President Asif Ali Zardari’s meetings with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in New York on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly session were claimed to have injected greater clarity to the US ‘endgame’ plans for Afghanistan.
If so, there is little evidence of this. Conscious of the need not to draw the electorate’s attention to the “good war turned bad”, President Barack Obama made only a passing reference to Afghanistan in his nomination speech, mentioning that “in 2014, our longest war will be over”. Mitt Romney ignored this issue.
Senior US Administration officials, however, insist that they remain committed to pursuing “peace and reconciliation”, irrespective of campaign pressures. The reality, however, is that exploratory talks between the US and the Taliban, suspended earlier this year, have not yet resumed. Moreover, the designation of the Haqqani network as a terrorist group is unlikely to help, as is evident from the Taliban’s description of this action as “inhuman and criminal” by a “deceitful America”.
Another element of uncertainty is President Karzai’s future. While he is barred by the Constitution from seeking a third term, he wants to have a say in who succeeds him. Recent sharp increase in ‘green-on-blue’ attacks has added a note of urgency and uncertainty, especially with regard to the army’s unity, coherence and discipline. While Defence Secretary Leon Panetta dismissed it as the “last gasp” of the Taliban; analysts compared it with former vice-president Dick Cheney’s claim in 2005 that the Iraqi insurgency was “in its last throes”. In fact, General Martin Dempsey called the attacks “a very serious threat to the campaign”, which would mean that the Taliban have achieved a major advantage by creating mistrust between the US-Nato and Afghan forces. This may explain why the US is unable to flesh the bare bones of its 2014 roadmap.
President Karzai’s latest outbursts against both Pakistan and the US have not amused either country. With regard to Pakistan, he came up with strange “conditions” that he feels Pakistan has to comply with if it wants to conclude a “strategic pact”. These conditions are so loosely defined and impractical that they could, at best, be viewed as pious wishes rather than achievable objectives. The US, on the other hand, was accused of playing a “double game” by fighting against Afghan militants rather than their backers in Pakistan.
Last weekend’s New York Times was right to point out that the US Administration had failed to make headway in talks with the Taliban because it “has not been persistent enough in figuring out how to initiate talks with a resilient, brutal insurgency”. It called on the US not to “give up completely on a negotiated solution” nor wait till 2014 “for the beginning of serious negotiations”. On the other hand, US sources confided to select journalists that the Taliban had proven far more “resilient” than had been anticipated, forcing the US to lower its earlier objectives and instead encourage the Afghans to work out a deal among themselves and also agree to a role for Pakistan in an eventual settlement — a startling change from its earlier ambition to dictate the peace terms to the Taliban.
All this can only mean that the agony of the Afghans is unlikely to end in the near future. A well-known expert on Afghanistan, Gilles Dorronsoro of the Carnegie Endowment, wrote recently that the Kabul regime “will most probably collapse in a few years”. He fears that “political fragmentation, whether in the form of militias or the establishment of sanctuaries in the north, is laying the ground for a long civil war”.
There is, therefore, merit in Pakistan’s urgings that the withdrawal plan of foreign troops needs to be in sync with developments on the political front, which is likely to become more complicated as the perception of America’s growing disinterest in that country gets reinforced. Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan’s peace and security is not academic, but inherently linked to its own.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 10th, 2012.
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@USCentcom.
While your comment maybe politically correct it's obvious that your not on the same page and I would observe your not even reading the same book.
A decent analysis. Unfortunately things will not be looking good for any of the so-called partners in this war. Whether US leaves earlier or later than 2014, the civil war in Afghanistan seems quite imminent at this point. I would not be surprised by Afghan army posing itself as a major stakeholder in the civil war trying to grab the remnants of the government in Kabul. Outside Kabul, its a different story, it always has been.
The fallout of the civil war will be again in Pakistan in the form of refugees to say the least. I just can not settle my brain to think that Taliban will not come back in power circles. If joint forces of world's top armies could not eliminate them, how would Pakistan and/or Afghanistan after US/NATO leaves. There has to be a political settlement. Bang & burn tactics just don't and won't work in this area.
Looking back at the decade-long crisis, every side involved lacks just one much-needed attribute - the ability to compromise to the ground realities. There will be end to this crisis someday inshallah and that day will only come when the parties finally recognize the need for a give-and-take solution.
@Ahmed: Dream on. The US has expended enough blood and treasure and is leaving in 2014. After that its up to the afghans and pakistanis to sort through their troubles.
Pakistan's involvement is only a matter of being considerate. If you don't get what you want, it's your own fault due to your double speak and harboring the enemy. Pakistan isn't the only country that can react to abuse. Most just don't put on a show about it and it ends up being reflected in policies, such as excluding Pakistan.
There is, therefore, merit in Pakistan’s urgings that the withdrawal plan of foreign troops needs to be in sync with developments on the political front, which is likely to become more complicated as the perception of America’s growing disinterest in that country gets reinforced. Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan’s peace and security is not academic, but inherently linked to its own.
