Changing times — Bangladesh’s emerging alliances

When Bangladesh was torn from Pakistan during that fateful December in 1971, Pakistan was jolted at the moorings. One is still at loss to find a cogent explanation for the hate and ensuing violence permeating the militant arm of Awami League (AL), the Mukti Bahini. A lot has been written on the saga. From accusations and counter accusations, historians are constructing an objective narrative, but as per a Pashto proverb; “Lies would destroy villages till the truth arrives”. In Pakistan, the hope for amity and fraternity with the people and government of erstwhile East Pakistan was never lost, given the common past, religious affinity, heritage, cultural kinship and latent hostility towards a hegemonic India. However, thaw in bilateral ties has mostly depended on Dhaka.

Thankfully, under Hindutva-driven Modi-Amit Shah combine, the Indian mask is off for the first time in history, blatantly and overtly. That Indian democracy has in fact become the oligarchy of upper-class Hindus, with no respectable space for minorities especially Muslims and Dalits. That neighbours, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka — not to mention Pakistan — would only be left alone and in peace, if they tow the Indian line. Consequently, an India endeared as liberator by Bangladesh has retracted to its chauvinist core, hitting and hurting Bangladesh like others.

In the erstwhile cordial Indo-Bangladesh relations, something seems amiss. While we in Pakistan never doubted that Bangladesh’s endearment to India was based solely upon its hostility towards Pakistan, it took a little over 50 years for Bangla brothers to see India’s true face behind the mask. When the staunchly pro-Indian government of AL headed by PM Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Bangladesh’s founding father Mujibur Rahman, rebuffs repeated meeting requests by India’s high commissioner, Riva Ganguly Das for the last four months, something has gone awry. Other indicators are the slowing pace of all Indian projects since PM Hasina’s re-election in 2019 and Dhaka’s preference to Chinese-financed infrastructure projects. Contracting the new terminal of Sylhet airport, bordering India’s sensitive northeastern region, to the Beijing Urban Construction Group (BUCG) is one such example.

Elsewhere, continuing rapprochement, PM Imran Khan spoke over telephone (his second call) with Sheikh Hasina on July 22 for some 15 minutes, inviting her to visit Pakistan. Last November, for the first time in the last 15 years, Bangladesh allowed Pakistani onions after India banned its export. And issues like war crimes, apology and repatriation of stranded Pakistanis seem resolvable under the spirit of the 1974 trilateral agreement between Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, wherein all parties agreed not to pursue war crime cases.

Let’s see Bangladesh’s ties with India first. Both countries share the fifth-longest land border in the world, compelling India to maintain friendly relations with Bangladesh to bolster security and border management. Refugees from the erstwhile East Pakistan served as one of the casus belli for Indian invasion in 1971. While publicly referring to the Indian government’s discriminatory Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), and National Register of Citizens (NRC) as “internal matters of India”, Dhaka nonetheless remains uneasy by senior BJP leaders’ utterances to send back undocumented citizens to Bangladesh. Bangladesh is justifiably weary of hosting more refugees, in addition to the 1.2 million Rohingyas from Myanmar, living in Chittagong. The CAA and NRC are viewed by Bangladesh as negative publicity for its “presumed” poor treatment of religious minorities, hence seeking refuge in India. And for the first time, Dhaka saw nationwide protests ahead of Modi’s March 2020 visit that was scrapped due to the corona pandemic.

Despite BJP’s anti-Muslim tirade, both Modi and Hasina continued to maintain closer ties through frequent high-level visits. Both nations signed 22 bilateral agreements, including one resolving a 1947 border dispute when Modi visited Bangladesh in 2015. During PM Hasina’s visit to India in 2017, India pledged investments in Bangladesh worth $5 billion. A 2018 tripartite nuclear pact commits India to facilitate Russia in building a nuclear power plant in Bangladesh. In a message on Mujib Barsho (Mujib anniversary), India called for diversifying Indo-Bangladesh relations, adding trade in services to the existing trade in goods.

However, economic ties and a history of cloaked and camouflaged friendship today seem unable to stop the turning public consensus in Bangladesh away from a domineering India. Sociologically, the religious right in Bangladesh, older generation and a sizeable part of the Bangladesh Armed Forces resent Indian hegemony and want a balanced — and not hostile — relationship with Pakistan. The July 14 video interview of retired army Lt General Chowdhury Hasan Sarwardy, with a US-based journalist Kanak Sarwar, is instructive. The general has squarely accused Indian intelligence agency RAW for intrusive influence to the extent of clearing appointment of ministers, generals, and senior bureaucrats in Bangladesh; besides deciding the outcome of national elections.

As far as China goes, nearly all Indian neighbours (except Bhutan, having no diplomatic relations with China) are on board the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China replaced India as Bangladesh’s top trading partner in 2015. During his 2016 visit to Bangladesh, President Xi Jinping signed 27 agreements worth $24 billion. Beijing recently allowed duty-free access to 97% Bangladeshi products. All this fits well with Bangladesh’s “Look East” policy, essentially designed to reduce Dhaka’s dependence on India. Bangladesh recently asked Beijing for $64 billion as an infrastructure development package. Dhaka’s tilt towards China could also be domestically inspired, since vibes betray PM Hasina’s uneasiness with her pro-India Army Chief, Gen Aziz.

China has also provided the much-needed medical supplies to Bangladesh during the Covid-19 pandemic, declaring Dhaka as a priority beneficiary, if and when a Chinese vaccine is developed. Bangladesh on its part, did not pick any sides during the recent military standoff between India and China in Ladakh.

China needs a welcoming relationship with a geo-strategically placed Bangladesh given its proximity to and relations with India; its large market with an impressive 8% economic growth; and its past linkage to Pakistan, in order to accrue trade benefits using Bangladesh’s ports — in China’s “String of Pearls” policy; and keep India under check.

This interdependence enables Dhaka to leverage gains from both China and India; and Islamabad to optimise its leverage with Bangladesh through China. Pakistan and Bangladesh need to realise that bilateral synergy can bring tremendous good to their people. The binding influences are stronger than remaining hostage to the past. Taking a leaf from post-war European history would do well to both brotherly Muslim countries.

Published in The Express Tribune, July 30^th, 2020.

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