Rethinking ‘imperial stretch’

One finds remarkable agreement between the Republican presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, and President Barack Obama on foreign policy issues, specifically relating to our region, including the extended Middle Eastern region. Both want to end the longest war America has fought in history, in Afghanistan, which according to some estimates is costing Washington two billion dollars a week. President Obama has learnt his own lesson, though late, on Afghanistan. Having promised to end wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in his 2008 election campaign, he reneged on his promise. Rather, prompted by the Pentagon and after a careful review of strategy, he ordered a surge in troops, deploying 34,000 more in the battlefield. Besides, he increased drone strikes inside Pakistan and allowed his military command in Afghanistan to launch night raids on Afghan villages, which have created a big wedge between Kabul and Washington. The lesson: the war in Afghanistan cannot be won by military means alone.

What emerged quite clearly in the third debate between the two candidates is that winding down the war in Afghanistan is the first priority. President Obama would like to withdraw according to the announced schedule, and in the meantime, negotiate with the Taliban and regional players to stabilise Afghanistan. Romney would like to expedite, perhaps, pull troops out of the battlefield, if not entirely from the country. Both would like to see Afghans take real responsibility for themselves and their country. The sooner that takes place the better.

There are serious questions being raised within the US and in our part of the world about what exactly Washington has achieved after investing so much of its resources in Afghanistan. Those who portray a failure scenario, rightly argue that the Taliban are stronger than before, the state and nation-building remains as remote as ever and the terrorist networks in the region are flourishing.

My assessment is different. The Afghan state, today, has some institutional infrastructure to stand on and may even be able survive the post-American war. But that will depend on whether the Afghans rise to the occasion and reach some grand compromises on power sharing and reconciliation with the Taliban. In wars like these, we never find clear losers or clear winners; but if there are any real losers, they are the Afghans — notably, the Pashtuns. The ethnic warlords who are preparing for a new bout and have benefited from anarchy and wars are a different story.

The US will remain positively engaged with Pakistan, Afghanistan and the region. No ‘divorce’ will be forthcoming as ‘marriages’ are about mutual convenience. As Americans rethink their ‘imperial’ stretch, Pakistan, for its own intrinsic reasons, will be an important country. But Washington would like to see Islamabad take a preferred direction on domestic and some foreign policy issues. The stretch will have other means to influence.

The bigger change that we are likely to see in US policy towards the extended region is the use of proxies that may be political actors, as well as regional powers aligned so as to indirectly protect and advance American interests. This strategy is going to cost less and put greater burden on the proxies with specific tasks to be accomplished. This is what I mean by other means. I am not sure if this will work or if it will prove to be a lasting solution to the question of projecting American power and influence.

This change in American strategy is necessitated by another consensus — the US must devote its attention and resources to fixing itself more than fixing the world. The US is witnessing  ‘imperial’ fatigue as the two wars have drained its national energy and resources. Focusing attention back on America will make the new administration think hard about any possible war against Iran and about direct intervention in Syria.

Published in The Express Tribune, November 6^th, 2012.