The ‘politics’ of war

The politics’ of war — the other being — the ‘power’ of war. Both are derivatives of the larger conceptual construct that Carl Von Clausewitz taught us almost 200 years back: ‘war is (but) policy through other means’. To us, reductionists of this semi-literate land immersed in perpetual war, though, war is only a kinetic application monopolised by the state; in this case the military, and chiefly the army as the understanding goes.

Hence, as General Raheel Sharif took reins over the army from the outgoing General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the questions that were most parried were how would the army change; or, will the army now wage a war against the TTP; and how would the army settle into an equation with the civilian rulers. All valid concerns from the perspective of Pakistan’s historical experience, but missing the substance, as these, however important, facets only superficially address what lies at the core of a pervasive imbalance in the civil-military system as new postings and promotions at the level of the army chief and the chairman joint chiefs of staff committee (CJCSC) are put into place.

The Clauswitzean theory of war must of essence build around the two intertwining planks: (a) the ‘politics’ of war, and (b) the ‘power’ of war. The legendary captains of war, Hannibal, or Napoleon literally embodied the concept. In more recent years, these began to be described as soldier-statesmen; Eisenhower and Colin Powell are increasingly so described. In Pakistan, the army chief sits atop the ‘power’ that will execute and conduct war, so is the custodian of the ‘power’ of war. However, since ‘war is (but) a continuation of policy through other means’, there is that interlinking aspect of the ‘politics’ of war, that must remain tied into the concept of war as its overarching umbrella. It manifests either as the political end-state, or simply as the intervening interplay of using force to carve political space to achieve political ends. This remains the touchstone of any military application; outside of it, all military applications is termed adventurism. Military (power of war) cannot be applied in a vacuum, and must have a political (politics of war) end to feed.

Army chiefs, by virtue of long years of military rule, in Pakistan have monopolised both the ‘power’ and the ‘politics’ of war. Even when civilians ruled under democratic set-ups, army chiefs have tended to dominate and drive policy that either responded to perceived threats; or emphasised pursuit of national interests that were so stated by the politics of war. General Musharraf, when he became the president, embodied both the ‘politics’ and the ‘power’ of war in his person. General Kayani too; though, a democratic set-up did ensue in 2008. Why, is the crux that begs a better understanding beyond the enigmatic peculiarity of Pakistan’s power equation. Despite a commonplace belief, it has little to do with the traditional proclivity that many ascribe to the army through historical experience. Rather, in the case of Kayani, it was refined cultivation of what might be called the ‘intellect of war’ that he seemed to have developed into an art, better than the rest.

Kayani was thoughtful and a thinking general; rare in an institutional system that begrudges intellectual brilliance. One, such brilliance is not commonplace, and two, anyone having it and then exhibiting it commonly is perceived as breaking away from the pack while relegating others to relative intellectual subordination.  Kayani used his ingrained intellect with great finesse. He mastered the methodology of logic and reason, and based his argument around such rationale, convincing his audiences around the world of Pakistan’s various political positions on some most vexing political issues with the US, Afghanistan and on those related to the war on terror. He honed this art of derivative reasoning through a simple cause-and-effect mechanism that practically sealed the case. It was always a brilliant expose that impressed diverse practitioners as suave as Hillary Clinton, John Kerry and many more who toed to his office even when a regular government with all its accompaniments existed in Islamabad.

This inter alia brought back the exclusivity and monopoly of the ‘politics’ of war back in his lap. While he was seen to be pushing the military to recede from all civilian areas of functioning, here he was in a rare display of an exceptional intellectual intervention, upping the ante for his civilian peers, where they desperately lagged his prowess in logical thinking, or attention to detail, or suffered because of the absence of the habit and tradition of methodological inquiry and development of reason. It, however, also constrained newer approaches. Such was the solidity of his rationally driven conclusions that little space was left to disagree. That closed the space for initiatives that could have been at variance with what the general espoused. This then became the driver of Nawaz Sharif’s underlying reasons to effect changes as have now occurred in the army’s hierarchy.

General Rashad Mahmood, the heir-apparent, may have been considered a clone of the Kayani model, who would have been coached, perhaps over-coached, in the established beliefs and the inevitability of the political choices that have driven Pakistan’s known positions; whether they be on Afghanistan, relations with the US, India, or on the war against terror. This accumulation of both the ‘politics’ and the ‘power’ in one man deterred the political government away to a ‘safer’ choice of General Sharif — as yet uninitiated to the complexities of domestic and international politics.

Such separation then of the ‘politics of war’ as would have been the necessary accompaniment of General Mahmood, and the ‘power of war’, as is the exclusive domain of General Raheel Sharif as the new army commander, has opened the space for the diplomatic and political initiatives that the Sharif government wishes to put in place. Prime Minister Sharif appears more relaxed; has a smile back; and has begun to talk big again. These are promising signs. But to imagine that a soldier’s intellect was what was holding all this back is a poor reflection of the intellectual capital that resides in the political sphere.

In choosing Raheel Sharif, Prime Minister Sharif, has gone with his instinct. There wasn't a colossus among the ‘probables’ that either chose himself, or needed to be felled to even out the distortions! It would though be a fallacy to assume Raheel Sharif to be someone’s man. In six month’s time, he will be demanding of the same government a clearer way forward, if none has been in the offing till then.

Published in The Express Tribune, November 30^th, 2013.

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