Pakistan needs to, clearly and with adequate analytical rigour, lay out the guiding principles of the negotiations. First, the economy must pull up from its present nosedive and revive GDP growth to the cruising level, the trend rate of five per cent.
Second, such acceleration in growth has to be integrally related with policies for a more equitable income distribution. The evidence shows that the more equitable the distribution of income, the greater the magnitude of poverty reduction for a given GDP growth rate.
So, the aim of economic policy for Pakistan is a new structure of the growth process that enables growth by the people and for the people. Such an economic structure will provide the necessary scaffolding for strengthening democracy.
Third, the control of the fiscal and balance of payments deficits, respectively, cannot be achieved through the standard IMF recipe of economic contraction. A further reduction in GDP growth would, in fact, increase the fiscal deficit through lower revenues and increase the balance of payments deficit through a reduction in exports. Slower growth would also increase poverty and unemployment, thereby placing an unbearable stress on the fragile democratic edifice.
Fourth, on the issue of negotiating a target budget deficit, let us for once give the IMF a commitment that we can fulfil. On the last occasion, our bureaucracy proposed four per cent of GDP as a budget deficit target when the IMF, I understand, was willing to live with 7.5 per cent. Let us not damage our credibility with such empty-headed heroism. Of course, the government ought to commit to changing the composition of the budget deficit: a drastic reduction in unproductive expenditure involving a smaller, more austere government; elimination of the plethora of tax exemptions; improving tax collection; ending government trading in food grain, which is locking up hundreds of billions of rupees; a proper property tax at the provincial level and a tax on services. But development expenditure must be increased from the present one per cent of GDP to the traditional seven per cent of GDP and focus on reducing the physical constraints to growth: electricity, gas and irrigation water.
This new SCF agreement will not bring fresh cash from the IMF. It will only reschedule the imminent seven billion dollar debt repayment to the IMF that currently the country cannot afford to pay. So, this time, we need to negotiate on the basis of Pakistan’s interests, sound economic reasoning and above all, honesty.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 1st, 2013.
COMMENTS (4)
Comments are moderated and generally will be posted if they are on-topic and not abusive.
For more information, please see our Comments FAQ
Pakistan is a prolonged user of the Fund resources. According to literature, those countries that are in long-term borrowing relationship with the Fund diminish the impact of the Fund policies in terms of reducing the time length of the external crisis.The very fact that such a long association has happened points towards the need to analyse which side is more to blame: the programme design of the Fund based on now-challenged neo-classical economics paradigm, or the lack of commitment from the Pakistani side. I would think both. So the way forward would be to improve on both sides, where Fund has to better its record ever since its role expanded around three decades back under the structural adjustment loans, and on the other side, Pakistani government has to improve its imagination in negotiating doable policies and then improving on compliance. Overall, the debate needs to move on from the very restricted focus on the twin deficits!
Unelected finance minister without any mandate sent to IMF. It is like Shaukat Aziz but without dictatorship unpleasantness. No, thank you.
The tone of this whole article seems to be that Pakistan would be doing a favour to IMF if it took a stand by loan and it has great negotiating leverage. All political parties recognize that Pakistan will NEED an IMF loan soon. This includes PTI which was initially against any foreign loans. In light of this, most of the negotuationg suggestions in this article are not relevant.
"This new SCF agreement will not bring fresh cash from the IMF. It will only reschedule the imminent seven billion dollar debt repayment to the IMF that currently the country cannot afford to pay."
Wrong. IMF does not allow rescheduling of debt. This new arrangement will be a brand new arrangement with its own terms and conditions, not a continuation of the old arrangement with the loan being rescheduled.
The net result MAYBE minimal cash inflow after netting out debt repayment but that is an incorrect way to look at it. In absence of the standby arrangements the outflows would still exist without a counterbalancing inflow from IMF.