There are some consistent themes that this scribe has been emphasising in dealings with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and their forced protégé, the TTP. After a quick reiteration, we would discuss the prevalent situation.
First, complex issues like the present Pakistan-TTP impasse cannot be resolved through quick fixes, officials vying for medals and decision-makers competing for legacy. Such complicated crises have their own life and multiple entangling linkages. And these get resolved when the time is right, and the stakeholders are more pragmatic. We saw the disastrous consequences of Kabul Dialogue with TTP last year. Second, the negotiating team should have capable and savvy government and agencies’ interlocutors, with a pulse on the Afghan/Pashtun psyche, and ability to speak in idioms and proverbs. Pashto language proficiency alone is not enough. Afghan/Pashtun is a shrewd negotiator. Third, the consistency and continuation of this (negotiating) team at functional level is important, as the policymaking level changes with changes in the government. Policy consistency is critical.
Fourth, the ownership of the process should squarely rest with the political/civilian leadership, with LEAs and others like academics, media-persons and experts providing the needed input on required basis. Fifth, the Jirga strategy has pitfalls, as Government itself is the arbitration authority, and not an equal party to the conflict on a par with the militant/terrorist groups. This age-old truism is well ingrained in the tribal psyche. Sixth, the other side, aka TTP, should sue for peace under Pashtunwali’s nanawatee injunctions, and only then the state’s magnanimity and raham (mercy) be invoked, once the conditions are right. Seventh, the beseeching TTP cadre be categorised into Black, White and Grey to be treated differently by the state under riwaj (tradition), tribal codes, laws, and sharia…as applicable. There is nothing like blanket amnesty, as some crimes are too raw and unpardonable till vindicated and punished. The state must retain deterrence at all costs. Eighth, those with ‘Black’ legacy and baggage are eliminated and/or deported and ex-communicated locally.
Ninth, the force of riwaj and lar (way-fare) is stronger and enduring than the injunctions of sharia…and the IEA knows it. Tenth, the dialogue (if and when) is conducted at the correct level with militants represented by their top-most leadership, and state sending in ranking officials.
It was heartening to see the Government of Pakistan (GoP) finally optimising its strengths in dealing with the TTP brigands and approaching the problem head-on and at the correct level.
There are certain constants at work vis-à-vis IEA (repeatedly mentioned) that should also be understood. First, IEA would like to rid itself of this legacy issue as; a) TTP mars IEA relations with its only interlocutor, Pakistan; b) it hinders IEA from extending its writ over the entire Afghan territory, given the TTP enclave in eastern Afghanistan; c) the TTP force-in-being strengthens its host, the Khostwal Haqqanis’ present weightage, and hand in potential internecine intra-Afghan fighting ‘if and when’ (the West reportedly is actively encouraging splits and factionalism inside the IEA); d) Afghan logistics cannot traditionally host large expat groups on its soil especially if these are armed. The reported TTP combat strength is estimated at around 12,000, and up to 30,000 with families included.
Above considered, GoP need to know that despite the brother-in-arms jihadi fraternity between the TTP and IEA, the above realities compel IEA to take a more pragmatic view of the environment. Hence the emphasis on dialogue facilitated by Sirajuddin Haqqani, apparently looking for a win-win outcome for IEA, TTP and Pakistan in that priority. However, it did not work due to TTP’s over-ask, and the IEA’s (read Haqqanis’) ambivalence. Second, IEA would be amenable to pressure from Pakistan, applied consistently with unison from all stakeholders, under the international approval and our military-diplomatic norms. Straight talk with coherence and resolve sinks in. That was the message conveyed to the IEA after the change in the military leadership in Pakistan, when Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, DG ISI Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum and other officials including foreign secretary and the special envoy on Afghanistan, Ambassador Sadiq visited Kabul on 22nd February this year.
It was right to separately take the issue to Moulvi Haibatullah Akhundzada first, the spiritual leader of IEA and TTP, to muster his support against TTP’s anti-Pakistan violence. It was also appropriate for the Defence Minister to head the delegation. He was rightly a critic of Gen Bajwa and Lt Gen Faiz Hameed’s flawed policy in the past to bring back TTP in group, unarmed and in Swat etc first, without enough spade work. IEA authorities were presented with irrefutable evidence of TTP’s presence on Afghan soil with ‘precise location of its leadership’. IEA, during the February meeting, outlined its future strategy and actions undertaken against certain TTP groups. The salient aspects of the IEA strategy, reportedly, is to disarm the terrorist outfit, relocate them away from the border and ‘ostensibly’ disperse them. Pakistan was requested to bear the cost of this plan, like similar offer IEA made to China for East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
This is a workable and pragmatic plan. The cost of relocating around 30,000 TTP rank and file vis-à-vis a few hundred ETIM cadre seems a major impediment. However, if the Plan in first phase, just covers the ‘Black and active’ TTP cadre, the cost could be managed. Secondly, the cost could also be adjusted in tariffs and barters. The second issue is verifiability of the proposal once in effect. Mechanisms could be evolved for the purpose, like electronic tagging and reporting at police stations etc. And if the IEA is just trying to deflect the pressure over TTP-led spike in attacks inside Pakistan, we would know it. Ostensibly, the pragmatists in the IEA are keen to redeem the situation by taking tangible steps, hence this plan.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, IBOs in coordination with IEA, selective cross-border hot pursuit and strikes without making silly noises are other options on the table, besides continuation of relentless elimination of TTP cadre inside Pakistan.
IEA-led peace parleys miserably failed and under the spirit of Pashto adage par me ka, no mer me ka (convince me and win the argument, then kill me)…Pakistan enjoys the moral authority against an enemy whose anti-humanity mask is off.
A pragmatic IEA knows the Pakistani leverages. It is time to unleash them with political clarity and resolve.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 9th, 2023.
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