What the Rawalpindi violence tells us

Rawalpindi has always been a relatively peaceful city. For it to be engulfed in flames is very bad news. The last time Rawalpindi caught the world’s attention was when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated here in December 2007. The resulting violence then had spiralled out of control and spread to the length and breadth of the entire country. Six years down the road, Rawalpindi once again witnesses criminals and thugs resorting to violence and murder. The question here is not who is to be blamed but why was the state not prepared to put up a strong defence?

One may agree that the likelihood of a clash between two rival factions taking an even more ugly form has been prevented, but at what cost? This has happened only after the army has been called in and once again asked to perform a role to augment domestic security. Had the army not been called in, it would have been extremely difficult for the local administration to contain the violence.

The state response to the event reveals that there are still problems with the domestic security apparatus in our major cities, which fails to rise to the occasion and protect the life and property of citizens. That the army eventually becomes the final troubleshooter only goes to show the continued failure of the state to invest in improving domestic security. Controlling violence by calling in the army is not a success but a failure. The inability of both the PPP and now the PML-N government to at least develop an efficient security system in major cities only speaks of the priority that the political elite give to safeguarding the life and property of the citizenry. The political system that they head has failed to place requisite state security deterrents to discourage extremists from resorting to violence.

Why don’t we debate the nature and purpose of American aid? In the 1950s and 1960s, we benefited from ‘US development aid’ that focused on helping the people and supporting our economic growth. The aid in the 1980s was meant to strengthen our military and the premier intelligence institution. The American aid that flows in now is primarily meant to help us and America to counter terrorism.

We talk about breaking the begging bowl but where has all the aid that the Americans poured into our bowl gone? Between 2002 and 2010, the US gave Pakistan almost $19 billion. Nearly two-thirds of this money comes in the form of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF). According to Robert Gates, the former US secretary of defence, the CSF has been used to support Pakistan Army operations.

If the primary purpose of US aid has been to counter terrorism, why are we still being terrorised in our major cities? Why have the civilian governments failed to raise the level of our domestic security, at least, in our major cities? If the army is being compensated by the Americans for the military expenditures it is incurring in Fata, why is the government then short of money to build an efficient state response against those who terrorise its citizenry in the cities? If the CSF is meant to reimburse the cost the military incurred in fighting terrorism, then where is the army’s plan to counter terrorism in the cities?

Incidents like the one in Rawalpindi show how vast resources available to the state are being wasted. If a state cannot put up a worthy defence when terrorised in a city that houses its military headquarters and neighbours its capital, then the money being spent to counter terror is not being well spent. The question that the world asks today is not who is terrorising us but why we are allowing ourselves to be terrorised.

The security and stability of our country demands that we review our strategic priorities. Why is all the aid money being spent to fight terror in Fata? Why can’t we spend some of it to develop and improve the security in our major cities?

Published in The Express Tribune, November 19^th, 2013.

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