Another rubbish USIP report!

Report suggests if there is attempt to right ‘civil-military imbalance’ right wing rhetoric will grow to US detriment.

“Fixing Pakistan’s Civil-Military Imbalance: A Dangerous Temptation” is the newest jewel to come out of the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), a think-tank based in Washington DC, the previous gem being “Pakistan, the United States, and the endgame in Afghanistan” in which our own Jinnah Institute also had a hand. Whilst the previous one was rubbished very fittingly in the press, this new Report needs discussion too.

Whilst one should have thought that the United States, the country most responsible for creating this ‘imbalance’ by making it convenient for army dictators to take over and then to rule unfettered for years, should ‘fix’ it too, one has to thank the USIP for at least acknowledging that there is an imbalance: a “civil-military divide” so to say, and that the ISI is the military (read army)’s very own spy agency. Which is to say that the two great untruths: one, that there is no divide between the military and the elected government; and two that the ISI reports to the country’s elected chief executive, are just that: complete untruths.

The Report suggests that the US should not attempt to ‘fix’ this imbalance for the reason mainly that the military is not so badly thought of by the people of Pakistan (contradicting itself a sentence later as we will see below), and because “…it must have a minimal degree of resonance … more importantly, with the desired partners, most notably the civilian political elite”. If you will recall, the ‘Afghan endgame’ report too used this ‘elite’ word, in that case “Foreign Policy Elites”, to near death! The Report also suggests that if there is an attempt to right the ‘balance’ the right wing rhetoric will grow to the US’s detriment because it is already not well-thought of.

But let the Report speak for itself on the salient points with my thoughts in parenthesis: “As the mistrust in the US-Pakistan relationship deepens, Washington’s frustration with Islamabad has also grown. Over the past few months, influential voices have begun to recommend that the US take a more aggressive approach to Pakistan by playing up Pakistan’s civil-military divide: prop up civilians while dealing harshly with the military and its spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Specifically, views range from moving to a more hostile ‘containment’ approach that would box in the Pakistan military; to seeing ‘progressive’ civilians as partners and declaring the military as an adversary; to labelling specific members of the military and ISI found to be involved in supporting militants as ‘terrorists’.”

{While the ‘labelling’ bit seems far-fetched, should the military itself not make an ugly example of those within it found ‘supporting militants’? Also, no one needs to deal ‘harshly’ with any Pakistani department of government: all the Americans have to do is to deal directly, and only, with the civilian government. That is all.}

“The premise for this view is that the Pakistani military and intelligence apparatus is undermining US interests in Afghanistan and that it has held civilian governments — who otherwise would be amenable to reversing Pakistan’s traditional strategic paradigm — hostage to its own agenda. Underlying this is the implicit belief that if the strength of the military is undercut and if the civilians are able to take charge in letter and spirit, resulting revisions in Pakistani threat perceptions and national priorities would overlap more neatly with US interests”.

{Where, pray, is the doubt that sections of the “Pakistani military and intelligence apparatus” aka the Deep State are, indeed, “undermining” not only US but also Pakistani “interests” in Afghanistan? Where is the doubt that this same Deep State holds civilian governments “hostage to its own agenda”? How, indeed, does dealing with the Deep State through elected governments “undercut” the “strength of the military”?}

“For one, the majority of Pakistanis do not see a clear good versus bad division between the civilians and the military. Surprising as it may be for Western audiences, the military ranks far higher than the political elite in terms of the trust people place in them. Moreover, while the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis support democratic dispensations over military rule, they tend to draw a distinction between elected and democratic governments; they are much more concerned about the output — read performance — than the process of democracy”.

{If the “majority of Pakistanis” rank the military “far higher than the political elite” how is it that political parties considered close to the army, such as the Commando’s PML-Q, got a trouncing in the 2008 elections? As for the “distinction between elected and democratic governments” I am afraid I am unable to decipher what the USIP intends to say! So, no comments. As for “output — read performance” I do hope the USIP is aware that during all the years of Musharraf’s dictatorship not ONE watt of electricity was added to the national grid?}

“Poor governance discredits governments fairly quickly, after which even those backing them are seen as part of the problem and often find themselves maligned as a result. Interestingly, the relatively greater trust Pakistanis place in the military has traditionally meant that civilian politicians get blamed and discredited more readily than the military..”.

{Is it not the case that because the military is accountable only to itself thanks to the Americans paying moneys directly into accounts operated by the Deep State, it spends hundreds of millions of rupees in self-promotion and in fuelling anti-civilian government propaganda? Where is the secret in any of this?}

I can only say in conclusion that the United States must immediately fix Pakistan’s Civil-Military Imbalance. There is no need for any Draconian measures: all it needs is to speak to the military (read army) through civilian elected governments in Pakistan and channel all aid through them. No more, no less.

P.S. As for the anti-US “right wing rhetoric” in Pakistan, might one ask the authors of the Report just WHO fuelled this rhetoric with cash and other inducements in the first place? No prizes for guessing though!

Published in The Express Tribune, May 25^th, 2012.