The trajectory of terrorist violence in Pakistan since the establishment of the Islamic Emirate Afghanistan in August 2021 is clear. So is the toll it has taken on the civilians and the security forces. The country witnessed a 38 per cent spike in TTP-mounted violence in 2022, followed by a rise of 118 per cent in 2023. The year 2024 saw a huge 192 per cent increase in the terrorists acts.
Pakistan's aerial strikes at TTP camps reflected frustration as well as angry reaction by the state over staggering human losses that crossed 2,500 during 2024.
The Afghan Taliban, on the other hand, continue to shirk their responsibility by declaring the terror rampage as "Pakistan's internal matter." They insist that the violence is happening on the Pakistani soil, and they are not to blame if the Pakistani authorities are unable to control it.
Taliban Information Minister Khairullah Khairkhwa had the following to address the Pakistani concerns.
"We must honor the Afghan nation's commitment to safeguarding these guests, friends (an apparent reference to the TTP fighters)," Khairkhwa said in a speech aired by state television and shared via X social media platform.
He also urged Pakistan "to draw lessons from the consequences of military interventions" in Afghanistan by Britain, the former Soviet Union and the United States since the 19th century.
Following Afghanistan's counterattacks into the Pakistani Waziristan territory, Taliban Defence Ministry Spokesman Enayatullah Khowarazmi referred to "several points beyond the hypothetical line serving as centres and hideouts for malicious elements and their supporters who organised and coordinated attacks in Afghanistan".
It was an obvious reference to what the Afghan foreign ministry had earlier been alleging to actually deflect from Pakistan's demands for action against TTP. They allege Daesh/ISKP terror camps on the Pakistani soil are responsible for six of the seven Daesh attacks in Afghanistan in 2024.
What options does Pakistan then have if Kabul, the host of TTP and other shades of militants: dismisses the gravity of situation for Pakistan ("your internal matter"); ignores the consequences for Pakistan of the Afghan hospitality to TTP leaders ("our internal matter"); continues to use the border issue as a weapon for stoking anti-Pakistan sentiment; projects a perpetual state of victimhood; acts out of a bloated sense of entitlement; blunts by pointing to relocation of TTP and other militants away from borders; and states fear of TTP fighters switching sides to ISKP if confronted with hard power.
Ostensibly this positioning amounts to a tough menu for a possible turning the clock back, but nothing is impossible as long as two states have the will to talk out contentious issues.
Pakistani leaders, firstly, need to step back from a patronising and sympathetic attitude towards Afghanistan. States rely and resolve based on hard facts, not emotions. And hence, Islamabad needs to confront Kabul with hard data on human losses as well as the international status of the 2,560 km border with Afghanistan. No formal conversation should be allowed on the border issue at all.
Secondly, trade should not be disrupted, as a leverage; and agricultural products in particular must stay exempted from seasonal taxes as well reactive punitive measures. Closure of border on Afghan exports hurts tens of thousands of workers in an economy already under tremendous stress. Punitive measures have already diverted the bulk of Afghan transit trade to Iran and Uzbekistan, a longer but safer route.
Thirdly, the TTP relocation mantra (away from border regions to Ghazni, Uruzgan) may be a temporarily acceptable move but hardly promises a real answer to Pakistan's terror-induced woes.
Relocation indeed is extremely problematic. Taliban assuaged Chinese concerns by relocating Islamic Turkestan Party (ITP/ETIM) within Afghanistan. They urged Pakistan to do the same and also fund the TTP members/families relocation.
But how will the relocation of "state guests" minimise terror threats to Pakistan? Will the militants be totally disarmed and made incommunicado? Will they have no access to telecommunication including satellite phone facilities? How will the Emirate keep their guests from planning subversion in Pakistan and other neighbouring countries? All it takes is a mobile or satellite phone to organise and coordinate an attack anywhere in the world.
Fourth, Pakistan shall have to shun hypocritical policy conduct to be able to talk tough on the terrorism and extremism front. As long as its self-centred leaders keep pandering to religio-political parties – which possess a manipulative nuisance value – there will be little hope for an effective counter-terror campaign.
The recent controversy around the Madrassas Act amply exposed the hypocrisy of power-holders; for their narrow-ended objectives, such as the 26th Amendment, the stakeholders are ready even to sacrifice the long-term national interests.
Bottomline: There is no way around a regional hard talk on terror groups and the border issue. Neither is the TTP/ITP/ISKP/IMU terror an indigenous phenomenon. China, Russia, Iran and India shall have to be part of such a conversation. However, if China is the primary target of the proxy terror campaign, then the TTP and others will remain intransigent with their unacceptable demands. A regional coalition may nevertheless work to soften Kabul into quiet but mutually beneficial and agreeable steps against terrorist franchises that they consider guests and mujahideen.
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