America’s Iran gamble: On a wing and a prayer

To the American mind, their best bet is in a regime change or through elevation of younger cadres in Iranian politics

The choices were stark. Iran had bolted the stables and was on the verge of defying the strategic order. Isolated, sanctioned and vilified, Iran resorted to the only option available to it when the chips were down — defiance. More importantly, it hurt and badly at that. It was unable to conduct international trade — with anyone. It could not exploit its rich natural resources which were critically needed by the market, especially when the West had circumscribed what Russia had been filling in, and the space seemed lost to the Iranian potential.

Denied a positive role as a relevant international player in trade and energy, what had defaced Iran was its alleged involvement in many of the internecine conflicts in the Middle East against the interests of the West. That this fact itself is in continuing flux is more a reflection of the numerous contradictions of the Middle East where Iran’s role in Syria and Iraq at one end is inimical while salubrious in other situations. But this is more recent. Before this moment arrived, Iran had made the ‘bomb’ — almost — and caught everyone’s eye. Had it not been engaged with a potential deal, it would have just gone on to build the bomb, and then some more, unleashing the most challenging strategic dynamic of the 21^st century. This was Iran’s strategic riposte to its strategic predicament. And the world was forced to take notice.

There were other determinants for the West, read America, to alter course on Iran. Russia’s resurgence in Europe was a potential game changer of strategic proportions. The only way that the US could do something about it included halting the Russian advance in Ukraine because if Ukraine fell back into the Russian sphere, dominoes would only sweep others of Soviet antecedence. America’s traditional eminence in Europe would have been seriously impaired. There were other complications too. Since the end of the Cold War and the relegation of Russia as just another European state with an observer status in Nato, it had moved on other fronts like becoming the biggest and the most crucial supplier of natural gas to most of Europe, especially the strongest economic giant of them all, Germany. Without Russian gas, Europe would simply freeze, both literally and euphemistically.

To stop Russia then, not only was there a need for it to be halted in its physical advance on eastern Europe, but also in its economic footprint. The shale option from the US was unwieldy, expensive and impractical. Those in Europe, like Germany, who were being constantly harassed by the US to stop import of Russian gas, were now on the verge of an economic imperative that spelt doom without critical energy supplies. They sought a resolution; if not Russia then Iran had to be the alternative source. Else, homegrown compulsions would have seen many of the US’ European partners bolting the tight stable of economic strangulation of Iran after Russia strategically diverted its supplies from a fully dependent Europe to a more congenial China with equally voracious energy needs. Unraveling of the sanctions regime through an internal revolt was imminent. That would have further lowered America’s stock and severely dented its global leadership.

There was also that minor issue of a presidential legacy. The Nobel prize that Barack Obama won for services yet to be rendered included proffering peace. While he may have withdrawn America from ill-conceived adventures and ratcheted down American involvement, he may have only partially completed the terms of the award. The world indeed is worse now with most wars abandoned midway without resolution or a sensible way forward, engendering further chaos. But he has added to the portfolio of his achievements by opening doors to Cuba and reintegrating Iran in the mainstream on the face of it. If these come off as sustaining initiatives, Obama may have hit the jackpot of leaving behind a global legacy as president, an important consideration for presidents as they reach the end of their tenures. In the case of Iran though, there were other determinants that forced his hand.

So then this is what the Iran-US nuclear deal is intended to deliver. Iran will be held back from pursuing the final turn of the screw on assembling a nuclear weapon and will not do so for at least another 10 years. That has bought America, Israel and the Middle East 10 years to deal with what will prove to be a cataclysmic event were it to happen. Next, the West and the rest will hope that the deal gradually mutates into an abiding disavowal of a weaponised programme beyond the 10 and 15 years that it stipulates in its current edition. Most of the world should be working in earnest towards that end. As a consequence, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, the next three breakout nations, too are held back from following suit with matching nuclear ambitions in a strategic rebalance. Had this possibility materialised, it would have only unravelled the existing global order in ways unimagined. The obtained pause remains tenuous unless Iran is engaged in an effective embrace.

In turn, Iran will receive its frozen assets of some $120 billion from international banks and more pertinently will be able to sell gas and oil in the international market, meeting some of the energy requirements in Europe helping reduce European dependence on Russia for the same. The Union may then not fragment under the telling pressure of stagnating economies with alternative energy assured from world’s third-largest gas producer. American eminence over Europe will thus sustain with Russia effectively checked. The physical side of the Russian advance though is still the elephant that will keep the US occupied for some time. The world is no more a neat unipolar existence; it increasingly is a muddle.

As an immediate measure, the deal will go through despite transient hiccups because it remains the best effort at saving most of the existing order. In the interim, while it lasts, how the West can galvanise its strategies to make the deal into a permanent course will mean an engaged effort at diverse fronts to wean Iran away from its intended course. To the American mind, their best bet is in a regime change — as usual — with the likely consequence of a grand failure — as always — or through the elevation of the younger cadres in the Iranian political hierarchy, developing in them the infused wisdom of keeping Iran mainstream by divesting its nuclear ambitions. This is the American hope; practically on a wing and a prayer. Hopes alone usually don't make good policies unless a lot more is invested in their execution.              

Published in The Express Tribune, July 25^th,  2015.

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