Brasstacks of Indian military leadership

While dust was beginning to settle on the Depsang Plains in Eastern Ladakh, there are more reports of Indo-China tensions, especially south of Pangong Lake. Godi media went berserk and started projecting as if the Indian Army has conquered the entire Tibet autonomous region. Meanwhile a report published in a prestigious Indian newspaper, The Hindu, indicated that the Indian army had lost 1,000 square kilometres of area in Ladakh. However, the Godi media trolls were found to be paddling the narrative on social media that the loss of the area had actually taken place during the time of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government and PM Modi should be absolved of this responsibility as India lost a few hundred square kilometres during the current standoff with China and bulk of the blame should be put on the previous government that was led by Congress. Yes, Modi, the great leader with a 56-inch broad chest, should be given all the credit for the Indian Army capturing a knoll of one square km south of Pangong Lake.

These reports may be good for media discourse, but they also indicate the way the Indian military leadership is quietly, but deliberately, left off the hook for military disasters. Sane and honest Indian defence and security experts have raised the issue of the failure of Indian military leadership and intelligence head honchos in a number of articles and talk-shows in Indian media.

Our June 19 article published in these columns after the Galwan debacle had highlighted the factor of accountability of the Indian military leadership and how Indian mainstream media was covering it. Indian defence analysts like Col Ajai Shukla and Pravin Sawhney have been criticising Indian leadership for the loss of face. While India was boasting about attacking G-B and AJK, it got a slap in the face from the Chinese Dragon. Today the Indian Army is demoralised and there is a growing call for Rajnath Singh, CDS General Bipin Rawat, Ajit Doval, the Army Chief, the Commander Northern Command and the Commander 14 Corps to step down, as they failed to appreciate the Chinese intent and prepare a contingency plan.

In order to go down to brasstacks of Indian military leadership, it is better to pitch its performance vis a vis the mission assigned.

Logically the mission assigned to the intelligence and military commanders of Indian establishment should read as: “Defend the territorial integrity of Indian Union and win the war or conflict, if imposed, on a victory note.” This mission when decomposed for formation commanders — commands, corps, divisions and brigades — translates into physical features with extents and depths specified up to rivers, hills, roads and passes. Hypothetically speaking, the mission assigned to 3 Division deployed along LAC in Ladakh could read as: “Defend area along LAC from Daulat Beg Oldie to patrolling point number 8 at Pangong Lake at all cost, deny any enemy penetration beyond line Daulat Beg Oldie, Galwan, PP 8 on Pangong So and create conditions for launching of 14 Corps, Northern Command or Army reserves.”

These are very precise mission statements; and entire defensive system, structure of forces and force posturing is worked out to minutest details. The area of responsibility is then divided into physical area of domination and areas of interest. Again hypothetically speaking, 14 Corps’ area of interest should include approximately 60 kms across the LAC into Chinese Western Command. The corps commander is supposed to deploy his surveillance effort (technical and human) and supplement it through the assets of RAW, Indian Air Force as well as aviation assets of the formation. This assortment of surveillance and intelligence gathering may include satellites, RPVs, quadcopters, radars as well as human intelligence of agents across the LAC.

Why we are going in details of the Indian military system and its formation is to highlight that military and intelligence commanders and intelligence agencies are equipped with best possible means to avoid surprise and build response in a comfortable timeframe.

Now we come to strategic, operational and tactical aspects of a typical defensive battle, especially when operations are conducted on high altitude and mountains. The time, space and relevant strength matrix, or TSR, is the most important aspect of military operation. And this gets added importance in a mountainous terrain. While appreciating the inhospitable terrain of Ladakh sector, a typical TSR matrix in a defensive battle is tabulated below:

RAW, as the frontline of intelligence gathering agency, is responsible for not only apprising the politico-military leadership of possible threat scenarios and intent of enemy, it is also supposed to precisely give the warning time of at least two weeks to formation commanders so that they can mount a suitable operational response.

Commander Northern Command and Commander 14 Corps should be able to get a warning time of deployment of enemy forces, at least ten days in advance, while using their own effort. Chinese build-up across the LAC took considerable time, however Indian military commanders from the CDS to Brigade did not place any forces to remain within the TSR matrix.

Suppose there was a political restrain imposed on Indian military commanders and they had their hands tight to avoid military confrontation with PLA, no one stopped them from taking basic operational and tactical measures to make sure they achieved their military mission, defending area of responsibility at all costs.

Giving the margin to Indian Army and formation commanders, Northern Command, 14 Corps and 3 Division could have thwarted Chinese operations through basic tactical level actions after Chinese incursions across the LAC at four places. The logical response within the desired TSR could have been mounted as following:

Brigade commanders responsible for Depsang , Galwan or Pangong sub-sectors should have launched a counterattack within 48 hours on Chinese incursions; GOC of 3 Division should have restored the situation within 3 to 4 days and Commander 14 Corps could have launched his counterattack within a weeks’ time; and Indian Army could have moved strategic reserves to restore the situation within a fortnight.

Today, four months have passed since reports of Chinese incursions and entire war machine of the third largest military in the world seems to have been paralysed.

While giving credit to Col Babu and his subordinates who lost their lives in the boulders of Galwan River, Indian intelligence establishment and military leadership have been thoroughly exposed for its poor foresight, bad planning, lack of decision-making and paralysis of the entire chain of command.

So, when Indian Godi media blames the UPA and deflects the attention away from intelligence and military failure, one must realise that it is the failure of RAW and Indian military who gobbles 71 billion dollars every year and fails to defend the territorial integrity of the Indian Union while the 800 million poor Indians live on 1kg Daal and 5kg rice per person per month doled out to it by Mr Modi.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 4^th, 2020.

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