The new great game in the Caucasus

For centuries, the Caucasus was one of the great frontiers of imperial rivalry, separating and connecting the competing spheres of the Ottoman, Russian and Persian empires. In the twentieth century, the region came under Soviet rule; after the Soviet Union's collapse, the emergence of independent republics dislodged Russia's influence across much of the post-Soviet space.

For generations, the central geopolitical question in the Caucasus was: who rules the Caucasus? Today, a more consequential question is emerging: who connects through the Caucasus? In an increasingly multipolar world, the region is acquiring three competing identities - a frontier, a corridor and a crossroads. Today, not only great powers but also middle and smaller states have substantial geopolitical and geoeconomic stakes in the Caucasus. The region bears striking structural similarities to the Middle East, a region whose politics have long been complicated by overlapping spheres of influence, unresolved territorial disputes, competing corridors, external interventions, historical and identity-based grievances and shifting alliances. Therefore, the question the region faces today is whether the Caucasus can transform these competing interests into commercial success or, like the Middle East, become another arena where geopolitical competition and conflict overwhelm the promise of connectivity.

Five emerging trends are likely to determine its future. They are: the rise of a multipolar world; the contest for connectivity; the geopolitics of energy; Russia's adaptation to a changing regional order; and the Middle Eastern spillover.

In a multipolar world, the Caucasus is likely to emerge as a strategic crossroads where the interests of Russia, China, the US, the EU, Turkey, and Iran intersect. States that shape the trade routes, energy pipelines and railway networks connecting Asia with Europe will gain significant geopolitical and geoeconomic influence. In this sense, the Caucasus could begin to resemble the historical 'Great Game', with major powers competing not only through diplomacy and military means, but also through economic leverage, infrastructure and proxy influence. The Caucasus therefore appears destined to become a principal strategic arena in the emerging multipolar Eurasian order.

The contest for connectivity in the Caucasus will be driven primarily by competition over transport corridors. Three corridors stand out. The first is the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which connects China and Central Asia to Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. It offers an alternative to routes passing through Russia and has gained growing strategic importance as a link between Asia and European markets. The second is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, a US-backed connectivity initiative through southern Armenia designed to link Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave and provide onward connections towards Turkey and Europe. The third is the Persian Gulf–Black Sea transport corridor, an Iranian initiative envisaged as a multimodal route linking the Persian Gulf to Europe through Armenia and Georgia and onward through the Black Sea. Together, these competing corridors could reshape the region's geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape. The contest for connectivity may become one of the defining geopolitical struggles in the emerging Caucasian order.

The geopolitics of energy transportation has brought the US to the region. The US views the region as a means of not only limiting Russian influence but also reducing the Iranian strategic depth. The US diplomatic engagement in Armenian-Azerbaijan peace efforts reflects this broader strategy. Turkey has emerged as the most influential regional power through its recent close ties with Azerbaijan. Iran, on the other hand, views with concern any attempt to isolate it from its neighbor Armenia. Tehran closely watches any transport corridors that might diminish its regional influence and trade interests. China's interest in the region is primarily economic, projected through its BRI connectivity, rail and road infrastructure, and Eurasian trade. Unresolved issues in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia prevent Russia's natural and existing corridor access to Armenia. The railway connection through Abkhazia has been closed since the early 1990s, and the unresolved Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is indeed a major political obstacle to restoring the Russia–Abkhazia–Georgia–Armenia rail link. From a geopolitical perspective, the Caucasus has already evolved from its historical role of acting as a buffer zone to becoming a competitive and contested energy and transport corridor.

The future role of Russia will remain one of the most significant aspects. Russia's current strategy in the Caucasus is to deepen its relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, preserve its ties with Armenia, and maintain its strategic position in the North Caucasus. Its ability to act as the region's sole security guarantor is reduced, particularly after the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict but largely due to its continued engagement in the Ukraine War. The challenge ahead for Russia is less about exercising exclusive control over the Caucasus but more about preventing its strategic exclusion from an increasingly multipolar order in the region.

The growing spillover of Middle Eastern rivalries into the Caucasus is likely to accelerate the transformation of the region from a post-Soviet security space into an interconnected geopolitical theatre. The standoff between US-Israel and Iran, Turkey's regional ambitions, Gulf states' engagement in the region, and the broader competition between the US, Russia and Iran are likely to be the future stories that may shape the future Caucasian politics. Iran is particularly concerned about expanding Israeli security cooperation with Azerbaijan and deeper Turkish and Western involvement along its northern frontier. Gulf states are showing greater interest in Caucasian energy, investment and connectivity, while Western powers view the region as a means of reducing dependence on Russian and Iranian routes.

All put together, the Middle Eastern conflicts and emerging alliances and partnerships are likely to affect the security calculations for the transport corridors and energy networks in the region. The Caucasus is therefore approaching a strategic choice. It can remain a frontier where competing powers confront one another, become a corridor through which competing powers merely seek passage, or evolve into a crossroads where competing interests are converted into trade, investment and interdependence.