Politics of non-implementation

Non-implementation of Constitution is as critical a phenomenon as implementation is, and needs to be deeply studied.

Everyone cries about the lack of implementation of some policy, law or part of the Constitution. Yet, very few people have written about the politics of non-implementation. Non-implementation is as critical a phenomenon as implementation is, and needs to be deeply studied.

If provincial governments are not applying Article 140 A and Article 32 of the Constitution to establish elected local bodies in their provinces, there are strong materialist and institutional reasons behind this. The purpose is not to condone lack of implementation of the Constitution but to analyse the politics of non-implementation.

Implementation of the reformed general sales tax (RGST) falls in the same category. There was immense pressure from international financial institutions on Pakistan to implement the general sales tax in the value added tax format. However, there was tooth-and-nail opposition to the implementation of the RGST from various quarters within Pakistan.

In any reform or implementation concerning law, policy or the Constitution, there are winners and losers. If losers of the purported reform or law are more powerful and stronger than the winners, they will block its implementation.

During the recently held national consultation on local governments, some useful suggestions were made. Some of them included devolving real power to the lowest tier i.e. at the union council level. The logic was that the greater the extent of devolution, the more useful it will be in terms of delivering services to the people near their environments. Other suggestions included enabling elected local governments to raise revenue for themselves to make them financially sustainable. However, it was countered by another equally powerful argument, that of serving the principle of equity and distribution of wealth in terms of implementation of cross-subsidisation. This means that financially better-off districts within a particular province should help with the development of less developed districts to serve the principles of equity.

In the debate on devolution at the local level, it is also important to look at the history of impersonal bureaucracy instituted in colonised India by the British in the 19^th century. Impersonal bureaucracy is a hallmark of a modern state. Of course, the real issue is how to strike a balance between elected local governments and the bureaucracy, so that the forces of centralisation and decentralisation do not end up in a constant state of friction and conflict. It is important to ensure that enough autonomy is given to elected local bodies so that they can provide better services close to people’s homes and, at the same time, the provincial and federal government should have some mechanisms in place to implement issues of larger national importance such as coordination during disasters etc.

The central point being made here is that real social science does not prescribe what should be done — rather, it offers insights about why it is not being done. It is about looking at the deeply entrenched vested interests of various groups and how winners of the reforms and implementation of the law have to be stronger and more organised than the losers. Again, something that may or may not happen in the foreseeable future. Otherwise, implementation of the rule of law in its de jure form may remain an academic interest only.

Published in The Express Tribune, November 01^st, 2011.