An unwinnable war

The American war in Afghanistan is now the longest ever fought by the only remaining superpower. In a few months time, the war – the third in a row after the Soviet debacle and civil conflict – will enter its tenth year. With this, Afghanistan will be the only country in the modern world to have suffered devastation from 30 years of unending wars.

These wars have caused tremendous pain and suffering to the Afghans. The current war that set the objective of peace, stability and reconstruction of the Afghan state and nation is no where close to achieving most of its goals. The victory against the Taliban insurgents, mainly Pashtuns, remains as elusive as ever.

As the war in one of the most difficult terrains, with a hostile population, has dragged on, a feeling of fatigue has set in among some of the coalition partners of the US. Under pressure from their public, some of these countries want to withdraw their troops as early as possible. A few have already given their timetables for calling their troops back.

The American war in Afghanistan doesn’t enjoy wide support within the Congress, or among the citizens, on the scale it did when the invasion was launched in 2001 to destroy the Taliban regime. Support for more war in Afghanistan is dwindling at a time when the Taliban insurgency is on the rise and becoming more threatening.

It is remarkable how the Taliban have survived the American war, bided their time, regrouped and gained enormous power to deny the United States the clear and decisive victory it wanted. The Taliban insurgency has forced the US to rethink the nature of its security commitment to the Afghan government in more or less the same way the mujahideen resistance compelled the former Soviet Union to re-examine its war in the country.

There are two serious questions under debate in the US and western security establishments: Is the cost of the war, both in human and material terms, worth the objectives being pursued? Why should British, American and other members of the coalition sacrifice their blood for incompetent and corrupt power elites in Kabul? These questions may dominate the Afghan strategy for the coming months and even years, as the surge strategy that was conceived on the pattern of Iraq has greatly failed in Marja, in eastern Afghanistan.

US President Barack Obama’s unveiling of a new Afghan strategy in December, in which he announced a troop surge to weaken the Taliban and a drawdown of troops in 2011, marks a shift in American thinking. In subsequent policy statements, Washington has tried to assure its Afghan allies that it will not quit and run Vietnam-style and has kept conveying an important message to them: they must put their house in order and take greater responsibility for their national security.

From the beginning, the Taliban have counted on the time factor against the Americans staying in such a remote and difficult terrain. The strategy has worked in their favour as they continue to increase their influence in the Pashtun regions.

This stark reality has hit Afghan President Hamid Karzai in the face, forcing him to explore a dialogue option with certain layers of the Taliban. Americans are no longer averse to the idea of dialogue with the Taliban if they accept three conditions — they accept the constitution, renounce militancy and break ties with al Qaeda.

The Taliban may have their own conditions, like a firm timetable for American departure, and may not enter a dialogue until they strengthen their position further in the Pakhtun regions.

Published in The Express Tribune, July 26^th, 2010.