How 1970 elections led to the break-up

Dr GW Choudhury, a central minister in the cabinet of president General Yahya Khan, wrote in his book, The Last Days of United Pakistan, that “elections were held on December 7, 1970, and were by any standard free and fair — ironically the first and last genuine election in united Pakistan.” Yet the results of such elections were astonishing: Awami League, which gained 160 out of 162 seats from East Pakistan could not get a single seat from West Pakistan; and Pakistan Peoples Party, which got 81 out of 138 seats from West Pakistan, was unable to secure even a single seat from the country’s Eastern wing. In the absence of a national party representing both the provinces, the die was cast and the disintegration of the country was inevitable.

The December 1970 elections were held according to the Legal Framework Order (LFO) of March 1970 which had formulated the mechanism of Pakistan’s first general elections. Almost one year was allowed for the election campaign and in East Pakistan, a free hand was given to the Awami League to coerce voters during the polling day. Choudhury further writes, “Mujib’s election campaign and strategy were simple: their sole purpose was to carry the gospel of Bengali nationalism and the ideal of Bangladesh. Thanks to the naiveté and incompetence of Governor Ahsan, Mujib and his followers had a free hand and were able to preach secession without the least hindrance.” The Awami League, which spearheaded the struggle for Bangladesh following the military operation of March 25, 1971, pledged it was committed to LFO but when president Yahya, during his meetings with Mujib used to complain that the Awami League was using election campaign for spreading venom and hatred against West Pakistan and his Six Points were propagating an independent country, Mujib used to be timid and argue these were just for political consumption and after winning elections he would be flexible and maintain the country’s integrity.

Fifty years have passed since the 1970 elections in what was called united Pakistan. The fact that Pakistan disintegrated in the aftermath of these raises a fundamental question: why did the election results fail to ensure the country’s unity and how did it pave the way for Pakistan’s disintegration? After all, elections were held under the LFO framework which had guaranteed the unity and integrity of Pakistan and from a legal point of view, the election results were in no way meant to provide legitimacy to the Awami League’s ambition for secession.

Critics argue that the 1970 elections were the last attempt to keep Pakistan united but in reality the very clause of one-man-one-vote mentioned in LFO was used by the Awami League to prove that since it had gained absolute majority in then East Pakistan, it can be interpreted as a verdict for independence. The Awami League’s Six Points were not asking for an outright independence from Pakistan but wanted a type of a confederal system with a loose Centre and strong provinces. It was only after the unilateral postponement of the NA’s inaugural session by the martial law regime which was to be held in Dhaka on March 3 that the Awami League got a chance to express its defiance and demanded maximum provincial autonomy and a nominal relationship between the two geographically, culturally and ethnically divergent parts of Pakistan. That was unacceptable to Islamabad and the PPP.

Yet because of three reasons one can argue that the elections paved the way for Pakistan’s disintegration. First, when the Awami League’s Six Points clearly stipulated a loose Federation with a weak Centre, why was it allowed to contest elections under the LFO in the first place? Verbal assurances of Sheikh Mujib to Yahya Khan about maintaining Pakistan’s integrity were mere excuses. Giving a free hand to the Awami League to spread hatred against West Pakistan and propagating an independent state of Bangladesh weakened those political parties and groups of East Pakistan who wanted to keep the country together. Furthermore, the majority in East Pakistan had not voted for the Awami League as a means to seek independence. But once the Awami League was able to get the overwhelming majority from East Pakistan it argued that the people have the given verdict for an independent Bangladesh and there was no point in accepting further ‘slavery’ of West Pakistan.

Second, in the election campaign, the martial law government which should have prevented anti-state slogans and speeches in East Pakistan remained mum. Why did the government fail to stop the Awami League when it was intolerant to its opponents and used tactics to forcibly subvert election meetings of other political parties like Jamaat-i-Islami, different factions of the Muslim League, Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) and Nizam-e-Islam Party? The Awami League’s aggressive and abusive campaign in East Pakistan raised questions about the free and fair nature of the elections as a level playing field was not available to other parties. In a year-long campaign, the Awami League got enough time to poison people’s minds, particularly the youths, against West Pakistan and to threaten its opponents with dire consequences if they dared to challenge them.

When election results were announced and it was clear that both the Awami League and the PPP would have to cooperate with each other to ensure a smooth transfer of power and keep the country united, no such approach was followed by either party. The PPP claimed that as a majority party from West Pakistan it had a veto over Awami League’s contention that it enjoyed majority in the assembly of Pakistan and could form government on the basis of Mujib’s Six Points. This means that since the beginning, the manner in which the election campaign was launched and the failure of government to prevent coercion, used particularly by the Awami League on the Election Day, produced results which eventually led to Pakistan’s disintegration.

Third, when general elections were held and results announced reflecting a sharp division on provincial basis, serious efforts to pursue a flexible approach by the Awami League and the PPP were not seen. In principle, the assembly session should not have been postponed without taking the Awami League into confidence, but by then Yahya Khan’s regime was feeling disillusioned with Mujib’s hardline stance on the Six Points, and had decided to sort out things militarily.

Perhaps, had the elections been properly managed and a level playing field made available to all parties contesting elections in East Pakistan, the Awami League wouldn’t have got an absolute majority. In case of PPP, it got an absolute majority only in Punjab, whereas in Sindh, it got a simple majority. In Balochistan, it won no seats and won only one in the NWFP, now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Therefore, PPP was representing only two out of four provinces of West Pakistan which made things more complicated in the post-December 1970 scenario.

Published in The Express Tribune, December 11^th, 2020.

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