The change of army command and civil-military relations

The command of the Pakistan Army changed in a public ceremony on November 29 marked by grandeur and a smart turnout of the troops. Why not? After all, Pakistan’s army chief is not simply a chief of an army. He is a pivot of power in Pakistan and heads the army, whose role is critical to countering terrorism in and around the country.

Such a grand public ceremony was held for the first time on the eve of the transfer of command of the army from General Pervez Musharraf to General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani on November 28, 2007. Earlier, the change of command took place as a limited affair at the General Headquarters. This ceremony used to be similar to the ceremony held at the Joint Services headquarters on November 28 for the office of the chairman joint chiefs of staff committee.

Normally, the appointment of the army chief is announced several weeks before the retirement date of the sitting army chief. However, this time Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made this appointment a day before General Kayani’s retirement. Two factors seem to have caused this delay. First, Nawaz Sharif’s style of governance is marked by slow decision-making and often delaying matters till the last moment. Second, Nawaz Sharif has not been able to overcome the trauma of losing power to the army chief in October 1999.

The prime minister is a political leader and it is not surprising if he balanced professional qualities with political considerations for the selection of the army chief. What seems to have tilted the balance in favour of the new army chief was his low-key and less-known personality outside military circles. He never made any non-professional news. Furthermore, he hails from near Lahore in Gujrat and Nawaz Sharif himself, as well as most of his key advisers also come from the Lahore-to-Rawalpindi area. This must have helped in verifying the political credentials of the general, creating the feeling of him being a ‘known’ and ‘safe’ person.

The notion of a ‘politically safe’ and ‘low profile’ person is not relevant after a general has assumed the command of the army. No matter what the perception of the political leadership is about the army chief, a person reaches this position normally after around 35 years of service. Being in the army is not just a day time job. It is a mindset and a way of life that covers all aspects of the lives of its personnel. Therefore, an army chief is a professional entity, who is responsible for managing a huge professional service. He will always be the army’s man. His relationship with the civilian leadership is going to be professional, task-oriented and consultative, with due deference to constitutional authority. However, he will protect the internal and professional autonomy of his service, and its professional and corporate interests.

The new army chief is expected to carry on with the traditions of civil-military relations as they evolved during the six years of General (retd) Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s tenure. He assumed the command of the army in November 2007 at a time when the reputation of the army’s top commanders had suffered due to General (retd) Pervez Musharraf’s combining of the presidency with the command of the army. General Kayani pulled back the army from active politics and withdrew most serving personnel from civilian jobs. He concentrated on service and professional affairs and gave special attention to improving the living conditions of the junior commissioned officers and non-commissioned personnel and soldiers.

General (retd) Kayani gave space to the civilian leadership and helped the democratic process take root. The decision-making on security-related affairs was a shared exercise between the civilian leadership and the military. Consultative decision-making was practised, although the details and precise strategies of countering terrorism were finalised by the army command.

Despite the army’s withdrawal from active politics, its top command did not hesitate to flex its muscles and put the civilian leadership under pressure when the military felt that the civilian leadership was threatening its primary interests or was trying to bypass it in adopting key foreign policy and security postures. It put its foot down with reference to the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill in September-October 2009. The Memogate episode was another example of how the military built pressure on the PPP government.

The pattern of shared decision-making and deference, on the part of the army command, for the democratic government will continue under the new army chief. However, if the civilian government is unable to ensure good governance, fails to maintain internal political coherence, cannot salvage the economy and alienates a large majority of people, the military will not respect the political leadership.

If the civilian government becomes overambitious and upsets the current pattern of civil-military relations of mutual consultation and shared decision-making on key internal and external security matters, internal stability will be threatened. This can happen if the civilian leadership interferes in professional and in-service affairs, and disregards the military’s interests pertaining to the defence expenditure, service privileges and perks, commercial and business interests, and engages in unilateral decision-making by the civilians on key foreign policy and security issues. The public trial of former army chiefs by the present government, for one reason or the other, can hurt civil-military relations to the disadvantage of the latter.

The military also expects that if the current civilian effort to hold a dialogue with the Taliban does not produce results within two to three months, the civilian government would extend full political support to the army’s effort to establish firm control over most tribal areas and secure the Pakistan-Afghan border.

Any strain in civil-military relations will cause instability in Pakistan. As the political domain is incoherent and divided, the opposition has a tendency to exploit any strain in civil-military relations. The opposition political leaders should avoid pursuing their agendas through street agitation and bypassing of democratic institutions. This can shift the political initiative to the military.

Published in The Express Tribune, December 2^nd, 2013.

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