Afghan endgame: Intentions vs Interests

"The new government in Islamabad has good intentions, but no agreement was made," said Hamid Karzai's Chief Spokesperson Aimal Faizi to Afghanistan’s TOLOnews on returning to Kabul after a two-day visit to Pakistan.

This statement was surprising as ‘having good intentions’ means nothing in international relations — it’s all about interests. And Pakistan does not share similar interests with Afghanistan — at least, not with the Karzai government. Therefore, no matter what the intentions are or how benign, if interests don’t converge, there is no hope for partnership.

Karzai’s Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan wants to cling on to power and influence in Kabul and beyond, especially after the American drawdown of troops.

According to a RAND Corporation paper, Karzai, or his successor, have a considerable incentive to solicit additional assistance from India. The Karzai government has realised that it needs to improve the economy to gain legitimacy, which it severely lacks, and outreach to India seems very attractive for this purpose. “A reinvigorated Indian economic aid and reconstruction programme could help the Kabul government continue to build popular support,” argues the paper.

To summarise, Karzai intends to ask Pakistan’s help to contact Taliban leaders and negotiate a peace deal, but his interest is in consolidating and retaining power in Kabul with tacit (or not) Indian assistance. That’s a divergence of intention and interest.

This palpable tilt towards India is Pakistan’s close-to-worst nightmare and a red flag vis-a-vis the country’s strategic interests in the region. As we’ve heard many a times before, a heavy Indian presence in the country’s backyard is unacceptable to Pakistan. Islamabad — or Rawalpindi, for that matter — cannot afford two heavily armed borders. It has to ensure that Pakistan is not ‘encircled’ by India and at the same time, to undermine the Greater Pakhtunistan campaign that can be rekindled. These interests may sound parochial, but they’re real and jarring for the state. But Pakistan does intend on contributing to a stable and peaceful Afghanistan.

Whatever the intentions, with such diverging interests, there is no room for cooperation.

In his latest visit to Islamabad, Karzai and members of the High Peace Council sought Pakistan’s cooperation on two fronts. First, they expected Pakistan to help in convincing the Taliban to take part in dialogue directly with the Afghan High Peace Council — the state’s key negotiator. The ‘onus’ on Pakistan to broker talks with the Taliban is a double-edged sword. It places the country as the central figure in the 2015 power-sharing equation, which Islamabad has coveted for a long time. However, this fundamental role of facilitating the dialogue puts the country in an awkward position vis-a-vis the Pakistani Taliban. This is exactly why Islamabad is hesitating in agreeing to release Taliban prisoners, including Mullah Baradar — the second point that was on Karzai’s Islamabad agenda.

If Pakistan agrees to such a major demand, the Afghan Taliban will interpret this as a weakness on Pakistan’s part and imminent Afghan triumph. Giving them a sense of victory and importance will boost the confidence of their namesake umbrella network across the border that has vowed to defeat the Pakistani state.

With these realities, fulfilling the High Peace Council’s five-step plan, titled “Peace Process Roadmap to 2015”, seems like an insurmountable task. The document begins with “securing the collaboration of Pakistan”, while step 2 — which the country seems to be on right now and comprises the agenda in Islamabad — encompasses undertaking confidence-building measures.

“Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States agree on terms and conditions for delisting, safe passage and other requirements of Taliban leaders willing to engage in peace talks,” it says.

Karzai’s Islamabad trip was his last attempt as president to be relevant in the peace process. Afghanistan goes to the polls in April next year. Karzai cannot be re-elected according to the Afghan Constitution unless he amends it. Therefore, the Taliban — like any guerrilla group — would wait it out. Why should the Taliban negotiate if he is going to leave the whole field for them anyway? This is exactly why the Taliban have refused to talk to Karzai.

This — again — leaves Pakistan in an awkward position. The stakeholders and parties involved in the peace process, namely the US, the UK, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are eyeing Pakistan to lead the course with the Kabul government. But helping Karzai or his successor — who’s likely to be a distant cousin or a cabinet member — compromises Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives at present and after the US drawdown.

It’s clear that the interests and objectives of Islamabad and the Afghan government do not converge. But Pakistan has leverage, with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif having a history of negotiations with the Taliban. Moreover, the central and military institutions — combined and united — seem to be showing restraint and responsibility. Islamabad can agree to play interlocutor and genuinely resolve the power-sharing equation.

Pakistan needs to be cautious. It cannot cleave to its insecurities and expect a solution. However, it can play a mature role in facilitating dialogue, though not directly, with the Taliban, and in return ask for counterterrorism assistance. Pakistan can play a very important role in the region, but not in an intransigent, quasi-imperialist way of just using Afghanistan as a strategic backyard. It needs to play the difficult balancing act. 

Published in The Express Tribune, August 31^st, 2013.

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