An exit strategy

If the ‘good’ Taliban can be persuaded to cooperate, additional troops could help bring the ‘bad’ ones in line.

“Yes, I have heard that British forces have entered Kabul, and now I am wondering how they will get out of there”

— The Khan of Kalat

That was in the nineteenth century. In the meantime, an invader should have learnt how to make a decent exit from Afghanistan. The latest in the series, the US, can start from a review of the situation.

The present policy has failed and the resistance — the Taliban et al — has gained ground. Considering its tribal structure and physical configuration, security in Afghanistan cannot be ensured by any army, local or foreign. It is only possible when major ethnic groups and tribes are on board. Rule by consent and not by diktat, has thus been the norm, whenever the country has been at peace. The Karzai-led dispensation has apparently reached its limits. The Durand Line cannot be sealed. Cross-border movement of militant groups will therefore continue as long as the insurgency lasts.

A decent exit strategy must fulfil the following conditions. It must not be seen as a retreat or a defeat. The Afghans might not have had much to do with 9/11 but a commitment from them to cut all links with al Qaeda is still needed to help the invaders claim that the expedition was not all in vain. And lastly, failure to hand over power to a consensus regime could lead to a civil war. An intra-afghan agreement before the exit is therefore a desirable condition for a successful strategy.

The salient points of the policy options that emerge from the above can now be outlined as follows:

A military surge for a last-ditch effort to force the resistance into submission is indeed an option. However, if it fails to achieve its objectives before the electorate at home runs out of patience, or the allies run out of money, an orderly withdrawal will become impossible.

In the second option a surge will still be needed, even if as a stratagem. If the ‘good’ Taliban can be persuaded to cooperate by peaceful means, additional troops could help bring the ‘bad’ ones in line. In case this non-military manoeuvre fails, adequate forces would be readily available to resume battle. Since a victory of arms best serves a nation’s ego, the military must be seen to have played a major role in the ultimate outcome. Most importantly, if the Afghan mission was aborted without having employed all available military means, for the incumbent US government it would be politically fatal.

Negotiations with the Taliban that have gone on for the last many years, through multiple channels, can now be given a definite direction: the shape of a transitory mechanism; shares of important factions; assurances about al Qaeda; and linkages between withdrawal of foreign forces and reduction in violence.

Because of the decentralised nature of the Afghan polity, much of the above can also be undertaken simultaneously and directly with the tribes and the warlords. It can help matters but may backfire if not done astutely. Neighbouring countries, especially Pakistan, can help in persuading some groups to join the process.

I suspect some parts of this policy are already in the works. I am not sure though, if all the important players in the US – the military and the CIA, for example – are also on board. By default or by design, either of them can subvert or scuttle the process. Lack of consensus in America may well be the last hurdle preventing the exit of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Once in control of their territory, the Afghans will deal with the others on merit. Pakistan being the ‘indispensible state’ for them, must remain several notches above all the rest. Every government in Afghanistan, even when a bit ill-disposed towards us, has ultimately found a working relationship with Pakistan.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 30^th, 2010.