The writer is a graduate of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
He tweets @uzairyounus
The ghastly attacks in Paris have brought to the fore fears about the presence of the Islamic State (IS) in Pakistan. The Foreign Office has ruled this out, with Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry stating that the country was winning the war on terror. The firm rejection of IS presence is wrong, and numerous reports can be cited as evidence that the group has a nascent presence in the country. More important, however, is the claim that Pakistan is winning this war. What defines ‘victory’ in a war against multiple non-state armed groups?
If victory is being measured by the effect of kinetic counterterror and counter-insurgency operations across Pakistan, then, surely, the country is winning. The number of terror attacks has fallen dramatically since the military went on the attack in North Waziristan. Karachi’s descent into the abyss has also been stemmed with both the Rangers and local police stepping up to the plate. We have not seen a high-profile attack on military installations for some time. All of this is evidence that terror cells have been disrupted across the country. This aggressive posture has thrown the enemy off-balance. Command and control centres have been eliminated in the tribal areas, militant leadership is on the run, and the grip of fear across Pakistan has receded.
A surge focused on increased kinetic operations can reduce violence. Without a suitable non-kinetic strategy, however, this reduction in violence is not sustainable, for it does not destroy the ecosystem of terror within society. We have seen evidence of this in both Afghanistan and Iraq, where violent groups hit back with a vengeance once military forces pull back.
In Pakistan, terrorists might be on the run, but the environment that enabled them to carry out deadly attacks continues to exist. This environment breeds on financing networks, extremist preachers using mosques and seminaries radicalising the youth, and an overall lack of capacity of local law-enforcement agencies. Victory, therefore, must be measured by the impact of both kinetic and non-kinetic operations on terror networks, as well as their impact on the ecosystem of terror in the country. Such a strategy demands a more long-term outlook. Inter-provincial cooperation, civil-military engagement and a consensus on strategic reforms is needed to achieve a permanent victory in this war. Three broad areas that require immediate discussion and consensus are curriculum and seminary reforms, measures to eliminate the shadow economy and enhancing inter-agency cooperation across the country.
While a large majority of seminaries provide religious education, a handful of seminaries continue to radicalise the youth. Instituting reforms and reaching a consensus with the religious lobby on the way forward has to be a priority. The past has shown how difficult madrassa reform can be, but this does not mean that the government gives up and turns a blind eye to this problem. In fact, the government must take advantage of public opinion and mount pressure on the religious lobby to accept much-needed reforms.
The shadow economy is where terrorists raise the money and resources to carry out their attacks. Some estimates place Pakistan’s shadow economy at 100 per cent of its GDP. This enables terrorists to raise large sums of money, while constraining the ability of the government to raise revenue, some of which could be used to increase funding for cash-strapped local law enforcement. While the enemy is free to raise large sums for advanced weapons, Pakistan’s local police forces have to fight with outdated weaponry due to resource constraints. This compounds civil-military relations in the country, as policymakers lean on the military to combat terrorists that outgun local law enforcement.
Finally, the enemy not only coordinates its attacks with other militant groups within Pakistan, it also collaborates with international terrorist organisations. Such an enemy cannot be defeated by a single institution of government. Greater inter-agency and inter-provincial coordination is a first step. Enabling law enforcement and intelligence agencies to collaborate with each other will aid in the development of a broader understanding of terror networks across Pakistan. Such coordination is necessary to ensure that intelligence gathered from raids in one part of the country leads to quick action against terror networks in other regions.
Besides claiming that “the back of the terrorists has been broken”, the government has been unable to showcase strong performance on these non-kinetic strategies. It has single-mindedly focused on eliminating terrorists, while ignoring the fertile soil upon which terrorists breed. Pakistan has been chipping away, successfully, at the ability of terrorists to operate in the country. Given all the chaos in the region, the relative stability in the country is indeed the result of successful counterterror operations. To sustain this momentum, however, Pakistan must switch gears and focus on the medium- and long-term solutions. Without these, a golden opportunity, brought about by the sacrifices of the military and law-enforcement officers, will be missed.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 21th, 2015.
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