CBMs and Nuclear CBMs in South Asia

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Nuclear CBMs (NCBMs) play a significant role in managing and preventing, if not resolving, longstanding issues between the South Asian rivals. Crises between the rivals may bring both danger of escalation and opportunities for the contending parties to reflect on how to manage, prevent and resolve the crises mutually. A Harvard University Professor Alastair Iain Johnston codified the Chinese ways of managing the crisis through which one may learn the crisis management techniques and strategies. This may include 1) communicate with the adversary clearly and constantly, and be specific about what is being demanded, 2) articulate limited goals and be prepared to drop unlimited ones, 3) maintain military flexibility and respond symmetrically in your options, 4) don’t excessively pressure the other side, and don’t take the use of force lightly, 5) avoid excessively ideological positions; 6) don’t threaten the other side’s basic values, and don’t moralise conflicts of interest, 7) exercise self-restraint, including in response to provocative actions by the other side, 8) do not issue ultimatums while ensuring that the adversary can back down in a face-saving manner, 9) divide large issues into smaller, manageable parts, and 10) anticipate unintended consequences of particular moves.

There are a number of CBMs and NCBMS between Pakistan and India, but each of these CBMs confronted setbacks in the event of serious crises such as the Kargil crisis (1999), the Twin Peaks crisis (2001-02), the Mumbai crisis (2008), the Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota attacks (2016), and more recently the Balakot incident (2019) where both India and Pakistan showed strategic restraint to avoid major conflict. Some of the proposed CBMs are either violated or declined by India. That said, mutual suspicion, a shared troubled history, acute security dilemma between the rivals, hostility, territorial disputes and cross-border terrorism between the South Asian rivals are some of the common reasons for undermining CBMs/NCBMs in South Asia.

Despite all this, the Direct Line of Communication (DLC)/ hotline between the responsible civilian and military leadership may play a significant role in both managing and preventing crises in South Asia. Although there still appears to be weakness in the DLC between the two rivals for a couple of reasons. One, most of the time the hotline remains little and limited at the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) level that needs to be expanded to other top civilian and military management levels. Two, the hotline sometimes remains missing between the two rivals, thus creating mistrust and risk of miscalculation. For example, the recent so-called misfiring of India’s Brahmos missile in the Pakistani territory was not communicated timely. This in the event of a crisis could trigger a risk of escalation to a dangerous level. Moreover, at the bilateral level, the South Asian rivals exchange the list of their nuclear installations and facilities every year on January the first as part of mutual understanding that they would not target each other’s nuclear installations and facilities. The nuclear moratorium may play some role in managing and preventing the arms race crisis in South Asia. However, if India opts for more nuclear tests, Pakistan could follow suit. It is reported that India might go for more nuclear weapon tests since it has been preparing grounds for testing the H-Bomb.

Two aspects are important to mention. First, the third-party role, in the South Asian case the longstanding US managerial role, has been significant in managing and preventing crises between the South Asian nuclear rivals. It is often argued that India for a variety of reasons may not be interested in the third-party role in South Asia. Many argue that India may desire to preempt Pakistan even before the third-party intervention reflecting India’s military aggression linked up with the dangers of escalation. Second, because of the logic of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), nuclear weapons have played their own part in discouraging the rivals, thereby inculcating strategic restraint for escalating the crisis to a dangerous level. This reflects the continuing deterring role and the relevance of nuclear weapons for preventing both major and limited wars in South Asia. Arguably, maintaining safe, secure and reliable nuclear forces as part of “shared responsibility” do play an important role by managing and preventing crises in the background of all nuclear politics.

Although crisis management techniques and strategies are rudimentary steps towards managing and preventing crises, there is eventually the need for resolving the conflict as part of longstanding measures for the proposed CBMs/NCBMs. For this to happen, there is a need for a graduated strategy, which may involve the following: a) improvement and expansion of the credibility of the existing CBMs, b) institutionalisation of CBMs/NCBMs, c) turning some of the CBMs into legal binding if mutually agreed upon by the rivals, d) establishing the proposed longstanding strategic restraint regime in South Asia, e) consistent mechanism for communication and dialogue at the important and responsible level between India and Pakistan, f) restraint for not carrying out more nuclear weapons tests, g) restraint for not undertaking limited war or limited preemptive strikes against each other, and h) demonstration of normative posture when it comes to global arms control and non-proliferation (both vertically and horizontally) if not nuclear disarmament.

Published in The Express Tribune, February 15^th, 2024.

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