Projecting influence and power — Iran’s military system

On 23 January, we discussed “History, revolution and revenge — Iran’s grand strategy” in this space. As a follow-up, it is instructive to detail Iran’s military structure that enables Iran to pursue its strategic interests

One of the reasons for Iran to consistently pursue its revolutionary goals and doctrine, as discussed previously, is the continuity, consistency and longevity of its revolutionary leadership. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei remains the ultimate guardian of Iran’s strategic posture since 1989. That has allowed him to staff military and security organisations with trusted and doctrinally-aligned senior officers. Likewise, Iran’s military leaders often enjoy extended tenures. None of Iran’s adversaries can match their exposure and experience.

Iran’s contemporary Military System draws heavily on Tehran’s experience of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Later years of the war laid bare Iran’s weakness of using outdated technology, shaping its future developmental strategy and indigenisation programmes. Doctrinally, Iran subsequently incorporated the concept of “layered defence and asymmetric responses” to prevail against stronger adversaries. Iran’s Military System was hence built upon an awkward combination of conventional and revolutionary forces. The unusual military architecture is comprised of a Western-style Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh-e-Jomhouri-ye Islamiye-Iran, or ‘Artesh’) that was politically suspect being the legacy of Shah; and a revolutionary military force, the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps) or Sepah-e-Pasdaran-e-Enqelab-e-Islami, an ideologically reliable but professionally inexperienced force, established on 22 April 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

IRGC or Pasdaran subsequently became mainstay of Iran’s Military System, acting as counterweight to Artesh, given the deep distrust of latter by Iran’s revolutionary leaders. Pasdaran assimilated multitude of armed groups and revolutionary committees that dominated post-Revolution Iran. They were employed to destroy armed monarchist, leftist, communist and ethnic elements who — though participant in the Revolution — later opposed the new Islamic Republic’s ideology. Pasdaran were used by the regime to purge all opponents and ensure ideological adherence to the Revolution, particularly to the concept of political rule by an eminent and supreme religious jurisprudent, called the Velayat-e Faqih.

This supreme leader has ever since effective oversight — through “Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) — over the President, Chief of Armed Forces General Staff, Artesh, Commander IRGC/ Pasdaran, Commander Quds Force (directly as well as through Pasdaran), Commander of Basij Militia, Judiciary and Ministries. Basij Militia, set up by Imam Khomeini in 1979, comprises volunteer regime loyalists employed to quell street dissent during a crisis.

Pasdaran commands Ground, Naval and Aerospace Forces, Quds Force (QF, roughly over 100,000) and Basij Militia (around 90,000) alongside Cyber installations, Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security forces. It also has sway over Educational and Scientific Centers and over the commercial conglomerate called Khatam-al-Anbiya. This commercial conglomerate, especially its construction arm, emerged during the re-building of war-ravaged Iran and it gives Pasdaran immense commercial clout, vast resources and network of commercial and political interests.

Pasdaran, in particular, stood to export Revolution as mandated through several sections of Islamic Republic’s constitution. Article 150 nebulously mandates Pasdaran to protect the nascent revolution and its future successes. Operationally, relationship between Pasdaran and Artesh during the Iran-Iraq War remained strained owing to struggle between loyalty of the Pasdaran and professionalism of the Artesh; and the working boundaries remained ill-defined. Pasdaran’s aggressive loyalty wins it greater prestige, direct access to senior political leadership and superior budget.

Both Forces are jointly responsible for a ‘mosaic’ defence, incorporating guerrilla, unconventional operations and exploitation of Iran’s terrain. For territorial defence, Iran’s deterrence-based doctrine stresses raising invaders’ risks and costs instead of reducing its own. Whereas, externally, the doctrine aims at increasing the enemy’s risks without increasing Iran’s costs/risks. Use of proxies abroad, affords Iran operational flexibility by retaliating against an adversary elsewhere, at a time and place of its choosing. Responding to killing of Gen Qasem Suleimani inside Iraq and earlier operations in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere point to this capability.

Today, Iran exercises influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon; 313 Force, Liwa-al-Baqir and Quwat-al-Ridha in Syria; Hamas in Palestine; Badr organisation, Asaib-Ahlel-Haq, Harkat-Hizbullah-al-Nujaba and Kataib Hizbullah in Iraq; Ansarullah (Houthis) in Yemen; al-Ashtar in Bahrain; Liwa-al-Fatemiyoun in Afghanistan and segments of Liwa-al-Zainabiyoun in Pakistan. Proxy partners abroad also extend Tehran’s psychological warfare, propaganda and perception management potential.

Iran deploys sizeable — albeit localised — tools to disrupt, destroy and hack adversaries’ networks and is improving to conduct more lethal and lasting cyber-attacks. The destructive malware Shamoon was traced to Iran’s official hacking group APT 33 (Elfin), used in successfully targeting Saudi and UAE oil and gas networks. It also operates variety of armed UAVs like Shahed-129 and Hamaseh. Shahab Series (1,2,3 variants) comprise the core of Iran’s missile programme capable of hitting targets up to 2500 kms.

IRGC’s extraterritorial role in supporting pro-Iran revolutionary movements is reliant upon Quds Force (Jerusalem Force, or Niru-ye-Quds). This Force, comprising intelligence and special-forces, was established during initial years of Iran-Iraq War. QF is tasked for unconventional missions, like establishing popular Hezbollah cells all over the world, for example. IRGC-QF has sections devoted to countries and regions like Ramazan Corps for Iraq; Levant Corps for Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, Rasullah Corps for Arabian Peninsula and Ansar Corps for Afghanistan. Besides, it is structured to operate in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America with a reported network of over 20 training camps in Iran, Lebanon and Sudan. It is accused of smuggling weapons internationally, besides providing safe havens, funding and ideological training to sympathetic international groups like Afghan Hazaras, Balkan Muslims, Gulf militants, Palestinians and, as reported, even al-Qaeda. Iran sees a failed state of geostrategic significance, a state being its logistics pipeline and absence of an external challenger, as conditions for interference abroad. QF is considered ideologically flexible, providing support to any group deemed part of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’. It was tagged in militant activity in Argentina, Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other Gulf governments. In 1998, the then IRGC Brigadier General Qasem Suleimani replaced Gen Vahidi as Commander QF.

Iran’s 1992 Military Doctrine avoids direct and extended conflict with superior powers. Although Iran’s Military System is well tailored to its strategic ambition, revolutionary goals and economic potential, it suffers from serious weaknesses. By deploying the cited asymmetric and unconventional capabilities, Iran risks over-extension and long-term sustenance problems. This shortcoming generally forces Iran to back down in crises at the last moment. Iran’s force projection is also suspect given its sectarian colouring and intrusive nature and lead to Iran’s isolation regionally and internationally. Iran’s brilliant tactics and operational strategy need to flow from an equally brilliant grand strategy that fits well with a compatible military system. And on this the jury is still out.

Published in The Express Tribune, February 6^th, 2020.

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