Does Taliban survival depend on US recognition?

During an interaction with the civil society in Islamabad, the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, Amir Muttaqi, raised the question: what will it take for the Taliban to gain recognition from the US and its allies? The question came in response to the Troika Plus meeting in the federal capital on November 11 attended by Russian, Chinese, Pakistani, and American Special Representatives to Afghanistan. Muttaqi quipped with regard to women’s rights and inclusivity, saying, “If by inclusivity, you mean induction of opposition in the government, show us an example. We have not asked President Biden to include Trump in his cabinet.” He pointed out that there are dictatorships, kingdoms, and undemocratic governments in many countries, which the US and the international community recognise.

“Can the US tell us which one of those systems would they like us to adopt so our government becomes acceptable to them?” Muttaqi said. He claimed that most Afghan women are back to work, and no woman has been removed from her job. Over 75% of girls have returned to schools in most provinces. Nearly half a million government employees are being paid their salaries and no employees have been fired based on political views. He also said nearly 3,000 clinics and hospitals were still operational.

Muttaqi made some emphatic statements even though his regime faces a slew of allegations on the very issues. Unless there is verifiable evidence to support his claims, the international community may not lend credence to them at all. Let’s see what factors are hindering Taliban’s recognition by the world community.

Firstly, Taliban are in a catch-22 situation. The US-led West is demanding a rule of law and fundamental rights for all Afghans. But at the same time, the US denies Kabul access to nearly $9 billion of state funds in American banks. By implication, the country is unable to conduct any commercial and financial transaction. Consequently, the banking channels are almost completely paralysed. There are no letters of credit for import or export. Banks are beset with liquidity crunch, both Afghanis and dollars. Businessmen can only withdraw $25,000 in a month. Even if the US or the UN have not declared any sanctions per se, the freeze on Afghan funds has practically closed all international banking possibilities on Afghanistan and choked its internal banking. This situation may not change for some time, which will mean that the EU will also remain unable to channel the one billion euros worth of humanitarian aid. The ICRC and other UN organisations have extended aid to the needy in Afghanistan. However, the cash for that is being smuggled out of Pakistan which can explain the sharp rise in demand for dollars.

Secondly, a weak Biden administration and mid-term elections next November — coupled with a general sense of outrage over failure in Afghanistan — make it almost improbable for Washington to recognise the Taliban regime. Until the US recognises the Taliban regime or unless it finds a modus operandi for other nations, including the EU, to channel funds legally into Afghanistan, the regime in Kabul will remain hamstrung for want of financial resources. According to UN agencies, Afghanistan faces the threat of an acute humanitarian crisis in the coming days. Therefore, there is an urgent need to find alternative channels to get the funds to Afghanistan. It is not illegitimate to place demands on a conservative and rigid party like the Taliban, but these demands do amount to a tall order for a regime that is struggling to deal with the shallowness of a system that came down crumbling once key stakeholders fled the country.

It is absurd of the world community to expect Taliban to fulfil commitments on human rights when the regime is unable to pay public servants, and feed and treat citizens well. Or is the Taliban regime being set up to fail? Many wonder about the context of registration in the US of the Afghan National Resistance Front, and the opposition republic movement led by former foreign minister Hanif Atmar in Tajikistan.

International humanitarian support cannot sustain half a million public servants. Neither can Afghan banks transact internationally if the US remains reticent in the freeze on Afghanistan’s funds. Iran had oil readily available and hence could gradually circumvent US/UN sanctions. But what does Afghanistan offer for barter trade other than fruits, vegetables, carpets, and leather products?

Thirdly, disunity within Taliban ranks on the issue of girls’ education and work opportunities for females is another precipitous factor. The divisions between the Haqqanis and the Kandahari Taliban — led by the acting prime minister Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund — are gradually becoming more pronounced now.

Fourth, appeals for and provision of humanitarian assistance by the US are hollow formalities because they will not help in providing the over 350,000 teachers and health workers whose monthly expenses (salaries alone) are over $40 million. How can humanitarian assistance offset this urgent requirement?

Fifth, the US position on recognition and the withheld funds are also preventing the EU countries to walk the pledge of over a billion-euro humanitarian assistance package. There is no legal way to process the aid in the absence of banking channels. This has exposed Pakistan to additional financial strains, as the INGOs such as UN and ICRS appear to be relying on smuggling the dollars out of Pakistan.

Doesn’t the US position on Afghanistan amount to punishing the hostages instead of kidnappers? Instead of calling Ashraf Ghani and others to account, Washington — hamstrung by domestic political compulsions including the mid-term elections in one — is holding back on recognition and the funding issue. Is this setting up the Taliban regime to fail?

The Taliban will need to be much more restrained when dealing with former government officials, particularly the National Directorate of Security, police, and military intelligence. They will have to create as much facilitation for people at large as possible. They should do what they can to appear as a normal state that cares for global concerns about fundamental human rights in Afghanistan and then lead the rest for outsiders to decide.

The Troika Plus meeting of November 11 in Islamabad, meanwhile, called on the Taliban delegation, led by Muttaqi, to take steps to form an inclusive and representative government in Afghanistan.

Nothing different was heard from what we have been hearing since August 15 after the Taliban takeover of Kabul. A cursory view of the statement betrays a few interesting but intriguing as well as contradictory points. The meeting, for instance, recalled relevant Afghan-related UNSC resolutions, including respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Afghanistan that is free of terrorism and drug-related crimes, which contributes to regional stability and connectivity. Troika Plus representatives also called on the Taliban to protect the rights of all Afghans and provide equal opportunities to women, and for girls to participate in all aspects of Afghan society.

The participants expressed deep concern over the severe humanitarian and economic situation in Afghanistan and reiterated unwavering support for the people of Afghanistan. At the same time, the participants called on the Taliban to ensure unhindered humanitarian access, including by female aid workers, for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan to respond to the developing crisis. However, we also need to consider what is triggering the humanitarian crisis.

Everybody will anxiously wait for an answer even as millions of Afghans experience hindrance on daily basis.