India’s thermonuclear bomb

A thermonuclear bomb has become India’s necessity to exert broader influence at a global level. Today, India enjoys a strategically advantageous position in order to achieve nuclear efficiency and sufficiency to prove its scientific proficiency.

India, from the outset, has been ambitious to achieve technological supremacy inspired by its “Greater India vision”. In June 1946, Nehru declared, “I have no doubt India will develop its scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes.” Domestic politics and scientists’ lobbying always remained a crucial factor in Indian nuclear politics. After China’s nuclear test, it was domestic politics, more than the security factor, that played a role in India’s nuclear acquisition. It was driven by the desire of its scientists to prove that Indian science was as good as anyone else’s. In 1963, Nehru convinced the Indian Parliament to develop nuclear weapons. Homi J Bhabha declared in 1964 that India is capable of developing nuclear weapons within 18 months if it wished to do so. Bhabha got approval from then prime minister Shastri to carry out an underground nuclear explosion in 1964. In July 1971, it was confirmed that India was to carry out an underground nuclear explosion under Indira Gandhi's administration.

India indeed deliberately took time for these to take place in order to evade international pressure. This was to ensure that the timing was favourable for India to evade the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) pressure; a partial test ban treaty was developed and India considered it necessary to proceed rapidly before any new treaty banning underground tests might be negotiated. Moreover, Indira’s declining political popularity at home was another factor. The same patterns later suggested India’s nuclear behaviour towards its nuclear explosions in 1998. Indeed, India was driven more by consideration of prestige and status than security. India again chose the right timing to opt for overt weaponisation. The desire to evade the United States (US) pressure to sign the NPT, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) compelled India to succeed before these treaties might be negotiated.

Broadly, India wanted greater freedom of action to exert an influential role in the world.

India today has got a technological edge and access to a global market in the backdrop of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver. For example, the 2005 agreement on full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India made the US not only modify 30 years of history of nuclear non-proliferation but also its own laws in order to transfer nuclear technology and alter international controls on the supply of nuclear fuel and technology. In 2006, a strong bipartisan majority in Congress passed the Hyde Act, which approved the initiative, thereby allowing the US investment in India’s civil nuclear power industry. The US assured India of a reliable supply of fuel by working with allies and NSG members along with negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Later India became the third Asian country after Japan and South Korea to get the Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 (STA-1) which is a waiver for individual licence requirements for defence and hi-tech dual-use equipment.

Against this deal, the US expectations from India were that they would separate military and civilian nuclear facilities by placing all civilian facilities under the IAEA’s safeguard system; sign the CTBT; work towards the conclusion of the FMCT; refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and to support international efforts to limit their spread and progress towards regional non-proliferation (later in 2012 the NSG qualified the exemption, granting to India in 2008 saying that the exemption did not apply to ENR); and make progress in the conclusion of the Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Besides, under US law, the deal would be reversed, and India will be bound to the return of nuclear fuel and technology shipped under the deal if it tests again in the future; India would commit to ensuring necessary steps to be taken to secure nuclear material and technologies through comprehensive export control legislation in line with the Wassaner Arrangements; and finally, the Henry Act required the president to report to the Congress on any new developments in the Indian nuclear programme which were relevant to India’s capability to make fissile material.

However, India refused to agree upon the permanent testing moratorium. The idea of separation of facilities has not yet been implemented. India has safeguarded only 14 out of its 22 nuclear facilities and diverts unchecked material for military purposes from these reactors. The IAEA does not have any check on cross-overs between military and civilian facilities.

India will prove technological mastery by testing the H-bomb as it has got a technological edge and fissile material sufficiency. The continued operation of its plutonium production reactors Dhruva and CIRUS, India has about two tons of plutonium in the spent fuel from its unprotected power reactors that could be used for weapons. And when its breeder programme, which is entirely on the military side, becomes fully operational, then India will have the ability to produce even larger amounts of weapon materials. The Indian government was building a nuclear city in Challakere, in the southern Karnataka state, which was likely to be completed by now. Western analysts suggested the existence of a new nuclear enrichment complex that is already feeding India’s weapons programme and setting the groundwork for a more ambitious hydrogen bomb project at the Rare Materials Plant, 160 miles to the south of Rattehalli, close to the city of Mysore. The IPFM estimates suggested that the Arihant class submarines core require only 65kg of uranium enriched to 30% — there will still be 160 kg of weapons-grade uranium left over every year, enough to fuel at least 55 H-bombs.

The rationale underlined below suggests that India will resume nuclear testing for the H-bomb. One, after procurement of sufficient material, India can decide to terminate the safeguard agreements, resume nuclear testing, test the hydrogen bomb, and expand its nuclear weapons programme. Two, India enjoys strategic convergences of interests with the US. The US loses its leverage over India on its hedge against China. Three, this time again India will achieve nuclear mastery for reasons driven by status and prestige rather than security. It is imperative to ask: Is the US President being informed about India’s new enrichment facilities at Karnataka? Is the NSG reviewing its cooperation with India and the impact of international uranium purchases by India on its domestic uranium resources and their use for military purposes? How would such a move impact the stability of a broader non-proliferation regime? These are tough questions for the NSG members to respond.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 3^rd, 2019.

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