Flawed comprehension

Sometimes, the lack of empathy for the Pakistani state of affairs is subordinate to a very war-like referential state of mind of the American-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In a report issued in the context of terrorism, counterterrorism, and human rights, a panel convened by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) explained how the US government has confused counterinsurgency activities and antiterrorism initiatives with a ‘war paradigm’. War is a state of conflict between or among nations in which the laws of war such as jus ad bello and jus ad bellum apply. Such international laws have been confused by the usage of terms such as ‘the war on terror’, ‘the war on drugs’, and perhaps, even the ‘war on obesity’, which not only obscure legal bases for definition and consequent contextualisation in terms of policy frameworks but also belittle desperately needed counterterrorist activities by exposing inherent flaws in international law and its flouting, such as occurred in the Guantanamo prison fiasco.

The ICJ panel found that “The US’ war paradigm has created fundamental problems. Among the most serious is that the United States has applied the rules of war to persons not involved in situations of armed conflict, and in genuine situations of warfare, it has distorted, selectively applied, and ignored otherwise binding rules, including fundamental guarantees of human rights laws.” The “binding rules” and “fundamental guarantees” that have tended to be violated with impunity during the GWOT are the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the US War Crimes Act and Uniform Code of Military Justice, and almost the entire body of international law governing war and human rights. The ICJ panel concluded that, contrary to the claims of the US government, the established principles of international law “were intended to withstand crises, and they provide a robust and effective framework from within which to tackle terrorism”. That is a far cry from condoning torture as a “necessary” tool as postulated by reputable legal authorities, such as Alan Dershowitz. Such rationalisations have tended to have a minimalist impact on gaining support for antiterrorism activities in developing countries such as Pakistan.

Americans have not been able to comprehend the nuances of Pakistani ethos as well. The continuous barrage of US communique encouraging secularisation has created a cognitive dissonance resulting in a communication gap between the Pakistani public at large and what is perceived to be a monolithic US state entity; conservative values are cherished in Pakistani society, and a stream of reports in the Western media about ‘extremism’, ‘fundamentalism’, and the conservative mindset of the Pakistani public has provoked negative reactions to western perceived attempts at promoting the secularisation of Pakistani society. All of the labels mentioned earlier are abhorrent to a majority of Pakistanis who continue to live peaceful, mundane existences marked by a mixture of progressiveness, conservatism, and traditional Islamic values. A society that displays such values is not easily understood by the West. Bearded men or veiled women are per se not signs of extremism in Pakistani society. An oft-ignored variable is the average Pakistani’s religious orientation; even though religiosity is indispensable to the Pakistani way of life, the average Pakistani voter has shown unequivocal disdain for terrorism. In order to tackle terrorists, they have to be isolated from mainstream society by alienating them from mainstream society, not by stereotyping Pakistani society as uniformly extremist as has happened in American media. This has the potential to even alienate the society; it seems obvious that US policymakers need to understand Pakistanis in their sociocultural context, which they have been failing to do.

In keeping with its own interests and those of Pakistan, the US needs to act as a reliable partner in Pakistan’s development; a ‘neocon’ style of engagement after achieving tactical victories and then withdrawing, as in the case of Afghanistan, will only lead to the emergence of another head of the Pakistani terrorism hydra . The US needs to be perceived in Pakistan as a more reliable partner to instil some confidence in the waning atmosphere of US–Pakistan cooperation. The US cannot just continue to engage the Pakistani leadership as the sole determinant of Pakistani politics in the medium to long-term; the common man has started to appreciate his rights, and, more important, civil society has found a way to depose dictators like General (retd) Pervez Musharraf through ‘agitational’ politics. There are signs of public empowerment in Pakistani society, which American policy echelons cannot just ignore by continuing to rely on the leadership. A win-win scenario will occur when Pakistan benefits from the US, geared at development and good governance, while the GWOT benefits from the suppression of terrorism in Pakistan.

Published in The Express Tribune, April 28^th, 2013.