Kabul-Delhi nexus

Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed serious concern over the visit of acting Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India. A statement issued on October 11 expressed "Pakistan's strong reservations on the elements of the India-Afghanistan Joint Statement, issued on 10 October 2025 in New Delhi; particularly the reference to Jammu and Kashmir as part of India is in clear violation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the legal status of Jammu and Kashmir. The Joint Statement is highly insensitive to the sacrifices and sentiments of the people of Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir in their just struggle for the right to self-determination." The statement also "strongly rejected the Afghan Acting Foreign Minister's assertion that terrorism is Pakistan's internal problem."

Indo-Afghan nexus is not a new phenomenon. But the week-long visit of Muttaqi to India led to the renewal of Indo-Afghan ties. Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the assumption of power by the Taliban in August 2021, New Delhi had ceased its relations with Kabul and closed its embassy there. But, later on it reviewed its decision and without recognising the Taliban regime decided to reopen its embassy and pledged to help the Taliban regime overcome its economic predicament. Interestingly, the fresh outbreak of armed conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan occurred when the Afghan foreign minister was in India.

How does the Indo-Afghan nexus pose a threat to Pakistan's national security interests and why does the Taliban regime want to get closer to New Delhi? How is the two-pronged security threat to Pakistan emanating from India and Afghanistan a moment of truth for Islamabad? India was never comfortable with Afghan Taliban – whether in their first regime from 1996-2001 or the current one that started from August 2021. But in 2023, New Delhi began to change its position, realising that this time the Taliban government is here to stay.

In a write-up in Al Jazeera on October 14, Yashraj Sharma wrote, "The Afghan foreign minister's week long trip, the first official visit by a Taliban leader, is being billed as ground breaking. India's reset with the Taliban, experts say, is part of a policy of pragmatism, as New Delhi aims to counter Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, whose relationship with Pakistan, India's arch foe, has been strained over cross-border attacks." Sharma further argued, "India's hosting of the Taliban leaders gives legitimacy and a de facto recognition to the Taliban administration, which has been struggling to boost its diplomatic legitimacy." After meeting Muttaqi, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said, "Closer cooperation between us contributes to national development as well as regional stability and resilience." In a joint statement issued after Muttaqi's visit to India, "New Delhi and the Taliban committed to maintaining close communication and continue regular engagement."

This paradigm shift in India's policy towards Taliban marks a significant development in the relations between the two countries. Muttaqi also met a delegation of Afghan Sikhs and Hindus and told them they were welcome to return to Afghanistan and restart their businesses. He also visited Darul Uloom Deoband. According to The Indian Express, "Muttaqi's visit to Deoband was therefore more than symbolic. For the Taliban, it was a bid to rebrand themselves as heirs to a respected scholarly tradition rather than as religious militants. For India, it offered a low-cost, high-impact diplomatic channel – an opening to engage Afghanistan through faith and education without formal recognition of the regime. It offers the 'four Ds' approach: Diplomacy, Development, Dialogue, and Deoband."

Muttaqi's visit paved the way for strengthening economic and trade ties with India and the resumption of air flights between Afghanistan and India. Muttaqi also invited Indian companies to invest in Afghanistan's mining sector and discussed prospects for sending Afghan students for their studies in India.

The basis of Indo-Afghan nexus needs to be analysed from three angles.

First, one can see a greater degree of harmony between ultra-Hindu nationalist BJP and ultra-right Islamist Afghan Taliban to cooperate despite their religious variations. The BJP government facilitating Muttaqi's visit to Deoband is a case in point. Ideological understanding between the Afghan Taliban and the Deoband school of thought will not go in Pakistan's favour. The Deoband card used by New Delhi to establish rapport with the Afghan Taliban has worked well.

Second, Pakistan got furious when Muttaqi endorsed New Delhi's sovereignty over IIOJK. Pakistan foreign office's prompt reaction in the context proves the growing level of schism in the Kabul-Islamabad ties. Furthermore, Muttaqi during his India visit called terrorism Pakistan's internal problem. On a number of occasions, Pakistan has accused the Taliban regime of letting its soil used by TTP to destabilise Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Muttaqi calling terrorism Pakistan's internal affair means that Kabul is denying its support to TTP. Pakistan has also accused Afghanistan of sponsoring BLA in conducting terrorist acts in Baluchistan.

Third, what the Afghan Taliban regime and the previous Afghan governments have done in Pakistan has also to do with Islamabad's flawed Afghan policy. Since the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in February 1989, power wielders in Islamabad began to support one Afghan Mujahideen group against another. Afghans have always alleged that Pakistan meddles in their internal affairs – something that has caused instability in their country.

However, the hard reality is that unless the Afghans put their own house in order and get united to deal with their critical issues, their country will never be at peace. Having strategic alignment with India in a bid to teach Pakistan a lesson will not go in favour of the Taliban regime. Pakistan has done a lot for Afghans in the last five decades and it is unbecoming of Kabul to seek to harm Pakistan by acting as a proxy of India. The Taliban government at the behest of India can also demand revocation of the Durand Line Agreement of 1893.