Regional diplomacy, domestic turmoil

Pakistan's ambition to serve as the gateway between South Asia and Central Asia has always been at the heart of its Afghanistan policy. The frantic diplomacy around the war between US-Israel and Iran i.e. mediation efforts as well as attempts to stich alliances/partnerships with countries such as Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt and Turkiye also reflect the desire for regional peace, stability and open trading corridors. But a fundamental contradiction overshadows this drive: continuously deteriorating security situation and dysfunctional borders with both India and Afghanistan.

No doubt, Pakistan offers Central Asia the shortest access to the Arabian Sea through the ports of Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar. Yet geography alone does not determine trade flows. Can the country progress when almost all three borders remain closed or only partially functional (Iran border) for formal trade? Are cross-border trade and terrorism correlated at all? Evidence points to an emphatic 'no'. Barring a slight decline after Pakistan shut down the border on October 11, cross-border terrorist attacks in Balochistan and Khyber-Pakthunkhwa have only intensified.

The month of July, for example, turned out to be the deadliest with 317 security and civilian casualties. Even August began with a suicide bombing that took 17 lives in the Kabal district of Swat.

The loss of life among security personnel in July marked the highest monthly toll since January 2023 – 114 martyred, including around 102 in the Peshawar Police Lines suicide bombing. The average monthly martyrdoms among security personnel rose from 56 in 2025 to 62 in 2026.

Overall, terrorist violence and counter-terrorism operations have resulted in about 2,786 deaths – including 1,857 terrorists, 463 civilians, 434 security personnel and 32 peace committee members.

The formal bilateral and transit trade, on the other hand, has plummeted from nearly 89,000 containers before August 2021, to just 11,592, most of which are stuck between Karachi Port, Port Qasim and Torkham/Chamman.

This emerging picture of distress and deterioration is accompanied by a state security response relying on a largely kinetic approach, with little focus on winning back the community as the eyes and ears of security forces.

But what sets the community and the state institutions apart is the perception that only areas rich in natural resources are experiencing violence and realignments. Another possibility could be that these highly secured areas may simply exist to provide employment opportunities for locals in chromite, coal and granite mines.

This development matches documented patterns observed over the past couple of decades – linking mineral wealth to militant extortion in most tribal regions formerly called FATA. Private contractors, commissioned by state institutions, have also continued to operate their business as usual by doling out protection money to militants – an undeclared understanding between the state and non-state actors for keeping the mineral business running.

Mineral-rich districts in K-P – Khyber, Darra Adam Khel, Orakzai, Mohmand, Kurram, Karak, Waziristan, Kohat – consistently attract militant groups. In some areas, internal recent factional fighting has recently pushed the TTP out of certain regions but armed groups still run extortion rackets wherever resources (gold, minerals) or wealthy overseas families exist. The drug mafia around Peshawar, Mohmand, Bajaur, Kohat and Hangu actively pays protection money to these militants to secure their networks. Natural resources continue to attract both state as well as non-state attention. Mine operators serve as a critical link in this business because they serve both as a source of revenue for locals as well as the state security apparatus.

It demonstrates a classic sub-national "resource curse". Instead of spurring development, mineral wealth in K-P fuels armed group financing, extortion economies and persistent instability. It also shows that militancy in the region is heavily driven by economic predation –taxing trade, mining, drugs and overseas remittances – not just ideology.

Locals are meanwhile intrigued as to how the business of mineral extraction continues amid ostensible security challenges.

One of the challenges relates to inter-factional fighting. In recent months, the ISKP and Jamaatul Ahrar, a dissident TTP group, seem to have ganged up against the TTP and hence apparently forced it out of Khyber, Darra Adamkhel and Mohmand regions.

But this 'realignment' raises deep suspicions and begs a basic question: did the TTP opt for a strategic retreat under pressure from Kabul, or was it genuinely forced out by the relatively smaller, so-called Jamaatul Ahrar and ISKP? Are the videos put out by TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud claiming to be in Pakistan also linked to the international pressure that Kabul faces at the moment? Why would the TTP give up what it considers its territory, particularly in regions where the night belongs to militants and the group has been hitting the security apparatus at will? How, then, can Jamaatul Ahrar and ISKP survive in regions where security forces have created protective cordons to safeguard the mineral extraction? And finally, are the TTP, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its Majeed Brigade, IS-K and its affiliates, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Al-Qaeda all different faces of the same coin, operating with the sole objective of keeping the region on the boil?