Shegara, ungratefulness and Afghanistan

The year is 2002 and the Afghan Militia Force (AMF) is being morphed into Afghan National Army (ANA) under the US/Western tutelage. Marshal Fahim, Defence Minister in the then Afghan Interim Administration (AIA), while arguing for the size of the force, considers Pakistan to be a greater threat and lobbies for a larger ANA. That hostile thinking, despite the Pakistan-assisted takeover of Kabul by the IEA forces in 2021, persists. Despite consistent friendly overtures, extreme patience and nudging by Pakistan towards helpful bilateralism, anti-Pakistan especially anti-ISI, anti-Army and anti-Punjab sentiment persists among Afghans across the board, including the rank and file of IEA, many of whom benefitted and continue to benefit from Pakistan's good offices, hospitality and interlocution on their behalf. Common citizenry is also hand-in-glove as gleaned from their derogatory and uncivil comments on social media. The Afghan media-houses in and outside Afghanistan are further inflaming this sentiment. The core frustration is to blame Pakistan et al for all of Afghanistan's troubles, past, present and likely in the future.

It is a sad situation, considering Pakistan has shielded and hosted around five million Afghan refugees (ARs) since former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan around 1979, despite Islamabad not being a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees. Afghan men, women and children were afforded dignity; and provided security, education, healthcare and employment - the four basics not available even in today's Afghanistan under IEA. Pakistan, its 'infamous' ISI and its 'Punjabi' establishment not only orchestrated the withdrawal of foreign troops twice from Afghan soil, they also helped the present rulers ascend to power. Pakistan remained instrumental in sustaining IEA's so-called jihad by providing them political, diplomatic, economic, military and advisory support. Pakistan allowed them safe havens in its border belt. Islamabad investing heavily in its Afghan enterprise, got flak for 'playing double game' and being in cahoots with TTA. Every government in Kabul, including the present one, was facilitated by Islamabad, persuading the factionalised and bickering Afghans.

Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan still budget Afghanistan's wheat requirements and almost all groceries and eatables are exported, smuggled and otherwise tacitly allowed by Pakistan to feed the struggling Afghan humanity. Unlike Iran, and despite more serious and unfriendly acts from the IEA - like continued hosting of TTP, clandestine and now open overtures with India, and overt animosity of ranking leadership - Pakistan did not push ARs inside the Afghan border. Repatriation follows forewarning, is dignified and peaceful. And even now Afghans in destitution are allowed into Pakistan. Universities and hospitals in K-P and Balochistan still take care of Afghan needs. Afghan music, culture and cricket remained preserved and thrived in Pakistan. The list is long.

In Pashto folklore this is shegara (khegara) - doing good. And that, under Pashtunwali and Afghan traditions, has to be remembered in eternity, and repaid and responded with shegara. Pakistan's actions were also, in addition to valid geostrategic reasons, 'mainly' based upon good neighbourliness and Islamic hamiyyat (fraternity), the religious tradition that the IEA championed in case of OBL and continues to cite for TTP.

However, what Pakistan and its people got in return…terrorism, denials, lack of empathy and outright hate. The Afghan soil is still brazenly used by terrorist groups like TTP, al-Qaeda, ISKP and others, despite IEA's commitment under Doha Agreement not to let this happen. This year up to October, Pakistan suffered 585 Afghan-backed attacks, compared to 521 in 2024, 306 in 2023 and 262 in 2022, the year after the IEA took power. More recently, during the October 11/12 and 14/15 nights, the IEA forces duly supported by TTP and other militants launched unprovoked attacks on multiple points along international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in K-P and Balochistan. Whereas the attacks were mainly limited to fire raids, at some places ground incursions were also attempted. Pakistan retaliated with ferocity, not only inflicting heavy losses but also 'improving defensive posture' in some areas. Afghan attacks were 'ostensibly' in retaliation to drone/airstrikes in Khowst and Kabul on October 9, the latter targeting TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud.

The brief ceasefire facilitated by Saudi Arabia and Qatar remains violated. It is a strange turn of events for Pakistan, dealing with a regime unschooled in diplomacy, governance and even basic Islamic principles of social and political relations. Afghanistan, in that sense, is not a normal state, and the dominant view in most of the Western capitals is that it is a 'lost cause' begetting action by the civilised world, due to Kabul's gender apartheid, terrorism sponsorship, human rights and lack of commitment to agreements. A recent UN report validates Afghan-based TTP terrorism against Pakistan.

For critics of Pakistan's Afghan policy, it is important to know that conversely IEA's Afghanistan has no Pakistan policy other than an innate desire to let Pakistan go down the drain, even if that means bonhomie with a Hindu India. Now, there are certain policy considerations.

First, Pakistan must stay the course and notch up the heat as needed without bravado and bluster. The policy announcement by Pakistan on October 11, that further terrorist attacks emanating from Afghan soil will evoke prompt and direct strikes on terrorist positions 'inside Afghanistan' should have come yesterday. It is a major and timely shift in the rules of engagement that will augment deterrence and help 'some within IEA', that is increasingly unable (and unwilling) to take on TTP. Serious Afghan deliberations are needed on TTP's 'mlatar' (proxy) status.

Second, the assertion from Afghan side that TTP is Pakistan's problem has no logical footing, and they know it. Everyone knows where TTP leadership is ensconced, who funds and arms them and how they operate. Hence Article 51 of the UN Charter empowers Pakistan to take appropriate actions in self-defence against an internationally unrecognised regime with limited domestic acceptability. And that, coupled with cited loss of patience by international community, also means regime change, as the indicators suggest. The die for change seems to have been cast.

The likely options are resurrection of the Northern Alliance; implosion from within; or the 'daisy cutters' and MOABs raining down and paramilitaries landing in the North again. Sadly, under the last option, IEA this time around will have no place to run to, except perhaps India, having spoiled their Pakistani dua kor (second home)! …

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