Rumble in the political jungle

Is the gig up?

As the PTI's long march turns into a circuitous one, it is increasingly becoming clear that it is heading nowhere - both literally and metaphorically. In fact, it may have triggered an outcome for the party far bigger than intended, and far less favourable than expected.

Let's do a deep dive:

1. The status quo in Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa may have outlived its utility. Change is in the air. This change is a by-product of three factors (i) Uncoordinated decision-making by the PTI leadership; (ii) Chief Minister Sohail Afridi's compulsions to fulfil his leader's perceived expectations; and (iii) Spike in terrorism and PTI's inability to adjust its approach accordingly. Taken together, these three factors have set in motion a series of events that may be very difficult to reverse from here on.

2. The federal government has a few constitutional options on the table. Whichever one it decides to go with, the outcome - direct or indirect - may be as follows: (i) PTI government in K-P will lose its executive authority in any real sense of the word (or will be diluted to an extent that it will mean the same); (ii) K-P assembly will have little role that could obstruct the governance of the province from the Centre; and (iii) the office of the chief minister will be hollowed out and its occupant will either go home or will sit in his room and catch up on his casual reading. From the federal government's perspective this will be a legally water tight arrangement.

3. Immediately thereafter, there will take place in the province a massive reshuffle of the bureaucracy and civil administration. The lists have almost fully been prepared. This reshuffle will go down to the junior cadres at the provincial, district and even tehsil level. The most sweeping changes are expected in the districts affected deepest by terrorism.

4. Access to Imran Khan is expected to remain restricted while these changes are taking place. Access has proved to be the most effective weapon in the hands of the government against the PTI. It has led to confusion, lack of policy clarity, bickering and deepening of divides within the party. The court order to bring Khan to the hospital is unlikely to be complied with. Sohail Afridi's ill-planned long march may have triggered events that may have not taken place for many more months. Now everything appears expedited.

5. Will PTI's resistance make the new arrangement untenable? This one factor worries decision-makers. They underestimated PTI's pushback in the February 2024 elections. All calculations done prior to the elections pointed to a smooth affair and equally smooth results. Like now, back then too field reports suggested things would work out as planned. The initial results, as they poured in from far and near that election night, were a massive body blow to the system. Yet again, PTI's rank and file had reminded all that cared to listen that Khan's supporters could not be taken for granted. Two can, as they proved, play the game. Can they, still?

6. The party's leadership will be tested even more severely if and when they lose the huge advantages that their provincial government offers. PTI has, without any doubt, enormous vote bank in Punjab. Yet the party and its leadership has failed spectacularly, every single time, to translate this support into street power. Could the same happen in K-P if the party is out of power? Hard to say at this point because K-P remains a PTI stronghold for the last thirteen years. But if the provincial leadership remains divided and at daggers drawn, and many are detained, and the party organisation comes under severe strain, and access to Khan remains cut-off, and his family's movement to K-P is barred, can the leadership put up the kind of resistance that may be required for it to retain its credibility among its support base? PTI's Punjab leadership hasn't really wrapped itself in glory these past few years.

7. Expect the counter-terrorism policy to go into much higher gear if and when the situation changes in K-P. Knowledgeable officials inside Islamabad's Red Zone say the following factors are shaping possible options and actions: (i) The diplomatic route with the Taliban government in Kabul is not working. The recent meeting in Moscow and Russia's sympathetic attitude towards the TTA has reinforced this assessment. This approach is now under review; (ii) Opposition groups inside Afghanistan are organising themselves better and are expected to step up their efforts against Kabul. There will be greater instability and the TTA may have to start looking over their shoulders; (iii) in districts of K-P (including the newly merged districts of erstwhile FATA), aim is to uproot the presence of TTP and ensure that spillover from events that will transpire inside Afghanistan in the months to come is blocked. A similar plan is underway for Balochistan. The change of military high command in the two provinces earlier this month is connected to this evolving strategy.

8. What happens in K-P may not stay in K-P. Red Zone insiders also say the debate over new provinces and administrative units may have subsided within the public domain but the project is very much alive and perhaps picking up pace. If a change in the K-P structure does indeed take place, it will be the first of what may be a long line of bigger governance changes across the land.

9. There's a Grand Bargain in process and PTI may be missing the bus. Notice the change of tone between the PML-N and PPP. Notice also the muted - and in some ways flexible - politics of JUI-F and Jamaat-e-Islami. The give-and-take of this bargain may lead to a loose consensus on governance reforms, and enhanced security policy. Things are still fluid but a pattern is slowly becoming visible.

10. The rumble in the political jungle is getting louder and louder as PTI's long march gets shorter and shorter. Could anything go wrong?