Mullah Omar’s demise — opportunities and risks
Now that Afghanistan has legitimate elected govt, military establishment should gradually distance itself from Taliban
The writer is a retired lieutenant general of the Pakistan Army and a former federal secretary. He has also served as chairman of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board
The announcement of Mullah Omar’s death has created a leadership crisis, giving rise to uncertainties regarding the fate of the Afghan Taliban and prospects of peace in Afghanistan. Keeping Mullah Omar’s death secret was a deliberate move on the part of Mullah Mansoor to maintain his grip on the Taliban and prevent the possibility of dissensions in the second tier leadership at a critical time. It also betrays lack of confidence on the part of Mullah Mansoor. He presumed that orders issued on behalf of Mullah Omar would be complied with and will not be challenged.
The Afghan Taliban leader was such a venerable figure and held in such high esteem that he was considered infallible. A certain mythical aura surrounded his personality and being a recluse, it was easy to hide the news of his death. This ruse helped Mullah Mansour retain control over various factions of the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistani security establishment, being supportive of his leadership, helped maintain the secret. Looking at this from a historical perspective, it would be interesting to know if our security apparatus knew of his death in 2013, and whether he died in a Karachi hospital, as some journalists maintain, or in Afghanistan as announced by the Taliban leadership. Another point of interest would be to find out who leaked the news at this time and what the motivation behind the disclosure was.
With the secret now out, Mullah Mansoor faces a serious challenge of establishing himself as the legitimate leader of the Afghan Taliban. Moreover, he will need to put forward some explanations as to why he kept Mullah Omar’s death a secret for so long. The question of leadership acquires greater significance in the backdrop of the ongoing peace negotiations. As of now, these have been held in abeyance. Unless Mullah Mansoor is legally authorised by the Taliban’s political council, he will carry no clout or authority and may be treated as a lackey of the Pakistani security apparatus by his detractors, especially since the general impression is that the Taliban nominees for the dialogue were close to Pakistan. It is not surprising that concerns are being raised that the delegation that engaged in earlier talks with the Afghan government did not truly represent the Taliban and did not have the approval of its political council.
If the leadership tussle is not solved soon, it might lead to the splintering of the Taliban movement. Already, some groups led by Mullah Zakir have shown their inclination to dissociate from or disown the leadership of Mullah Mansoor. The danger is that these groups may join the Islamic State (IS) or al Qaeda, although Afghan tradition and a study of Afghanistan’s past insurgencies indicate that Afghans have been very consistent in opposing the hegemony of any outside group. Whether they will show the same proclivity when it comes to the IS is not certain.
Future relations with Afghanistan will depend on how Pakistan is able to play a role in the peace process and its dealings with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan is already overstretched on several fronts and is making a sincere effort at bringing peace on its borders, and realises that relations between the two countries are pivotal to peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region.
The benefits of the China- Pakistan Economic Corridor can only be fully actualised if there is peace in Afghanistan and the tribal areas. In the same vein, China also has an interest in Afghanistan’s stability. If Afghanistan or the border areas in Pakistan face insurgency and instability, this will have an adverse impact on the security of the western and central regions of China.
All these compelling factors have provided Islamabad with a fresh opportunity to revisit its relations with the Taliban. Mistrust created over the years, with respect to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and the country’s role in influencing Afghanistan’s internal politics, have not gone down well with Afghans. There is no doubt that the conditions prevailing in Afghanistan and the regional dynamics of that time necessitated support for the Taliban. However, now that Afghanistan has a legitimate elected government, the military establishment should gradually distance itself from the Taliban. Pakistan’s primary motive now is to assist Afghanistan stabilise. The best way of doing this is for Afghans to come up with an ‘Afghan-led Afghan-owned policy’ as forcefully advocated by President Ashraf Ghani and officially endorsed by our government. This will allow Pakistan to gain acceptance and goodwill in Afghanistan, and synergise with the current policy of developing a strong and enduring relationship with a key neighbour.
In any case in the emerging scenario, Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban leadership is declining as we effectively clear their sanctuaries and deny them the hospitality they enjoyed in the past. By denying Pakistani space to the Afghan Taliban, their capacity to wage insurgency in Afghanistan should decline. Clearly, in the changed strategic environment, it is not in our interest that the Taliban enjoy power in Afghanistan because of its negative fallout on the tribal belt and the ideological affinity that they have with the TTP. It is time both countries started according high priority to the great potential that exists for increasing trade and commerce due to their strategic location.
