‘Tightening the rules’: CIA makes concessions on drone campaign

US military has demanded more selective strikes.

After US military and diplomatic officials complained that large strikes were damaging Washington’s already fragile relations with Pakistan, the Central Intelligence Agency made a series of secret concessions in its drone campaign, The Wall Street Journal reported.

Many key US military and state department officials have demanded more selective strikes, which has pitted them against CIA brass who want a free hand to pursue suspected militants. The disputes became so protracted that the White House launched a review over the summer, in which US President Barack Obama intervened.

The review ultimately affirmed support for the underlying CIA programme. But a senior official said: “The bar has been raised. Inside CIA, there is a recognition you need to be damn sure it’s worth it.”

Among the changes: the state department won greater sway in strike decisions; Pakistani leaders got advance notice about more operations; and the CIA agreed to suspend operations when Pakistani officials visit the US.

The CIA concessions were detailed by high-level officials in a series of interviews with The Journal. But in a measure of the discord, administration officials have different interpretations about the outcome of the White House review. While some cast the concessions as a “new phase” in which the CIA would weigh diplomacy more heavily in its activities, others said the impact was minimal and that the bar for vetting targets has been consistently high.

“Even if there are added considerations, the programme — which still has strong support in Washington — remains as aggressive as ever,” said a US official.

To some degree, the programme has become a victim of its own success. Many officials at the Pentagon and state department privately argued the CIA pays too little attention to the diplomatic costs of air strikes that kill large groups of low-level fighters.

The CIA and the state department have been at odds for months over the use of drones. Tensions flared with the arrival in Islamabad late last year of a new ambassador, Cameron Munter, who advocated more judicious use of signature strikes, senior officials said.

State Department diplomats weren’t alone in their concerns. Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other military leaders, who initially favoured more aggressive CIA methods, began to question that approach.

The debate in Washington was fueled by a particularly deadly drone strike on March 17, a “signature” strike that targets men believed to be associated with militant groups. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and others at the White House, taken aback by the number of casualties and Pakistan’s sharp reaction, questioned whether the CIA should, at times, hold its fire.

A senior Obama administration official said the White House wanted to use the drone programme smartly to pick off al Qaeda leaders and the Haqqanis. “It’s about keeping our eyes on the ball,” the

official said.

In the spring, military leaders increasingly found themselves on the phone with Panetta and his deputy urging restraint in drone attacks, particularly during periods when the US was engaging in high-level diplomatic exchanges with Pakistan.

Panetta made his first concession in an April meeting with his Pakistani counterpart where he said that the US would tell Pakistanis ahead of time about strikes expected to kill more than 20 militants, officials said.

The debate over the future of the drone programme intensified after Bin Laden’s death. Donilon launched a broad review of Pakistan policy, including the drone programme. Officials said the internal debate that ensued was the most serious since the signature strikes were expanded in 2008. CIA officials defended the signature strikes by saying they frequently netted top terrorists, not just foot soldiers. Mullen argued that the CIA needed to be more selective. Then-Defence Secretary Robert Gates feared that Pakistanis, if pushed too hard, would block the flow of supplies to troops in Afghanistan, officials said.

Some top officials in the White House meetings this summer argued for a broader reassessment. “The question is, ‘Is it even worth doing now? We’ve got the key leadership in al Qaeda, what is it that we’re there for now?” one of the officials recalled some advisers asking.

The White House review culminated in a Situation Room meeting with Obama in June in which he reaffirmed support for the programme. But changes were made. Obama instituted an appeals procedure to give the state department more of a voice in deciding when and if to strike. If the US ambassador to Pakistan objected to a strike, for example, the CIA director or his deputy would first try to talk through their differences with the ambassador. If the conflict was unresolved, the secretary of state would appeal directly to the CIA director. If they couldn’t reach an agreement, however, the CIA director retained the final say.

Since the changes were made, officials say internal tensions over the strikes have eased and agencies were acting more in concert with each other. “It’s not like they took the car keys away from the CIA,” a senior official said. “There are just more people in the car.”

Published in The Express Tribune, November 5^th,  2011.