Militancy: historical perspective

The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa faces persistent militancy that can only be understood through its historical context. Rather than isolated incidents, the current waves of terrorism are rooted in decades of regional conflict. They remain deeply tied to broader regional dynamics, institutional weaknesses and the evolving security environment along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

The roots of the crisis trace back to the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s, when the borderlands transformed into critical conduits for fighters, weaponry and resources. Militant networks and ideologues gravitated toward this frontier belt - and they did not dissipate following the Soviet withdrawal.

The situation took a lethal turn following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent US-led intervention in Afghanistan. As US and NATO forces deployed on the ground, Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters retreated into Pakistan's tribal belt. In response, the Pakistan Army deployed to the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas, particularly North and South Waziristan. What initially appeared to be a border-security challenge gradually escalated into a sustained insurgency.

To better understand its trajectory, the evolution of terrorism in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the former FATA can be divided into three distinct phases: an initial escalation and peak from 2003 to 2014; a substantial decline from 2015 to 2019; and a renewed resurgence from 2020 onward.

The first phase proved to be the most devastating. South and North Waziristan, Swat, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Peshawar, and adjoining districts witnessed rampant suicide bombings, targeted killings, attacks on security forces, and large-scale civilian displacement. During this period, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged as an umbrella organisation unifying various militant factions, which triggered a sharp escalation in the intensity of violence.

The Swat Valley presented one of the starkest examples of the eroding writ of the state. Militants established a parallel administrative structure, openly defying government institutions. In response, a series of military operations - including Rah-e-Haq, Rah-e-Rast and Rah-e-Nijat - were launched. Furthermore, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched in North Waziristan in June 2014, successfully dismantled entrenched militant networks but failed to entirely shatter their leadership nucleus. The human toll was catastrophic, with the UNHCR recording more than two million internally displaced persons during the 2009 Swat crisis alone.

Statistical data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) underscores the sheer intensity of the conflict. In 2009, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa recorded 5,883 terrorism-related fatalities - the highest annual figure documented in the series. Following this peak, annual fatalities began a gradual and steady decline.

The second phase, from 2015 to 2019, yielded significant progress. Operation Zarb-e-Azb successfully dismantled major militant infrastructure, while Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad was launched in February 2017 to eliminate residual terrorist networks and consolidate earlier gains. This concerted military effort led to a drastic drop in violence: according to the SATP, annual fatalities in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa plummeted to 298 in 2015, followed by 215 in 2016, 129 in 2017, 167 in 2018 and 130 in 2019.

The merger of FATA with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in May 31, 2017 was a landmark development. Before the merger, FATA was directly administered by the federal government.

The third phase, which began in 2020, became significantly more pronounced following the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021. This shift altered the region's entire geopolitical dynamic, creating a conducive environment for the TTP to renew its operational activities. Although peace negotiations were attempted between Pakistani authorities and the TTP, the talks ultimately collapsed. In November 2022, the group formally terminated its ceasefire and announced a widespread resumption of attacks.

In these renewed offensives, police stations, checkpoints, security convoys and individual personnel across Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, North and South Waziristan, Khyber and Bajaur became primary targets. While the geography of the conflict remained volatile, the tactical methods adopted by the militants remained largely unchanged.

The SATP data explicitly illustrates this escalating trajectory. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa recorded 216 fatalities in 2020, 301 in 2021, 527 in 2022, 941 in 2023 and 1,363 in 2024. The toll sharply escalated to 2,359 in 2025. For 2026, SATP documented 1,654 fatalities up to September 26 alone, comprising 247 civilians, 316 security-force personnel and 1,091 militants.

The current resurgence, therefore, does not represent an entirely new conflict, but rather another phase of a prolonged struggle deeply rooted in regional history. Unless its historical, institutional, political and socioeconomic dimensions are comprehensively addressed, Pakistan risks merely suppressing the symptoms of the crisis without permanently eliminating the underlying conditions in which militancy regenerates.

A chronological analysis of these figures from 2003 to 2026 demonstrates that the core leadership nucleus and organizational structure of the militants remain intact, with little variation in their attack patterns. Furthermore, because this violent trend has persisted across successive, ideologically diverse administrations, militancy cannot reasonably be attributed to a single provincial government or political party alone. While governments should be judged on their policies, preparedness, governance and response, the foundational roots of the conflict remain inherently regional, historical, institutional and socioeconomic.

The experience of the past two decades offers a clear lesson: while military operations can dismantle militant infrastructure, eliminate key commanders, and reclaim territory - as demonstrated in the years following 2014 - such actions alone cannot guarantee sustainable peace.

Achieving long-term stability requires a multi-pronged approach that includes effective policing, robust intelligence coordination, a functioning criminal justice system and stringent border management. Furthermore, it demands sustained socioeconomic development, strengthened local governance, the rigorous implementation of the National Action Plan and targeted actions against terrorist financing, facilitation networks and organised crime.

Above all, the writ of the state must manifest not merely through the application of force, but through the delivery of swift justice, lawful governance and public confidence. Ultimately, lasting security cannot be achieved by military means alone; it relies on the comprehensive execution of institutional reforms and transparent, accountable governance.