The CDF is in office for five years, plus perhaps another five after that. Second, if the system brings greater economic stability through continuity of policies and greater diplomatic dividends, this could further undercut PTI's narrative, and perhaps its hold on the popular imagination. Third, another conflict with India, whose prospects are fairly high, could have the nation rallying around the system once again, and pushing PTI further onto the margins.

The second option is also presently in play to an extent. The party is in fact lying low in practical terms. There is hardly any public outreach, or voter mobilisation, or any kind of protests and street activity. Is it a wait-and-see approach? Perhaps. But it is also a reflection of the confusion about a grand strategy. With access to Khan severely limited now, such confusion and lack of clarity is manifesting itself daily in contradictory statements, lukewarm criticism and internal wrangling.

The combination of the first and second option has, till today, failed to produce any positive outcome for PTI and its leader. Which is why there are now growing whispers about the need to consider the third option. But how?

Here's where things get complicated.

This option is premised on two factors. One, the system is ready and willing to provide space to PTI. Two, PTI can actually have a shot at getting back into the saddle via this option. The logic goes something like this: with the current system in place for presumably a decade, and constitutional amendments ensuring a stronger central executive, and the establishment now leading the system not from the shadows but from the front – based on all of these factors one can surmise that the continuity of the system is not dependent solely on its current political partners. It figures then that whichever political outfit can showcase greater value – basically bring more to the table – that outfit can, theoretically speaking, partner with the establishment without disturbing the fundamentals of the system.

What does PTI then bring to the table that the present parties struggle to?

It brings popularity. It brings legitimacy. It brings younger demographic. These three factors in of themselves are powerful ingredients to provide strength to the system – the kind of strength it would need if it intends to actualise its freshly acquired constitutional powers for outcome-oriented change.

PTI may bring all these three ingredients but – and this may be the deal binder or breaker – can it bring subservience?

Subservience is a strong word. It has negative connotations. But the third option carries inside it various shades of gray that can convert subservience to cooperation, and cooperation to partnership. Not today, not tomorrow, but perhaps the day after that. Or the one after that. Much depends on Khan's capacity and willingness to seriously consider this option.

But can he change course?