Reset or another political ploy?

Mohsin Naqvi - the second most powerful figure in Pakistan's present hybrid system - made a series of striking admissions during the Economic Summit in Islamabad. Not known for polished public speaking or political sophistication, he nevertheless delivered a carefully calibrated message that appeared to reflect thinking within the power structure itself. Coming from somebody thought of as the de facto prime minister, the speech suggested a system searching for a way out of its current predicament, albeit on its own terms.

Describing the present governance model as "tardy" and "a total flop", Naqvi called for an urgent "reset" backed by all political forces. Otherwise, he warned, Pakistan could face a public backlash similar to the recent rise of the youth-led Cockroach Party in India, whose protests unsettled the political establishment there and enforced a minister's resignation.

Naqvi acknowledged that young people cannot be appeased merely by distributing a few thousand rupees or laptops - an implicit swipe at PML-N's longstanding laptop and stipend schemes. He also questioned the PPP's resistance to revisiting the 18th Amendment, arguing that Pakistan needs more administrative units for better governance. In doing so, he quietly revived the debate over creating new provinces.

Taken together, Naqvi's speech reflected an apparent recognition that the absence of political legitimacy has rendered the present governance arrangement increasingly ineffective. We have hit a dead, was the implicit message. It combined an admission of failure, anxiety over growing public frustration - particularly among the youth - and a call to restructure the constitutional and administrative framework with the support of business elites and mainstream political parties.

Yet an obvious question follows: do the rulers really believe they have hit a dead end? And, one, is the confession genuine? Two, can a public admission that the system has "totally flopped" compensate for the enormous political discord, institutional erosion and economic losses caused by years of continuous manipulation of the political process. And three, does the recipe for correction draw on global good governance experiences or is it yet another page from the old play?

It takes two to tango. The reset button ultimately lies with the powers-that-be. Any meaningful reset would require the military establishment to review its present intransigence, move beyond its one-dimensional view of Imran Khan, and acknowledge that he represents a political sentiment shared by a substantial section of the Pakistani society.

Naqvi's response to Khan's future also exposed a contradiction. He insisted that only the courts could decide the former prime minister's fate, though even the layman is convinced that the cases against him are politically-driven. Moreover, the 26th Constitutional Amendment significantly reduced judicial independence in politically sensitive matters. Will the same courts facilitate the emergence of yet another carefully managed, "test-tube" national leader? This characterisation was thus far reserved for Nawaz Sharif only.

For many sceptics, the direction appears unmistakable. Naqvi's increasingly prominent foreign policy role, combined with his unusually "candid" admission of systemic failure, inevitably raises questions about whether another carefully cultivated political figure is being prepared for national leadership. What remains unclear is how Pakistan will escape its ruling elite's favourite pastime - moving in circles while presenting continuity of the status quo as reform.

The credibility of Naqvi's message is also undermined by his own record. As caretaker chief minister of Punjab and later as interior minister, he presided over some of the harshest crackdowns on political protesters, including the violence in Islamabad in November 2024. He also dismissed the Baloch insurgency with the now-infamous remark that "one SHO is enough" to deal with the militants. Such statements sit uneasily alongside his current call for dialogue and systemic reform.

Nor can politicians alone engineer meaningful change while the real centre of power remains untouched. Asking elected parties to deliver a national reset without any corresponding change in the conduct of the establishment risks becoming little more than another attempt to preserve an elite-centric political order.

A genuine reset would require far more than administrative restructuring. It demands a fundamental rethink of both economic governance and national security. Pakistan's economic distress is matched by an equally alarming deterioration in the security situation, with terrorist violence reaching disturbing levels this year.

If the call for a reset is genuine, the initiative must come from the real power wielders. That would require creating conditions for a credible national dialogue, including providing meaningful political relief to Khan and the PTI. It would also require difficult sacrifices from many of those who have benefited from the political order established after the change of government in April 2022.

The key question, therefore, is whether Mohsin Naqvi truly meant what he said. Does he genuinely believe that national reconciliation has become indispensable? More importantly, does the military leadership share that assessment and possess the willingness to take the first step?

Or was the speech simply a tactical exercise designed to slow the momentum of the PTI's mobilisation campaign, scheduled to begin on August 5, the anniversary of Khan's arrest?

The answer to those questions will determine whether Naqvi's "reset" was the beginning of genuine political introspection - or merely another carefully scripted episode in Pakistan's long cycle of managed politics.

Let us not forget: vision without well-meaning action is a daydream and action without vision is a nightmare as much as planning without a clear plan can only create chaos.