The Qadri game

Qadri’s strategic behaviour seems to be to demonstrate people’s power with a desire to change the electoral system.

Oligopoly in economics is a situation where a few players compete for market share by matching a rival strategy, as decisions are interdependent. Applying game theory to the oligopolistic state of play in our politics offers some interesting insights. There is a general impression that Dr Tahirul Qadri’s million-march has challenged Islamabad. Both parties know the implications of such a march but they are waiting for the real show. This strategic behaviour seems irrational. The first principle of rational behaviour is to avoid a strategy that has an alternative strategy raising a rival’s payoffs for all possible strategies. Dr Qadri’s strategic behaviour seems to be to demonstrate people’s power with a view to concretising his desire to change the electoral system. Based on the first principle, the outcome depends on how strongly Dr Qadri wants to march towards Islamabad and the extent of support he can muster from other parties.

The possible outcomes are that Dr Qadri fails and goes back to Canada, that the status quo ends or that he has a significant role in the existing system. He has, thus, nothing to lose. Either the status quo remains and the PPP and the PML-N run the show in the future, or Qadri wins and political parties lose out. In the event of a successful march, voters have three choices: the PPP, the PML-N or the third force/the collusion forces (Qadri, the MQM, PTI and PML-Q). Obviously the ruling parties, PPP and PML-N, do not want a threat to the status quo. Nor would they like Dr Qadri to emerge as a significant player in the system. In other words, their interest is served best if the march is not a success by any reckoning. The preferred outcome for Islamabad is to maintain the status quo. The available set of alternatives for the current system, which is mainly run by the PPP and the PML-N with the support of smaller parties, comprises a do-nothing approach — be part of the collusion or use force to prevent the march.



There is, however, more to the strategic behaviour than meets the eye. As a result of the success of the march, the PPP will have a chance to delay the elections and prolong its rule. In the process, the chances of the PML-N winning the elections in the next few months will diminish. This is an altogether different prospect. The PPP may ultimately join the march, announce electoral reform and delay the elections until the reform is completed. In this scenario, Dr Qadri has a significant role in the reformed system. The question is: will the PPP-led alliance be willing to a have a reformed structure with a significant role for the judiciary and the military? The position may be difficult to swallow for the old guard of the PPP with its strong, ideological stance about civilian supremacy. However, the reconciliation-happy flexi-regime of the PPP under President Asif Ali Zardari may have no qualms about it. They can sell it at the right time for political forces to bring the judiciary and the military on board. After all, the democratic system is open to change and to influencing voters. There is no greater goalpost for a political party than to keep power to look after its workers and voters.

Based on the first principle outlined above, collusion is the dominant strategy for all the players. This means engaging Qadri in negotiations to delay the march. As in the prisoner’s dilemma, holding out is a dominated strategy but confession is the only strategy combination that does not contain strictly dominated strategies.

Published in The Express Tribune, January 4^th, 2013.