Will a US settlement with Iran bring peace to extended ME?

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There may be some clearing of the air by the time this article appears in print. The air would clear if the ongoing negotiations hosted by Oman lead to some understanding between Iran on the one hand and the United States and Israel on the other. This would settle down the region I have been calling the extended Middle East by including in it Afghanistan, Pakistan and the countries of Central Asia. As discussed below, an understanding between the contesting parties would bring much-needed peace to the area and have the policymakers concentrate their attention on improving the lives of their large citizenry.

In an article titled "A Tough but Sensible Way to Solve the Iran Problem', Bret Stephens, a columnist who writes for The New York Times, quoted from the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, according to which Iran had enriched uranium to 60 per cent purity and might be able to enrich enough uranium to make five fission weapons in less than two weeks.

Stephens argued that the real problem with Iran is not that it would go nuclear, but its geopolitical ambitions and raging anti-Americanism, as well as its long record of supporting terrorism. He argues that there are two paths to dealing with the Iran situation. One is to go back to the sanctions-for-nukes deal that was the basis of the agreement reached by the Barack Obama administration in 2015 of which Trump pulled out when he first took office. The other is normalisation of relations with Iran by the United States.

Normalisation means the resumption of full diplomatic ties between Tehran and Washington, including the reopening of embassies that have been shuttered for decades; the end of all US economic sanctions, including secondary sanctions imposed on foreign companies for doing business with Iran; direct bilateral trade and investment; thousands of student visas for Iranians wising to study in the United States; and the offer of arms sales to Iran, at least of a conventional kind.

In return, Iran would begin to behave like a normal country. Stephens defines what normality would mean for Iran. "A normal country doesn't finance and arm terrorist groups that start regional wars and disrupt global commerce, like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. A normal country with the world's third largest oil reserves but an otherwise collapsing economy, doesn't need to spend billions of dollars to enrich uranium.

A normal country doesn't call for the elimination of other countries, even hostile ones. A normal country doesn't take foreign nationals as hostage, a routine part of its diplomacy. A normal country doesn't seek to assassinate former U.S. government officials or dissident exiles. A normal country doesn't hang gay people.

A normal country doesn't gang rape women in prison to enforce a so-called modesty code. If Iran wants to solve its pressing economic and strategic problems — a catering currency, energy shortages, widespread popular opposition and the decimation of its regional allies — all it has to do is to change its behavior." It has to become a normal country.

During his second term that began on January 20, 2025, President Donald Trump began to work on reaching some sort of understanding with the Islamic cleric regime in Tehran to limit Iran's nuclear ambitions.

According to an assessment by The New York Times correspondents Susannah George and Nilo Tarrisy that appeared in the issue of April 26, 2025 under the caption, "Elite in Iran grow supportive of nuclear talks amid rising economic unease", hardline media wrote in favour of the talks that were led on the United States by its emissary Steve Witkoff. "There is certainly a sense that ground has shifted," said Gregory Brew, an analyst at Eurasia Group. "There is consensus among the elite, that negotiations with the United States to secure sanctions relief should be a priority."

Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, was not enthusiastic about the terms of the 2025 agreement but following successful Israeli military operations against his country and its regional allies, support for engagement with the United States began to grow, particularly among senior military leadership. But the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah's Hasan Nasrallah split the military leadership into two competing groups: one favouring accommodation, the other remaining hostile.

At the time of this writing detailed discussions were taking place in Oman. There is no doubt that after facing years of crippling economic sanctions and the growing military pressure from Israel and the United States, Iranian negotiators were being pressed to accept difficult concessions.

Iranian pronouncements are markedly different from those that were made by Tehran in the days leading up to the 2015 agreement. Then, Khamenei was in conflict with President Hasan Rouhani and labeled the agreement that was being worked upon with the United States and other participants as disastrous for Iran.

The change in Tehran's position began with the election in 2024 of Masoud Pezeshkian as president. He was looked upon as a reformist, prepared to work for slackening the Islamic rule and also working with the West, in particular with the United States. Those working on Iran issues in think-tanks across the globe saw the change in thinking.

According to Kusha Sefat, an associated professor of sociology at the University of Tehran, the divide in thinking was between those who were leaning towards regional escalation, even war, and those who advocated for normalisation of relations between Tehran and Washington. "What is particularly significant is that the supreme leader Khamanei has taken up a mediating role between these two opposing poles." There were other commentators who saw significant changes in the way they looked at Iran's situation. Mostafa Najafi, a Middle East analyst based in Iran, said, "President Pezeshkian and some other influential political figures were able to create political persuasion for negotiations."

Behind the scenes Khamanei and Pezeshkian were working in close collaboration. The president sought to delay retaliation against Israel for the latter's killing of senior leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah. But there were influential voices that were opposed to the ongoing talks in Oman.

Hamid Rasaei, a member of parliament close to senior hardliners, railed against the Oman talks. The supreme leader allowed talks "merely to show the extent of irrationality and perjury of the U.S. officials", he said. Even as negotiations continue, Rasaei warned, "The sanctions are going to get harsher, the problems are going to get worse."