Afghanistan - losing the cause!

The relations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban regime are in freefall, with no improvement likely in the near to mid-term. The IEA will not budge on the TTP, and Islamabad will not give an inch on its core demand that Kabul rein in the TTP and not permit Afghan soil to be used against Pakistan. The IEA refusal acts in open violation of the 2020 Doha Agreement, and shows complete disregard for the precepts of neighbourly obligations under gawandgiri (neighbourliness), Islamic amity and pashtunwali.

The bilateral ties have fractured following intense cross-border strikes by Pakistan Army and airstrikes by PAF inside Afghanistan on suspected TTP locations. This came after Pakistan had exhausted all peaceful options, diplomatic contacts, warnings, mediation efforts and repeated assurances. Situation is further complicated by the IEA's overtures to India, quite paradoxically. Regional powers, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Türkiye have repeatedly attempted mediation with mixed results.

Recently, both countries clashed at the 8th Moscow Format, a Russia-led regional mechanism launched in 2017 to build consensus on Afghanistan. Quite comically, IEA's interim FM, Amir Khan Muttaqi, emphasised resolution of all bilateral issues through dialogue, criticising Islamabad's 'military approach'. Pakistan's special representative, Ambassador Sadiq, delivered 'a blunt assessment', reiterating the centrality of Afghanistan-based terrorism directed against Pakistan. He highlighted the not-so-hidden TTP-IEA nexus, providing statistics, and accused IEA of being 'complicit' in anti-Pakistan terrorism. He defended Pakistan's military operations as acts of self-defence. Afghanistan has repeatedly dubbed TTP as Pakistan's internal problem. No joint statement was issued by Moscow Format due to a lack of consensus.

Pakistan, in dealing with a recalcitrant Kabul regime, is left with the military option as the only residual leverage, having exhausted the other pressure points at P2P and B2B levels. The latest Corps Commanders Conference, held on Oct 2, 2026, strongly supported current military strategy; and ISPR characterised IEA as 'delusional Taliban leadership'. The ISPR chief disclosed that during a meeting in Qandahar on August 26, IEA directed representatives of terrorist groups to step up anti-Pakistan attacks. September 2026 was the deadliest month in 12 years. Let's see if Islamabad's current strategy is working.

First, the timeframe under consideration is too short to evaluate if and when a strategy is working. Pakistan officially shuns G2G contact but tacitly looks the other way at selected B2B and P2P overtures, purely on humanitarian grounds. Despite overt hostility, Afghanistan still enjoys public support – whether it is repatriation of Afghan students and refugees or Afghan patients in search of affordable treatment in Pakistan. Possible distinction between Kabul under IEA and the wider Afghan citizenry is being made. Even military pressure is calibrated, proportionate and allows for course corrections. Targeting Taliban leadership, for example, if push comes to shove, should not be outside Pakistan's military capability.

Second, diplomatically, Islamabad must 'continue' to impress upon IEA that supporting TTP does not serve their bilateral, regional or global interests. Recognition of the interim regime and relative isolation are cases in point. Intelligence collaboration to discreetly target TTP on Afghan soil needs to be re-established to ease out the IEA from its predicament, as TTP remains IEA's historic baggage, that they can neither doff nor carry. Saner elements within Qandahar realise the insanity of Rahbari Shoora's obstinacy on this issue, and would like to revert to normalcy with Pakistan, their indispensable interlocutor.

Third, Islamabad should revive and strengthen its relations and contacts with the myriad Afghan resistance groups. If IEA can warm up to an erstwhile hostile New Delhi, Pakistan is well within its right to foster its ties with former Northern Alliance and other groups. They represent sizeable populations and enjoy clout in Central Asia and Türkiye. All is not well beyond the Hindu Kush. Badakhshan may have been temporarily pacified but the seed of resistance against IEA-led Kabul are resistant to force. Resistance groups (NRF, AFF) carried out 78+ operations during July-September 2026 (details were covered in earlier pieces). These attacks reportedly killed 126 Taliban personnel, including 14 senior commanders, besides material losses. Key IEA institutions, like ministries of Defence and Interior, and Intelligence HQs, were also targeted.

Fourth, at the geostrategic levels, the 'Great Game' continues with changed set of players. The US would like to keep its listening posts on Afghan soil, given its proximity to Iran, China, Russia, Central Asia and nuclear Pakistan. With the passage of time, there may be more palatable options to the rigid and frigid IEA, and the die for change might then be cast. In the mid to long-term, IEA will either have to reform or undergo an in-house change (for the better), or relinquish power, as it did in 2001. The US/West's sporadic engagement with Kabul presently should not be confused with a love lost. It is simply motivated by the fact that presently there are no viable and workable alternatives to the IEA, on the important real estate of Afghanistan.

Russian FM Lavrov's conciliatory tone during Moscow Format, praising IEA gains against ISK needs to be analysed in context. Russia courts IEA in its desperation to: a) keep Afghanistan-generated terrorism and narco trade in check; b) regain lost foothold in Afghanistan; c) deny space to the US; d) protect its soft underbelly in Central Asia, and; e) be poised to exploit Afghanistan's mineral riches. The Russia-India-Afghanistan nexus will work 'ostensibly' for regional security, and to keep the US (and China for India) out. China's interests complicate the picture. In all this jockeying for power, the IEA, by default, attracts centrality, hence the various forms and format of engagement with Kabul.

Fifth, as the relationship does not yield to the old formula of 'engagement' through diplomacy, mediation and pressure, and since Taliban leadership cannot be trusted as a partner, nudging towards a regime change may be 'seemingly' the last option. The 'doves', who believe Afghanistan should be left to its own devices, are living in oblivion of ignorance. With an ongoing hot war on terror, the terror swamp being on the Afghan soil, and K-P and Balochistan intertwined with Kabul and Qandahar; overlooking Afghanistan is simply not an option.

Walking away from military option without solving the TTP problem leaves Islamabad with an even bigger security challenge. Although terrorism does have a domestic dimension. Continuation of strikes conversely risks prolonged confrontation with IEA. No easy choices, hence, a policy reappraisal to include whole-of-nation approach, employing all elements of national power, to protect Pakistan's core regional and bilateral interests.

Continued…