A democracy in danger

Islamabad must see Modi’s win as a historic challenge and prepare for eventualities with a mix of hard and soft power

The BJP-led coalition of Narendra Modi trounced opponents with a landslide vote share of 45%. Modi’s victory moves India away from secularism to an expansionist authoritarian Hindu polity, especially if the BJP belligerently manoeuvres on Ram Mandir, the Uniform Civil Code and alters the 42^nd Constitutional Amendment (guaranteeing secularism) stirring minority unrest. Muslim, Christian, Parsi, Dalit and Adivasi constitutional safeguards are on a sharp knife’s edge of uncertainty.

Modi’s victory did not enrich democracy but imperilled it. The BJP institutionalised rigging and corruption through electoral bonds. Two million electronic voting machines “vanished” between manufacturers and the Election Commission (now a BJP political appendage) prior to votes being cast. It is sheer naïveté to assume that the Samajwadi Paty and the Bahujan Samaj Party failed to perform in UP and other northern states.

The BJP’s victory importantly vindicates Jinnah’s visionary two-nation theory. In a majoritarian 80% Hindu-dominated country, the fate of the Muslims and minorities dangles on a Damoclean sword as they are lynched for chewing beef and dating Hindus. Jinnah’s two-nation theory is a dynamic ongoing debate. Had the referendum sought by UN Security Council Resolution 47 been implemented, had Pakistan not fallen prey to hostilities from her neighbour, had India been at peace with herself by ceasing communal vitriol, had Delhi not been pitting Iran against Pakistan, the two-nation theory could be a historical triumph. However, it will gain relevance in 2019.

The BJP’s re-election is a departure from Gandhi-Nehruvian inclusion as opposed to exclusionary bigotry by Modi and Amit Shah. Money, mainstream media’s war hysteria, Pakistan-bashing, a haunting radicalisation of Hindu society, the power of propaganda, opposition’s disunity, institutional collapse, the global rise of the personality cult (Trump, Orban, Netanyahu), fatigue with family-based, dynastic politics and the global rise of far-right populism catapulted the BJP at the ballot box.

Modi oversaw the 2002 anti-Muslim Gujarat pogrom, glorifies Godse over Gandhi, botches up elementary physics with cloud radar theory, boasts of humble origins yet curries favours with corrupt billionaires, labels himself a Chowkidar (watchman) yet imperils the lives of millions of minorities.

If you deem Modi 1.0 to be heavy-handed, you have not seen anything yet. A newly elected Modi 2.0 will retain a regressive grip on institutions; further politicise the military and judiciary. Anti-minority lynching is not from the fringes. The BJP is now the party of Pragya Thakur and Yogi Adityanath — one is a charged terrorist, the other a firebrand Hindutva hardliner. Pakistan, meanwhile, clamped down on Hafiz Saeed during the 2018 elections.

Modi’s worming his way back to power bears far-reaching implications for Pakistan. Modi’s decision not to invite Prime Minister Imran Khan to his oath-taking ceremony on May 30 is a missed opportunity and an omen of things to come. However, even if Modi 2.0 extends olive branches to Pakistan by restoring the WTO’s Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status, resume visa services or opens up to dialogue on Kashmir, all of it is still going to be sabotaged by a hardcore RSS, VHP and RAW who keep pulling Modi’s strings to hawkish hilts. Recent ice-melting between Sushma Swaraj and FM Shah Mahmood Qureshi at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Bishkek are only tokenistic gestures.

An electorally-emboldened BJP is likelier to de-hyphenate Saarc (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) from Pakistan, obstruct the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), specifically the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and treat Pakistan as a sub-set of China.

India might raise a spoiler’s role in Afghanistan: for three decades Delhi has thwarted Islamabad’s endeavours to stabilise Afghanistan, and allied with Kabul by bankrolling the nefarious TTP, BLA, BLF, IS-KP (South Asia) especially in Kandahar and Nangarhar fermenting terror within Pakistan. The BJP sought to undercut a potential Taliban-inclusive government and derail the Qatar talks. This destabilises Pakistani forces east of the Durand Line — accentuating a need to further secure the Pak-Afghan border. Absent a sustainable peace accord, Afghanistan could break down into a civil war like in the 1990s.

Modi presides over economic growth at 7%, as economic power differentials between Pakistan (3% growth) and India widen, with Pakistan’s GDP at $300 billion versus India’s $3 trillion, Delhi could weaponise trade tariffs as geopolitical ammunition. The BJP can misuse such economic heft to lure Washington, alienate non-aligned capitals by denting Pakistan’s interests at international fora like the Nuclear Supplier’s Group, the World Bank, IMF, UN, Saarc, the WTO and the Financial Action Task Forced (FATF) despite crackdown against Masood Azhar.

The BJP is likely to intensify proxy terrorism, especially in G-B, K-P and targeting Gwadar Port (like the recent PC attack) in a blood-soaked Balochistan where just on May 24, post-Modi’s election, a bomb blast in Pashtunabad’s Rehmania mosque in Quetta marked the fifth terror attack in a month.

India’s RAW routinely utilises Chabahar Port’s “cells and assets” to stoke sectarian terror in Balochistan. As for Chabahar, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif proposed to Army Chief General Qamar Bajwa that Iran is ready to connect Gwadar Port with Chabahar for regional trade, creating a railroad from Iran to the Northern Corridor via Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey — promising new marketing opportunities for Pakistan.

Modi 2.0 is likely to exploit Pakistan’s physical and digital fault lines such as water diversion from the Eastern rivers away from Pakistan, to further weakening the rupee via currency manipulation or assisting false currency smuggling to cyber-attacks (BJP’s cyber-cell is ineptly active) birthing instability in regional capital and online markets.

India’s foreign policy of ‘multi-alignment’ unravels itself with the Delhi-US strategic alliance marked by an anti-Russian military pivot. Modi is likely to ditch Moscow as it did Iran after sanctions, hinder Beijing and leverage the current US-Chinese trade tensions to boost bilateral trade with DC.

During the dogfight over Kashmiri skies in February 2019, a nuclear war between Pakistan and India was averted. Due to the Balakot blunder, Modi, inadvertently, “internationalised” the Kashmir issue by illegal over-reach. Pakistan’s shooting down Indian jets, PM Imran Khan’s release of the captured pilot Abhinandan and COAS Qamar Bajwa’s Delhi outreach generated global goodwill. Yet realistically Modi is unlikely to resolve the Kashmiri issue. Intimately aligned with Western Asia is the stability of South Asia which can only be guaranteed if Modi’s administration revises its IOK policy of Kashmiri suppression. As the global gaze increasingly mounts on Kashmir, as a nuclear South Asia hovers on the precipice, the time for peace was yesterday.

Islamabad must utilise Modi’s victory as a historic challenge to prepare for any eventuality, combining both hard and soft power. A strategically appropriate Shaheen II missile test launch at the exact moment of Modi’s victory was a well-timed “hard-power” message balanced with PM Imran Khan’s congratulatory tweet to Modi exhibiting diplomatic “soft power”.

Success in international relations is contingent upon locating and leveraging the optimal space between hard and soft power.

Published in The Express Tribune, May 30^th, 2019.

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