Another Doha agreement - prospects and pitfalls

Last week we cited that Afghanistan, and by default the IEA, was unable to justify their avowed and demonstrated hostility towards Pakistan, from a sociological (Pashtunwali, Riwaj), Islamic fraternity and/or good neighbourly stand points. That Afghanistan is in grave violation of the basic tenets of shegara (khegara) or doing good, and returning shegara with shegara for the massive humanitarian, economic, politico-military and diplomatic support (shegara) rendered by Islamabad during the last four decades. And that assistance in some form, even under IEA's overt hostility, continues.

The recent Pak-Afghan flare-up (effective October 9, 2025) now seems settled in Doha, if temporarily, through a Qatar-Türkiye brokered agreement on October 19. Key provisions of the Agreement reported (the text is not released) include: a) immediate and permanent ceasefire: b) end to cross-border terrorism; under this iteration, Mr Sohail Shaheen, the spokesperson for IEA, from his Doha Office, affirmed, in a tweet, Afghanistan's agreement that "support will not be provided to groups (mlatar - proxies) operating against the Government of Pakistan"; c) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; d) avoiding targeting security forces, civilians, or critical infrastructure; e) establishment of a permanent mechanism to verify ceasefire's implementation; and f) follow-up meetings to ensure agreement's sustainability. The next round is scheduled in Istanbul on October 25.

Pakistan's deployment of punishing leverages against Kabul, especially the symbolic strikes on Kabul and Qandahar was the needed strategic posturing, that should have been employed yesterday, not allowing the situation getting thus far. Afghanistan, under the IEA, unfortunately is not a normal state, as the governing cabal is unschooled in statecraft, diplomacy, governance and still struggles hard to transcend from religo-tribal warriors to rulers.

Afghanistan's Relevance: Policymakers and analysts have long considered Afghanistan indispensable to Pakistan's geo- strategic and economic interests. This needs a fresh look. Notwithstanding the need for brotherly and neighbourly bilateralism, and in a departure from archaic thinking, it is Afghanistan that needs Pakistan more than Islamabad does. Other faulty notions like considering Afghanistan as Islamabad's 'strategic depth' also needs to be buried for good. Its less patronising version in my characterisation, i.e. the accrual of 'strategic dividend' once IEA ascended to power, is also now, no more.

The notion of 'strategic dividend' in empowering IEA, being indispensable for Pakistan's security calculus to avoid a 'Two-Front' War, is now outdated and overtaken by events. Much that it should be avoided; Pakistan's experienced military can fight a '1.5 Front' War, that the nature of Indo-Afghan threat perception presents. Stable and resolute leadership, professional military, demonstrated performance and nuclear triad augment Pakistan's clout, relevance and influence. Although overconfidence, bluster, hyperbole can cause over-stretch and should be avoided.

In today's geostrategic calculus, Afghanistan only becomes relevant to Pakistan due to: a) common Pashtun ethnicity; b) inseparable geography; c) the need for humanitarian support for Afghanistan's struggling humanity; d) Afghan-based terrorism; and e) countering the hostile Indian influence. Afghanistan's proximity as a gateway to Central Asian riches is also challengeable given the actual trade potential of CARs through Kabul. Details are contained in my piece; "The myth of Central Asia's trade potential", published in this space on February 20, 2025.

The Situational Recap: From the lack of UN recognition to the Pashtunistan bogey to general hostility to claims of civilisational superiority and territorial claims, Kabul has remained at odds with the Raj's legacy state, Pakistan, except for some brief interlude under King Zahir Shah. Afghanistan's recent parleys with India, FM Muttaqi's statement on Kashmir while in India, and IEA's statement on recent stand-off with TLP, enunciating TLP protests as democratic right, etc undermine a stable bilateral framework. The last is captured in a Pashtu proverb, wherein a ghalbail (sieve or colander) accuses kooza (a water container with two holes) of having two holes, forgetting its own many.

No wonder the Agreement in Doha was sealed by Defence Ministers on both sides with FM Muttaqi taking the needed break from his Indian yatra. Some hard talk in Doha, reportedly, with Defence Minister Mulla Yaqub, the son of venerated Mulla Omar, the founder of TTA, was in order, to keep the bilateral record straight, visible and known, especially Pakistan's forgotten empathy.

The scorecard is sadly alarming. Afghanistan's IEA runs, tolerates or facilitates the operations of over 60 anti-Pakistan training camps in Kunar and greater Paktia, shielding and training TTP and BLA terrorists. BLA's fighters, in good numbers, enter Balochistan from Zabul, Wardak, Qandahar, Helmand, etc, besides a trickle from Loya Paktia. Infiltration from the cited provinces, other than Loya Paktia under Haqqnis, allude to the mentioned complicity of IEA in fostering anti-Pakistan terror. Noor Wali Mehsud, the TTP chief, reportedly receives $43,000 in monthly funding, in addition to sophisticated arms, ammunition and equipment, abandoned by America.

Afghan signature in recent 'TTP-blamed' attacks is also significantly higher, with more than 200 Afghan nationals killed including son of the deputy governor of Badghis Province, Mulla Ghulam Muhammad, early this year. And such tashkeel (teaming for terrorism) is not restricted to the Haqqani controlled Loya Paktia (Khowst, Paktia, Paktika, and parts of Nangarhar). Now Afghans from Qandahar, Zabul, Wardak and other provinces are also increasingly becoming part of the anti-Pakistan terrorism, reinforcing the perceptions of complicity by elements other than TTP. The thin veneer of plausible deniability by the IEA and its rhetorical blaming of Islamabad for ISKP-based violence against Kabul, have increasingly, no takers.

Piecing it Together: Pakistan's patience has understandably run out, as evident from the changed rules of engagement, wherein Pakistan announced hitting at terror networks inside Afghanistan, heretofore. And under the changed policy framework, Pakistan is gravitating, more profoundly, towards the idea of an inclusive, representative and pluralistic government in Kabul; supporting a peaceful Afghanistan without gender apartheid, terror-sponsorship, human rights violations, non-recognition and perpetual hostility. This, when combined with the prevalent sentiment among diplomatic corps in Islamabad and elsewhere, points towards a possible regime change, if IEA does not relent. The US approach, of treating IEA's Afghanistan with international exclusion, and as a pariah state, seems to be more entrenched vis-à-vis Russia and China, both of whom opt for limited, if careful engagement with Kabul.

Islamabad's change of heart has profound implications.

Continued…