Where did we go wrong?

No war is right, period. I am not making an ideological argument or saying this from the point of view of a pacifist. Wars everywhere have failed to offer a solution to troubling issues. Nevertheless, they happen with some frequency. History is replete with examples from the ancient to medieval and modern times that nations, big and small, have gone to wars for one reason or another. The great powers, particularly those of our own times — the Soviet Union and the United States — have gone to wars that proved deadly and self-destructive in Afghanistan and Vietnam. It seems the countries in the Middle East haven’t learnt any lessons. Look at the three wars going on simultaneously in Iraq, Yemen and Syria, pushing millions of people to the margins of life. Wars are bad, very bad and destructive. In the end, everyone loses, and there are no winners.



While we proudly recall the great, heroic sacrifices that our men and women in uniform made in the defence of the country 50 years ago, we must also reflect on the quality of leadership, its vision, thinking and the decisions it took that led to the 1965 war. It is true that they were able to create a spirit of solidarity, Pakistani nationalism and a tremendous emotional atmosphere. The people, the armed forces and the government of Field Marshal Ayub Khan stood united. Facing an Indian invasion directed at Lahore and Sialkot created one of those first moments in Pakistan’s history when the whole nation came together. The censored, manipulated and one-sided narrative that dominated the state-run information system worked magically on the minds of a nascent nation that was in a state of a real war with India. The hatred for ‘Hindu’ India was at its highest, and so was the spirit within us to go to the borders and fight to the last.

While I salute the heroism and sacrifices of our soldiers to defend the country, I believe that the Ayub Khan government created the right conditions for war by orchestrating Operation Gibraltar — our intrusion into Indian-held Kashmir months prior to the full-scale war between India and Pakistan. The lessons of its failure were not learnt, and the regime blundered further into launching Operation Grand Slam by sending regular troops to cut Jammu off the Srinagar valley. Was it rational to assume that India will confine itself to defending its position in disputed Kashmir territories and not react along the international borders? Was there any calculation of how long the country could sustain the war when it had very little infrastructure in terms of its own defence production capability or an economy to support the war effort? There are no satisfactory answers.

The valour, tactical brilliance and spirit of sacrifice among our soldiers led to a stalemate, forcing India to accept ceasefire and sign the Tashkent Declaration. However, animosity and distrust between the two countries deepened and the emotional distance further expanded towards opposite directions.

The stability, order and the pace of development that Ayub Khan had created suffered the gravest of blows. The elite consensus that the general was able to create around his leadership and the vision of politics and development he had established began to collapse. Within a few years, he had to face a democratic movement against him. This was actually a nationwide uprising that consisted of the youth, labour and political parties of all shades and opinions. Many of Pakistan’s political misfortunes have origins in the 1965 war.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 9^th,  2015.

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