For other reasons, too, it is important that Pakistan changes direction. The threat of the IS making inroads in Afghanistan and Pakistan does exist. Therefore, effective control of Fata and improved governance of remote areas in Pakistan is critical. There is a school of thought that believes that the IS will never be able to establish a foothold in Afghanistan because Afghans have always opposed any foreign-based ideology. However, facts belie this assumption as there are confirmed reports of some presence of the IS in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kandahar and Helmand. Nonetheless, the Afghan security forces cannot leave this to chance as there is always a first time and they should take all possible measures to counter any threat posed by the IS. The same applies to Pakistan. Mullah Omar’s death provides Pakistan with a fresh opportunity to further strengthen ties with Afghanistan on an enduring basis.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 5th, 2015.
The Afghan Taliban leader was such a venerable figure and held in such high esteem that he was considered infallible. A certain mythical aura surrounded his personality and being a recluse, it was easy to hide the news of his death. This ruse helped Mullah Mansour retain control over various factions of the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistani security establishment, being supportive of his leadership, helped maintain the secret. Looking at this from a historical perspective, it would be interesting to know if our security apparatus knew of his death in 2013, and whether he died in a Karachi hospital, as some journalists maintain, or in Afghanistan as announced by the Taliban leadership. Another point of interest would be to find out who leaked the news at this time and what the motivation behind the disclosure was.
With the secret now out, Mullah Mansoor faces a serious challenge of establishing himself as the legitimate leader of the Afghan Taliban. Moreover, he will need to put forward some explanations as to why he kept Mullah Omar’s death a secret for so long. The question of leadership acquires greater significance in the backdrop of the ongoing peace negotiations. As of now, these have been held in abeyance. Unless Mullah Mansoor is legally authorised by the Taliban’s political council, he will carry no clout or authority and may be treated as a lackey of the Pakistani security apparatus by his detractors, especially since the general impression is that the Taliban nominees for the dialogue were close to Pakistan. It is not surprising that concerns are being raised that the delegation that engaged in earlier talks with the Afghan government did not truly represent the Taliban and did not have the approval of its political council.
If the leadership tussle is not solved soon, it might lead to the splintering of the Taliban movement. Already, some groups led by Mullah Zakir have shown their inclination to dissociate from or disown the leadership of Mullah Mansoor. The danger is that these groups may join the Islamic State (IS) or al Qaeda, although Afghan tradition and a study of Afghanistan’s past insurgencies indicate that Afghans have been very consistent in opposing the hegemony of any outside group. Whether they will show the same proclivity when it comes to the IS is not certain.
Future relations with Afghanistan will depend on how Pakistan is able to play a role in the peace process and its dealings with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan is already overstretched on several fronts and is making a sincere effort at bringing peace on its borders, and realises that relations between the two countries are pivotal to peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region.
The benefits of the China- Pakistan Economic Corridor can only be fully actualised if there is peace in Afghanistan and the tribal areas. In the same vein, China also has an interest in Afghanistan’s stability. If Afghanistan or the border areas in Pakistan face insurgency and instability, this will have an adverse impact on the security of the western and central regions of China.
All these compelling factors have provided Islamabad with a fresh opportunity to revisit its relations with the Taliban. Mistrust created over the years, with respect to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and the country’s role in influencing Afghanistan’s internal politics, have not gone down well with Afghans. There is no doubt that the conditions prevailing in Afghanistan and the regional dynamics of that time necessitated support for the Taliban. However, now that Afghanistan has a legitimate elected government, the military establishment should gradually distance itself from the Taliban. Pakistan’s primary motive now is to assist Afghanistan stabilise. The best way of doing this is for Afghans to come up with an ‘Afghan-led Afghan-owned policy’ as forcefully advocated by President Ashraf Ghani and officially endorsed by our government. This will allow Pakistan to gain acceptance and goodwill in Afghanistan, and synergise with the current policy of developing a strong and enduring relationship with a key neighbour.
In any case in the emerging scenario, Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban leadership is declining as we effectively clear their sanctuaries and deny them the hospitality they enjoyed in the past. By denying Pakistani space to the Afghan Taliban, their capacity to wage insurgency in Afghanistan should decline. Clearly, in the changed strategic environment, it is not in our interest that the Taliban enjoy power in Afghanistan because of its negative fallout on the tribal belt and the ideological affinity that they have with the TTP. It is time both countries started according high priority to the great potential that exists for increasing trade and commerce due to their strategic location.
For other reasons, too, it is important that Pakistan changes direction. The threat of the IS making inroads in Afghanistan and Pakistan does exist. Therefore, effective control of Fata and improved governance of remote areas in Pakistan is critical. There is a school of thought that believes that the IS will never be able to establish a foothold in Afghanistan because Afghans have always opposed any foreign-based ideology. However, facts belie this assumption as there are confirmed reports of some presence of the IS in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kandahar and Helmand. Nonetheless, the Afghan security forces cannot leave this to chance as there is always a first time and they should take all possible measures to counter any threat posed by the IS. The same applies to Pakistan. Mullah Omar’s death provides Pakistan with a fresh opportunity to further strengthen ties with Afghanistan on an enduring basis.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 5th, 2015.