I, Leader

As long as the TTP maintains a centre of gravity in Afghanistan, we will never win this war

I am the leader and I see red. Blood red. Red is the colour of rage. But rage is not a plan of action.

Here I sit in my study as yet another day dissolves into the cold darkness of the night. Finally I am alone. I need to clear my head and organise my thoughts. Alone. The responsibility on my shoulders weighs a tonne. I know it burdens me with a duty I must fulfill. Am I fulfilling this duty? Have I failed the parents of Charsadda victims?

Director General ISPR says five terrorists involved in the Charsadda attack have been apprehended. They are Pakistanis but they crossed over from Afghanistan via Torkham for this bloody carnage. They will certainly hang. But their hanging will not ease the pain of burying those children they helped murder in Charsadda.

Charsadda should not have happened. After the pummeling we have given the TTP; after the cleansing and mopping we have done in North Waziristan; after the intelligence-based operations in cities; after all these and the narrative of victory – Charsadda should not have happened.

Here’s what my mental map tells me: Since the time we launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb and especially since the APS tragedy, our strategy has worked fairly well. It was premised on two parallel streams: first, smash the TTP’s headquarter – their centre of gravity – in North Waziristan and shatter their ability to plan and execute attacks from the relative safety of their lair; second, snatch n’ grab their operatives in cities and towns and go after their sympathisers, benefactors, financiers and affiliates.



This strategy worked fairly well. But clearly not well enough.

The TTP lost its centre of gravity in North Waziristan but gained a new one across the border in Afghanistan. Did we underestimate the significance of this shift? Well, perhaps not because we told Ashraf Ghani in clear terms the attack originated from his soil. Badhaber, Charsadda and other attacks have also been masterminded from across the border. We have solid evidence. We told the Afghans and the Americans time and again to take action against Fazlullah and his band of murderers. So no, we did not underestimate the threat. But the fact is Afghans have done nothing against Fazlullah; the Americans have done nothing against Fazlullah. And perhaps we, too, have not done to Fazlullah what we should have done to Fazlullah.

So what options do we have?

Let’s see, option one is to keep doing more of the same. Well, aren’t we doing that already? We told Ghani after Charsadda the same thing we had told him in December 2014: take action against Fazlullah. He mumbled some weak commitments which we know mean nothing. I can lean harder on the Americans. The Americans don’t say it but I know what they are thinking: “You sheltered Bin Laden on your soil, and you treated Mullah Omar in your hospitals so you’ve got some nerve complaining about the Afghans nurturing Fazlullah on their soil.”

Dammit.

Yes I know the past is another country. Our sins of yore must not be allowed to devour our children. And we do not have much time, because time now is measured in the number of freshly dug graves. I do believe I’m correct in concluding that as long as the TTP maintains this centre of gravity in Afghanistan, we will never win this war.

So what option do I have?

Option two is to send in our boys and neutralise the TTP high command across the border in Afghanistan. The operation itself is not an issue. I would green-light it without a moment’s hesitation. It’s the fallout that stops me. But wait. Let’s talk precedent. The Americans came into Abbottabad and snatched OBL. So they better not talk to me about violation of international borders. Heck, they crossed into our territory earlier also when they raided Angoor Ada. Their allies, the Israelis, have been snatching, grabbing and assassinating their enemies across the globe without a care in the world. Yet, the world may not look too kindly at our boys crossing over into another country and liquidating all threats.

Here’s another option: I could have Fazlullah droned to hell with one of our Buraqs. If the Yanks can rain hellfire on our side, why can’t we return the favour across the Durand Line? But I will need to take the Yanks on board. After Charsadda perhaps this option needs a stronger push.

I believe I’m quite clear after Charsadda: if I cannot solve this Fazlullah problem, I would not have done justice to the duty given to me by my people.

But what about the terror-mongers roaming around on our soil? We are hunting them down one by one, yet there are complications. We live in a nasty neighbourhood where regional thugs don’t play nice. Neither do we. But if Pathankot can happen without us knowing about it, something is not right. I know it. But can I do something about it? It is my responsibility, my obligation, my call of duty and perhaps my number one priority to crush these monsters. And yet, there are too many gray areas where rules don’t make much of a sense.

And that’s our flaw.

A strange thing is happening though: with each new grave dug, and each freshly martyred Pakistani lowered into it, my mind clears. Our mind clears. All those grey areas, all those sly motivations and twisted justifications are gradually losing traction. What use of the clever games we play if those games come back to haunt us? What use of belligerent policies if they come back to bite our children?

History is brutally unforgiving. But it favours the bold. Can I rise above and beyond political and institutional limitations and do what needs to be done to decisively win this war? Can I? Dare I?

When I preside over official meetings, I am presented with many options. But when I look into the eyes of the mother who just buried her son, I realise I have one, and only one, option.

Published in The Express Tribune, January 24^th, 2016.

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