What went wrong in Afghanistan?

Most of the $1.5 trillion spent by America in Afghanistan have gone into destruction rather than construction.

As the date for America’s withdrawal of combat troops approaches, more and more Americans with deep knowledge of Afghanistan have begun to analyse what went wrong with their country’s 12-year long mission. James F Dobbins, President Obama’s current special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, spoke in London on November 1, to give his version of the Afghanistan story. His emphasis was on the series of opportunities lost by the United States. The September/October issue of the magazine Foreign Affairs carried two essays on the same subject. The one by Karl W Eikenberry argued that in opting for the counterinsurgency strategy or COIN, the American military made a series of mistakes. These doomed the American enterprise from the time this strategy was adopted. Eickenberry’s experience in Afghanistan was unique since he was able to see the evolving situation from two different perspectives. He served as Commanding General from 2005 to 2007 and saw how the American military was operating. Two years later, he was sent back to Afghanistan by President Obama and saw from close distance the political aspects of the struggle Washington was engaged in.

The second essay is by Stephen Biddle, an academic who has studied America’s three wars in the last half century — in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. His main conclusion is that America is heading towards a total defeat that will resemble the one it suffered in Vietnam unless it corrects its course even at this late stage. He favours negotiations with the Taliban in order to save the country from another series of civil wars that occurred after the Soviet Union left Afghanistan. All three arguments have great relevance for Pakistan as the new administration in Islamabad begins the difficult task of articulating its own position with reference to Afghanistan.

Dobbins finds two major faults with the way Washington approached the conflict. Both happened under President George W Bush’s watch. The first was to keep out some of the countries that had aided the United States in the overthrow of the well-entrenched Taliban regime in Kabul. Referring to the help given by Iran, Russia and others, Dobbins argues that “the coalition created at the time should not have been allowed to dissipate”. Iran should have been more deeply engaged rather than shunted aside. Tehran’s “interests are not incompatible with that of the current Afghan government. They don’t like the Taliban, they are worried about drugs, and they want protection for the Shia minority”. The second major mistake was to believe that there was a military solution to the Afghan problem. The Taliban proved to be a resilient force capable of mounting acts of violence. Reconciliation efforts should have started much earlier, perhaps as soon as 2002.

Eikenberry’s focus is on the counterinsurgency strategy, based on a series of what he argues were naive beliefs. He identifies three problems with the concept as applied to Afghanistan. “Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditure of time and resources.” America was running out of both as President Obama entered his second term.

Even more problematic was the stated aim of the strategy to secure the Afghan people by employing the method of “clear, hold and build — in other words, push the insurgents out, keep them out, and use the resulting space and time to establish a legitimate government, build capable security forces, and improve the Afghan economy. With persistent outside efforts, advocates of the COIN doctrine asserted that the capacity of the Afghan government would steadily grow, the levels of US and international assistance would decline, and the insurgency would eventually be defeated.” This was a seriously flawed approach. “Historically, visionary indigenous leaders backed by native populations have been the key to building viable states — not foreigners serving one-year tours of duty, no matter how passionate and skilled they might be.”

Biddle brings into the argument the economic viability of the approach. In fiscal year 2013, the Afghan force’s operating budget of $6.5 billion was more than twice as large as the government’s entire federal revenue. “According to most estimates, after the transition, the United States will need to contribute some $4-$6 billion annually to the ANSF, a pittance compared to the nearly $120 billion it spent in 2011 to wage the war with mostly American troops.”

Given these assessments, what should have been the contours of a strategy Washington should have followed? To begin with, Washington should have concentrated on Afghanistan, leaving Iraq alone. Having disposed of the Taliban regime, it should have quickly built a coalition of the several countries that had their own interests in Afghanistan. Prominent among them were Pakistan, Iran, India, China and Russia. This coalition should have been charged with the task of involving some elements from within the Taliban movement to enter mainstream Afghan politics.

America’s Afghan effort has probably cost upward of $1.5 trillion in the 12-year period between 2001 and 2013. Most of it went into destruction rather than construction. A good part of this should have been left in the hands of development experts to rebuild the country that was destroyed after years of war. The main lesson for Pakistan is that it should work with other regional countries to stabilise its neighbour and concentrate on rebuilding its economy and to help bring the Taliban into the political system. Afghanistan should not become another Kashmir, a contested area between Pakistan and India.

Published in The Express Tribune, November 9^th, 2013.

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