The Afghan chessboard - competition and challenges

Last week we mentioned that in Afghanistan the 'Great Game' continues with changed players. The US would like to keep its engagement with the ruling clique – willingly or unwillingly – due to Washington's geostrategic interests in the region including counterterrorism, its ongoing competition with China and Russia, and, most of all, Afghanistan's proximity to Iran, China, Russia, Central Asia and a nuclear Pakistan. Pashtun IEA, reportedly, has been trying to be in the US good books again, irrespective of its propaganda.

Washington, on the other hand, has a history with the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance (NA) and other groups, and remained supportive of Afghanistan's pro-Western First Republic (2001-2021) during decades of Afghan nation-building. These avidly anti-Taliban Afghans may be down but are not out. Resistance by Afghan opposition to the IEA's obscurantist rule is intensifying in the non-Pashtun north, as mentioned previously.

IEA's recalcitrance on issues like human rights, women right to education and work, inclusivity in the government, and, more significantly, terrorism is not easily ignorable by the West Plus, even if ideological divergence is put aside. Deep-seated nexus among Al Qaeda, TTP and IEA and their overt jihadism keep the chances of another 9/11-type catalyst alive. In that event, the US re-focus on Afghanistan, with or without European Allies, cannot be ruled, to nudge or participate in regime change.

Short of that catalyst, the US would ensure a pliant IEA using leverages like NGO-level engagement, cash subsidies, diplomatic isolation, non-recognition, etc, but would otherwise leave Taliban alone. In West Plus's assessment (correctly), there is no viable alternative to the IEA at present. Afghan opposition gaining enough strength to challenge IEA militarily would be long drawn. Hence, the West Plus would keep nudging IEA towards self-reform and in-house change.

Russia has been sending mixed signals on Afghanistan using its regional framework like the Moscow Format. Russian motivation for engagement ostensibly stems from keeping Afghanistan-generated terrorism and narcotics trade in check; regaining lost geostrategic foothold in Afghanistan; denying space to the US/West; protecting its soft underbelly in Central Asia; exploiting Afghanistan's mineral riches; and presumably avenging the loss of Soviet Union, consequent to the Pakistan/West-supported Taliban jihad (1979-89).

Moscow has significantly ramped up its diplomatic and military engagement with Kabul. It is the first and only country to recognise the Afghan regime in July 2025. Militarily, both sides have signed a military-technical cooperation agreement to repair and restore Afghanistan's Soviet-era military hardware. Russia sees IEA indispensable in suppressing the IS-K, which is responsible for a deadly attack in Crocus city hall, Krasnogorsk (2024). Foreign Minister Lavrov, during Moscow Format consultations, committed to provide technical and intelligence support to enhance IEA's CT capabilities. Russia has repeatedly commended IEA for controlling narcotics trade from Afghanistan, and its ability to reduce opiate production by 90% since 2022. Most importantly, Moscow has issued strict warnings against Western military return to the region. Lavrov, on October 5, during Moscow Format, called 'categorically unacceptable' any US/NATO military deployment in Afghanistan, or in Central Asian countries. This ostensibly blocks any US move to reclaim or return to Bagram Air Base.

Diplomatically, Moscow has proposed reintegrating Afghanistan into SCO via a specialised contact group. Russian presidential envoy Zamir Kabulov offered to mediate between Islamabad and Kabul as an 'independent mediator' to de-escalate tensions. Other projects between Russia and Afghanistan include establishment of a dedicated trade working group to prioritise infrastructure development and jointly explore transport and energy connectivity to link Afghanistan with Central and South Asia.

Moscow's strategic motivation seems multi-layered. In CT, a softer approach secures Russia's soft Central Asian underbelly and southern flank against terrorism. Diplomatic and economic engagement enables Moscow to prevent Taliban regime from eventually tilting towards Washington, which Taliban deeply desire, the US willing. In an ostensible break with the US under Trump, India too rides the Russian bandwagon in its own competition with Pakistan. Indian manoeuvre to reduce Pakistan's space in Afghanistan may also be Russia's 'peripheral' interest, under its broader alignment with New Delhi and Modi. However, the Russia-India-Afghanistan Combine works under different geostrategic compulsions. Russia leverages these trilateral ties against Washington; India plays to contain a resurgent China and keep Pakistan under pressure, besides protecting its Chabahar investment and its logistics for its base in Tajikistan; whereas Afghanistan wants diplomatic and economic space, both from India and Russia, and invite the US Plus's engagement in the process. Although, New Delhi and Moscow see Taliban with weary eyes.

Regionally, the Sunni Gulf and Saudi Arabia compete for influence on the Afghan real estate, also under different motivations. Gulf and KSA want to limit Iranian influence; some in the oil-rich Gulf want to put Pakistan under pressure through insurgency-like situation in Balochistan; Iran vies for influence under its Shia credentials in Hazarajat, for example; whereas Turkey supports Turkic speaking Northern Afghanistan, especially the Uzbek enclave. Neighbouring Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan stand for respective ethnic minorities in the Northern Afghanistan.

China sees engagement with a recalcitrant Kabul, worthy of strategic payoff by: a) keeping the Uighur militancy by ETIM under check through IEA and pacifying its Muslim Turkestan (Xinjiang); b) helping stability along Pakistan's Western border to allow Islamabad greater attention towards the Indian border; c) protecting CPEC, its ambitious BRI's pilot project; and d) positioning itself to exploit Afghanistan's mineral riches beyond Aynak cooper mines.

In all this jockeying for power, IEA, even if under pressure, remains an attractive partner. Countries are induced to ignore Kabul's human rights record and political repression, for given reasons. IEA presently seems militarily and politically entrenched; however, its future consolidation and sustainment would largely depend upon situation in Northern Afghanistan and Kabul's relations with Islamabad. The Afghan North is in turmoil; and in the mid to long-term, the Pashtun South may join it, driven by economic desperation. The mute noise of discontent is already there, as reports after reports validate the increasing poverty under IEA rule across Afghanistan. That noise can become a crescendo. One will not put a timeline on it, as the trigger may be one terrorist attack, not even as spectacular as 9/11.

So, IEA makes the next move on the chessboard. Meanwhile, Islamabad needs to be aware of the Indian money, Israeli technology and Afghan manpower arrayed against it. (Concluded)