On the USIP-JI report, and notions of ‘strategic depth’

Without Pakhtuns of Afghanistan, included in post-American Afghan political set-up, there will be no peace.


Shahzad Chaudhry September 18, 2011

I am rather struck by the attention that the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)-Jinnah Institute (JI) report titled, “Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite”, seems to have garnered. My previous paper, the Daily Times, and indeed that of Ejaz Haider, seems to have carried an intense debate on the intent, content and scent of it all, invoking “strategic depth”, “anti-Pakhtun sentiment” and, of course, crass “incapacity” to take on the murky avenues of defining a way out of the Afghan muddle. I must admit, I was one of the ten Establishment moles allegedly set into the melee to power our way through the combined intellect of the remaining forty-five loaders; and sure enough, it seems, we got our way by the looks of it, at least as the commentariat elite infers. I have always held that our civilian quarter must raise their game to contain the dominating presence of the Establishment; to look for legal and constitutional crutches, without looking the part, will not sustain. (Jest, in case you didn’t get it.)

This goes to prove extremism isn’t always a religious proclivity. In this bedevilling environment of extremes, gaming the middle is unacceptable; it must be ‘my way’ or the ‘highway’; ‘with us’ or ‘against us’; ‘us’ versus ‘them’. We stereotype with impunity and shun one away simply by how he looks. We have shut ourselves down to an unfamiliar thought — so insecure we remain as people and society. I always kept a hope alive that when we ever set our eyes on education, we may just turn the corner by educating one generation to the next. My hopes seem dashed. The literate are no different. This is sick. From dysfunctional, we are now a sick country and a sick society. I do not need to qualify this sickness. We live it every day on the streets of Karachi.

Back to the USIP-JI report. There is, however, a serious commission of a glaring error in it, and that appears in the title: the use of the word ‘elite’ in explaining the participants interested in geo-political and security issues as either an academic or professional interest was rather overstretched. Imagine, there are 180 million more, who, too, may have an opinion; and, then who decides who is elite among those? The backlash, thus, is quite natural. A little prevention may have obviated the need for a cure, with a persistent danger that in a perpetually sick society there may never be a cure.

I do wish to comment on the notion of ‘strategic depth’ and other affiliates. What gives relevance to greater concern among the critics of this report is the presence of ‘ten moles’ and thus, by implication, how ‘strategic depth’ may have made an appearance in meaning, if not by literal mention. Of the ten moles, the few that appeared in the discussions in my presence derided the very concept. It may have something to do with its author of yore, and the nature of their professional association, but some of these people have been severe critics of any sense of strategic depth. A couple of those have widely held that an Afghanistan, fully dominated by India, is of little concern, since its geographic and logistical contiguity with Pakistan itself generates an intertwining dynamic, difficult to shake away by the fiercest inimicus. It is widely recognised, even within the present-day ‘Establishment’, that Pakistan has its “plate full”, possibly for years to come, in cleaning out the mess that has spilled over from Afghanistan or found root within, without spare capacity to, in addition, worry about Afghanistan. What the interlocutors of these deliberations mention as the way forward is how ‘they’ think the region may muddle its way through with least pain, not essentially how things might actually shape-up. Of those, ‘strategic depth’ is a dead notion, beyond the capacity of today’s Pakistan.

Of the implied synonymity of Pakhtuns with the Taliban, unfortunately, the sensibilities are easily ruffled. For one, the Pakhtuns this side of the border find it difficult to differentiate from those across — whether herein lies the genesis of an uncertified Durand Line, is anyone’s guess. Two, the original Taliban movement took its root from within the Kandahari Pakhtuns, unless we wish to germinate it in the precincts of Haqqania in Akora Khattak. Three, the Taliban as a force answered the manifest void in the post-Communist Afghanistan. And fourth, the Taliban continue to challenge foreign presence, facilitated by the non-Pakhtun Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Each is a patently an Afghan-centred effort, pursued by the Afghan Taliban who remain predominantly Afghan Pakhtuns. The Pakistani genre of the Taliban, too, are rooted in the tribal regions with, one might add, profuse support of non-Pakhtun Pakistanis. Getting the context right may just help soothe frayed emotions. Without the Pakhtuns of Afghanistan, included in the post-American Afghan political set-up, there shall be no peace in Afghanistan, and selfishly, without peace in Afghanistan, there cannot be peace in Pakistan.

It is easy to deride someone’s work, but we must graduate in our debate from symbols to issues. A society on edge is a bad omen for serious debate but, with right minds willing to meet in the centre, ways open up. Let the literate hold the torch of reason and wean us away from a literal strategic depth.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 19th,  2011.

COMMENTS (18)

R S JOHAR | 12 years ago | Reply The fact of the matter is that Pakistan rather than focusing on its internal problems namely terrorism including sectarian, economy, education, health, flood relief, roads etc is unduly wasting its precious and limited resources which is totally dependent on foreign aid, on military infrastructure matching India, strategic depth in Afghanistan and Kashmir. India is unlikely to send its army into Afghanistan and may have to wind up its development programmes if Taleban comes back to power or civil war breaks out after withdrawl of US and NATO forces as either of the two are the distinct possibilities. Therefore, in both scenarios India might not be able to play any significant role in Afghanistan.
rohool | 12 years ago | Reply

Why we are hiding the truth, to look at the situation of Pakistan bake to the time, when Russia attacked Afghanistan, the Pakistani government was one of the biggest player in that game why? Because, there were benefits for the Pakistani government on that time. And why now Pakistan stand at the front of US war and killing their own people is all about this that they are in benefit. They are getting million and million in the game has been started. Pakistan will come in trap one day, If they keep these games. So, please Pakistan stop these games and change the situation to a peaceful and prosperous one.

Thanks,

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