Translation-
NATO/ISAF, Please do not go yet. We fear we are likely to be overwhelmed by our own proteges. Do stick around and neutralise them, while we loudly protest and condemn your interference.Thank You.
@author: You could have perhaps elaborated on "developments on the political front" to accompany withdrawal of troops. The Taliban have always described themselves as an Islamic movement, but there have been indications that some elements in it prefer to see themselves as representatives of Pashtun nationalism and hence prepared to terms at the negotiating table on the future of Afghanistan. The US wants Pakistan to help bring these elements for discussions. Given its economic problems and the uncertainty amongst some of the consequences of Taliban rule (from Kabul) on Pakistan, some would like negotiations but uncertain where to go beyond reiterating that Pakistan must have a seat at the table to decide on the end-game. On the other hand, given the time and investment that Pakistan has made on the Taliban, many want to wait departure of US troops to see how to go ahead. The real issue is that Pakistan does not have strong cards to play now, apart from GLOC (the last caper of blocking it cost the Pakistanis relatively more than the US or NATO), and may have even less after the US departs when they may have to face a surge in Islamic movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan on having "defeated" the sole Super Power.
@Mirza: As always Pakistan seems to be underestimating the fallout from US/NATO withdrawal in 2014. The Military mindset steeped in strategic depth is alive and kicking, sadly even the loss of 40,000 citizens could not bury it. A golden chance to wipe out the Taliban (good,bad and ugly) either side of the Durand line is being lost. Pakistan having learnt no lessons from from all its self created tragedies is likely to come out of this with egg on its face and blood on its hands. Bluff and bluster is no substitute for real politic and with no accountability and little sense of responsibility Institutions are at each others throats. Sadly, there is little to make people hopeful.
@Chris:
It will be what Pakistan intends. U'l find out.
Mr. Author! It is not only Karzai who is asking Pakistan to stop supporting and nurturing extremists but the entire world is demanding Pakistan to give up its policy of using extremists as foreign policy tool. And more importantly, these allegations are not unfounded, For example, all acts of terror are traced to Pakistan, Mr. Osama bin Laden and other leaders of his organizations were killed and captured in Pakistan. What you will say about these crystal clear facts?
Endgame in Afghanistan, if there is one, will not be as Pakistan intended.
The author (like most in Pakistan) just doesn't get it. Pakistan isn't going to get a say in the "end game" - that ship has sailed. The USA views both Pakistan and Afghan leaders as corrupt, inept, and unreliable. The "end game" is pretty straight forward - the American's will leave a cost effective but lethal military footprint sufficient to keep the Taliban from formally taking control while allowing the USA the freedom to target militants in the region. Afghanistan and Pakistan will mirror each other --- lots of religious militants and corrupt central govt's which control a fraction of the territory they consider "sovereign".
"There is, therefore, merit in Pakistan’s urgings that the withdrawal plan of foreign troops needs to be in sync with developments on the political front, which is likely to become more complicated as the perception of America’s growing disinterest in that country gets reinforced."
In other words, US should delay its plan until it reaches a political solution with Afghan Taliban and Haqqanis - which is never considering that they are protected in Pakistani safe havens. In the meantime, security aid continues and Pakistan does not have to face payday for all its perfidies until the GLOC is operational. Nice try. The green on blue attacks which have caused joy within certain circles within Pakistan thinking it will delay US exit may do just the reverse. At some point a decision might simply be made to cut the losses and leave. Then Pakistan will be left alone to deal with Haqqanis and Afghan Taliban who have never recognized the Durand line anyway. Haqqanis are already ruling NWA and once US is gone, how long do you think before they rule the entire FATA?
@BlackJack: I agree with your comments 100%. The dream of Taliban coming back in power is over for good. Even when Taliban were in full control they could not completely overrun the Hazara and Northern Alliance. With much more training by the US of anti Taliban elements and effective actions against Taliban, it is not going to be easy for Taliban even after 2014. In addition the US would not leave the area in vacuum and would keep its drone campaign active and effective. It would be a repeat of the withdrawal from Iraq after the US invasion. Cheers, Mirza
There is, therefore, merit in Pakistan’s urgings that the withdrawal plan of foreign troops needs to be in sync with developments on the political front. Which are these developments on the political front that need to wait till the withdrawal of foreign troops? Pakistan is still placing its money on its proxies taking control of Afghanistan. Karzai may be corrupt and probably has no domestic constituency to speak of, but he is spot on in spelling terms for a strategic partnership that is more Pakistan's interest (mainly because of a similar agreement with India), as well as in pointing out the US reluctance to nail Pakistan's perfidy due to its exit logistic- related concerns. What Pakistan does not understand is that while the Afghan army may not be a cohesive, professional unit, they are still unlikely to defect to the Taliban. The funny thing almost everyone else can afford to wait till 2014 except Pakistan. As long as Pakistan decides to continue the waiting game and to play the genial host to its Haqqani and Quetta Shura buddies, the situation within the country will only get worse - and 2014 is a long time away.