More on defending the defenders

Answering unwarranted criticism of the Military in this space last week, we discussed Military (read Army) take-overs, and Military not allowing democracy to flourish in Pakistan. The article generated debate but unfortunately many restricted their comments to continuing emotive criticism devoid of rationale and missed the finer points made about Pakistan's military-dependent civil-military construct and its subpar political class. Continuing the debate, we discuss the remaining issues of corruption in Military and the perks of its senior leadership, before coming back to Maulana Fazlur Rehman's speech in Islamabad Lawyers' Convention on July 19, 2026.

Curruption in the Military ranks, like all organs of any State, is not unique to any specific country. According to Transparency International Defence & Security Index, almost two-thirds of the countries in the world face 'high to critical risk of corruption' because Defence Sector masks behind national security exemptions, bypassing public oversight and transparency. However, Military corruption in Pakistan's context is dealt with decisively, swiftly and with due diligence at all levels. The internal accountability of the System is strong, responsive and aggressive. Under the System, punishments have been awarded from Sepoy to General, as known.

There, unfortunately, is no comparative precedent by other state organs. Corruption in the political class in numerous ways – MNA/MPA Discretionary Funds being just one example – is too well known. The ways wherein politically-motivated schemes, 'ostensibly' for public welfare, drain the national exchequer, are all too brazen. The mad race to acquire privileges, including financial benefits of all sorts, by legislators is not hidden either. The scale and scope of corruption in other organs of the State decidedly dwarfs Military's corruption, if any. And Military's corruption is punishable even after retirement. Examples galore.

In Pakistan's case, the audit system is feared, is very detailed and penetrating with very aggressive Parliament oversight (paradoxically!). Worldwide, military corruption is concentrated in arms procurement, the embezzlement and misuse of secret budgets, military-owned commercial enterprises, and favouritism in personnel decisions. In our Military, there are relatively stringent checks to ensure institutional integrity, contain corruption and ensure swift punishment, if the System fails or is made to fail. Generally, career officers are posted to lucrative positions, where even an iota of doubt can cost them their advancement.

And finally, the perks and privileges of Generals. Comparatively, a four-star General's monthly salary, after close to 40 years in service, is below a million rupee. Income tax, house rent, mess bill, cost of private usage of government transport and utility charges are deducted from their meagre salaries. Compare this with just the pensionary benefits of judiciary, the remunerations in the corporate sector, and the mad money TV anchors make, and you would get a sense.

Yes, junior Military officers get a decent house on retirement in Military-run colonies, but only if they are members of the scheme, required to make monthly contribution throughout the service. Generally, the terminal payment of the house takes a good chunk of retirees' post-retirement funds, forcing them to seek jobs. In case of General Officers, they make their own house, for which they mostly sell their service benefits (plots, etc). These schemes are totally member-sponsored.

The agriculture land given to Military officers, on a par with civil officers, is generally rehabilitated by them spending their own resources. They retain it mostly as a legacy benefit rather than being a lucrative financial return. Most General officers end up selling the developed land after years of hard work and financial drain. One post-retirement job (at the COAS's discretion) is the norm for Generals in most cases, to keep them financially afloat, as pension barely runs the kitchen. Yes, there are success stories here and there, but these are few and far apart.

And honestly, none of the cited perks, privileges and remunerations are enough to compensate veterans, who sign up with their blood to offer the supreme sacrifice for defence of nation and the Country, whenever required, no questions asked, no excuse offered, once the call comes, even in retirement.

In his cited speech, the 'venerable' Maulana, defends not agreeing to forming a civil militia (lashkar) in the militancy-affected K-P and Balochistan, citing the 1971 East Pakistan; wherein Jamaat-e-Islami, the supporter of 'Al Badr' and 'Al Shams' militias that supported Pakistan's Military, to this day faces the wrath of Bangladeshi State. Is the savvy Maulana indicating secession of K-P/Balochistan from Pakistan? What sort of comparison is he offering? Have not K-P offered public resistance for and against religious militancies in the past. He would do well to read the account of similar lashkarkashi in upper K-P against Ghazis led by Swat's Lewaney Baba (Mohammad Jan), once he got people butchered by British and Sikh soldiers. Khyber tribes under Warburton, and others too, sided with the British during the Anglo-Afghan wars despite the fatwas i.e. religious edicts.

Continuing his diatribe, Rehman alludes to the inherent capability of the K-P Government to fight terrorism on its own, using police, if the Army steps aside. He sure seems out of historic sync. It was not long ago when the ANP-led K-P Government requested General Kiyani to delay Swat Operation (2010) and give political process/negotiations another chance. And it was only a week after the request, when BBC announced militants advancing towards Islamabad, the Military – after utter failure of the K-P Government to contain them – launched its successful operation to rescue Swat and Dir.

In the same breath, Maulana mentions the breakdown of police's chain of command in DIK, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Bannu, etc, leaving one wondering how the provincial government would then fight a deadly militancy, under Israeli advice, Indian money, Afghan recruits and America's abandoned weaponry. To get some sense, he should request a briefing on Swat and the current operations, rather than misleading his followers in an awkward attempt to boost his political stocks.

In his typical bombast, Maulana laments the failure of Pakistan's policy on terrorism, without offering any solution. Not knowing the rules of warfare, he is utterly disrespectful when he cites exchange of fallen soldiers at Kargil, alluding as if India received no dead. He goes on to cite the Military's 'institutional overreach', ignoring how his frequent and acidic diatribes against the Military and its martyrs would be interpreted in India?

In another country, he would be facing a trial now!

Concluded.