Afghanistan: ideological mindset and negative peace

I was all set to write on why talks between Pakistan and Afghan Taliban are not making any progress, but then came the big headline, 'Pakistan, Afghan Taliban reach interim understanding in Istanbul talks.' This takes us to the next level, and the big question now will be whether the ceasefire agreement can convert into an enduring peace agreement. To answer this question, I would like to draw some assumptions by viewing the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship from five different angles: of negative peace, ideology, power politics, deterrence and the Pakistan-India rivalry.

The nature of the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship is such that if there will ever be peace between the two countries, it will be what political scientists call 'negative peace' — peace maintained by the absence of war rather than the presence of goodwill. States act rationally and compromise when the fear is mutual. Pakistan fears spillover of instability and terrorism, and Afghanistan depends on Pakistan for trade and access. This mutual vulnerability can sustain an inter-state relationship which is likely to be powered only by negative peace.

Afghanistan's foreign policy embodies an ideological mindset shaped by extremist ideological convictions that prioritise belief over strategy. This approach under the Taliban has led Afghanistan to regional and international isolation, thus Afghanistan has a foreign policy that is constrained by ideological rigidity with little strategic flexibility and foresight. Ideology comes from shared values and worldviews. China endured 100 years of humiliation from 1840 to 1940.

Over a hundred years of social and economic injustice, warlordism, feudalism and foreign interference meant that China needed a revolution. The revolution needed an ideology to overthrow exploitation, and the communist revolution in the neighbourhood impressed Chairman Mao, who used it for the creation of a socialist state. What China has achieved is not only a product of an ideological mindset but a strategic one that ran the affairs of the country since the time of Deng Xiaoping and continues today under President Xi Jinping. The lesson that Afghanistan needs to learn is that ideologies rise and fall, such as monarchism, fascism, communism and even liberalism, but what endures is the need for balance that comes not from ideology but strategy.

Realpolitik or power politics embodies Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, which is based on the pursuit of national interests through the use of the threat of power. Pakistan's altered foreign policy approach towards Afghanistan is to stop convincing the Taliban regime about what is right and start compelling Afghanistan to act in ways that serve the interests of both countries. The foreign policy towards Afghanistan is now more pressure-based than persuasion-based. What Afghanistan needs to understand is that while India's goodwill can win it friendship, only a lasting strategic partnership with Pakistan can keep both countries aligned.

Understanding Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship under a deterrence framework requires understanding how both countries use the threat of political, military and strategic costs to influence each other's behaviour without resorting to a full-scale conflict. There are levers of pressure that both countries utilise to dominate the inter-state relationship. Pakistan uses military and economic deterrence, the threat of the use of force and control over trade routes.

Afghanistan relies on political and non-conventional deterrence. Tolerating anti-Pakistan elements across the border and conducting ethnic politics is Afghanistan's political deterrence, and harbouring terrorists and allowing them to carry out cross-border militancy is their non-conventional deterrence. Afghanistan's non-conventional deterrence also stems from the presence of a large Afghan diaspora in Pakistan, which, in the case of a conflict, can play a role in endangering Pakistan's state stability.

In a nutshell, it is not peace and reconciliation but deterrence that defines the Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relationship. The Taliban regime's reluctance to accept some of the conditions of the peace deal stems from the realisation that a peace deal with Pakistan would mean letting go of its one big lever of power: threat of non-conventional deterrence, through which it pressures Pakistan. Given this dynamic, a realist assessment would suggest that any enduring peace deal between the two countries would be difficult.

At the core of the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship lies the Pakistan-India rivalry. Pakistan has always viewed Afghanistan as its strategic rear and continues to make efforts to prevent the growth of Indian influence there. India, on its part, views engagement with Afghanistan as a means to encircle Pakistan on both the eastern and western front. India also relies on Afghanistan to counter Pakistan's regional dominance and its desire to establish connectivity with the Central Asian States.

Afghanistan needs to stop becoming a proxy arena where two large rivals and medium powers contest for influence and control. Russia has already formally recognised the Taliban government, and China also has a big diplomatic presence in Afghanistan. Both great powers of the region must advise Afghanistan against its current foreign policy approach which is marred with danger and undermines regional stability. The approach prevents South Asia from registering its connectivity potential and obstructs its economic integration through trade and energy corridors.

Mutual trust, not fear, should guide the Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relationship, which can only happen if Afghanistan comprehends the nature of its relationship with India. Not as a conduit to India to harm and destabilise Pakistan, but as an economic and strategic partner whose friendly relations with India are not at the cost of Pakistan. Otherwise, Afghanistan, caught between the two, will continue to remain a proxy battleground, which will only undermine its sovereignty and stability. It is not long before both China and Russia grasp India's ambitions and actions in Afghanistan as not a geopolitical favour but a geopolitical trap for Pakistan, one which affects the entire region by obstructing regional cooperation, economic integration and peace.

The Taliban regime would not harm Afghanistan if it stopped looking at and shaping their world in a particular vision of what is right. To strive and thrive, Afghanistan needs not just an ideological, but a strategic mindset driven by interests, calculations and pragmatism. Such a mindset would prefer peace with Pakistan, even if it is negative peace.