How the 1971 crisis was mismanaged?

For the successful management of a national crisis there were six major requirements

The writer is Meritorious Professor of International Relations and former Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Karachi. He can be reached at [e-mail]

A leadership with strong nerves, capability and courage is required to face and manage a grave crisis. Unfortunately, all three qualities which were required to cope with the East Pakistan crisis were not present in the Pakistani leadership in 1971. 

While there was a degree of optimism following the general elections of December 1970, the tone and attitude of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the majority party (the Awami League), became inflexible after the election win. On January 3, 1971, while addressing a massive public meeting at the Race Course ground in Dhaka, he bluntly said: “None would be able to stop us framing a Constitution on the basis of the Six-Point programme.” He also took an oath from the newly elected national and provincial assembly members of his party to remain loyal to the Awami League’s Six Points.

The 1971 East Pakistan crisis worsened when neither Mujib nor Bhutto or president Yahya Khan expressed the political will, wisdom and courage to pull the country from a dangerous situation. Mujib was unwilling to compromise on the Six Points which were unacceptable to PPP, as it got majority seats from West Pakistan. The nexus between Bhutto and the hawkish generals who were unwilling to transfer power to the Awami League because they suspected their loyalty for Pakistan triggered the outbreak of East Pakistan crisis particularly when the National Assembly’s inaugural session on March 3 was postponed by the Yahya regime without taking Mujib into confidence.  

Hasan Zaheer, a former civil servant who was posted in then East Pakistan during 1950s and in 1971, in his book, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism, gives a vivid account as to how the 1971 East Pakistan crisis got mismanaged: “The decision to postpone the National Assembly meeting is regretted, in retrospect, by the West Pakistani intelligentsia as a tragic decision which led to the breakup of Pakistan. A considerable body of opinion holds Bhutto responsible for it.” In remembrance, one may contemplate that had the inaugural NA session taken place in Dhaka on March 3, the crisis which augmented because of its postponement by Islamabad and on Bhutto’s insistence, would have been managed. Events unfolding after the unilateral postponement of the assembly session escalated Pakistan’s grave crisis which ultimately culminated into the country’s breakup in December 1971.

For the successful management of a national crisis there are six major requirements: leadership which should be wise and courageous; political will and determination of the concerned stakeholders; planning to prevent the deepening of the crisis; timeline by making suitable timely decisions; role of external factors and internal forces who want to use the crisis for their own interests. The absence of most of these requirements was responsible for the outbreak and deepening of the 1971 East Pakistan crisis. Three major realities must be taken into consideration while examining why the East Pakistan crisis was mismanaged. First, even before 1971, Pakistan was under a political crisis during the 1950s and 1960s, but the crisis which emerged after December 1970 elections was different because the majority party, the Awami League, and the minority PPP were unable to pursue a flexible approach and develop a consensus on participating in the NA’s inaugural session. It means both political parties lacked wisdom, prudence and flexibility to place the interests of the country supreme, and rather plunged the country into a perpetual state of crisis, chaos, violence, war and ultimate disintegration. A power-hungry approach and inflexibility on the part of PPP and Awami League mismanaged the East Pakistan crisis.

Second, the Martial Law regime of General Yahya Khan, which should have been neutral and prevailed over both parties to abandon their intransigent positions, miserably failed to deal with the crisis dynamics. If the attitude of president Yahya towards Mujib was highly formal, then his relationship with Bhutto was friendly which was reflected in January 1971 when he and his generals went to Larkana for hunting. Yahya never visited Mujib’s house but the majority party leader was summoned to the president house for a meeting. Such an asymmetrical treatment on the president’s part caused enormous anger among the Bengalis who accused West Pakistan of treating East Pakistan as a colony and maintaining a master-slave relationship. Yahya’s non-serious attitude and lack of leadership qualities to deal with a grave crisis emanating after December 1970 elections also contributed to the breakup of the country.

Narrating the eventful days of March 1971, when Yahya Khan reached Dhaka on March 15 to manage the crisis, Brig (retd) AR Siddiqi, the then director Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), writes in his book, East Pakistan: The Endgame: An Onlooker’s Journal 1969-71, that: “Mujib had accused the president of betraying his trust by unilaterally deciding to postpone the assembly. The president, on the other hand, accused Mujib and his party of overreacting by taking the law into their hands.” Yahya’s pathetic condition after the military operation in East Pakistan was reflected when Yahya looked completely lost and was requested by his senior colleagues to realise the gravity of the situation and visit Dhaka to see the situation himself. He replied: “What can I do for East Pakistan?” The mental and physical condition of General Yahya Khan was a source of disgrace for the country as he not only let the people down at a critical juncture but utterly failed to prevent a humiliating defeat of Pakistan Army at the hands of India and their subsequent surrender on December 16, 1971. It was a misfortune for the country to have a leadership which was intoxicated and indifferent when the country was facing a critical situation and was on the verge of disintegration.

Third, apathy was prevailing in West Pakistan about the events which led to the launch of the military operation and the outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan. Press censorship and jubilant feelings in West Pakistan on the military operation against Awami League and Mujib’s arrest reflected the total insensitivity of the people of West Pakistan that their counterparts in the eastern wing were passing through a difficult situation. Except muted voices which were raised in West Pakistan against the military operation in East Pakistan, people and political parties remained indifferent to the reality that the country was fast moving towards disintegration. Official media and the press in West Pakistan used to depict a rosy picture of East Pakistan and ruled out the existence of a grave crisis. As a result when the news about the surrender of the Pakistani armed forces before the joint command of the Indian army and Mukti Bahini on December 16 reached West Pakistan, people were shocked but it was too late and Jinnah’s Pakistan was gone.