China: the ultimate target

The passage of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2027 proposes $1.15 trillion defence framework. It reflects the strategic priorities that will shape the American foreign and security policy in future. The intense cooperation arrangement with Israel anchored in the section 219 of the Act, it seems, only reinforces that China is now the principal focus of long-term US strategy in Asia.

Besides the usual emphasis on investment in advanced military capabilities, artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, missile defence, naval modernization and defence-industrial capacity, the Section 219 of the NDAA accelerates joint US-Israel cooperation on artificial intelligence, cyber defences and advanced weapons production through 2029, underscoring Washington's determination to preserve technological superiority.

Critics called the bill, passed with an overwhelmingly bipartisan majority and unusual haste, "sneaky and undemocratic", likening it to putting another nation's interests above America's.

Former congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene (MTG) called it a "destruction of our sovereignty" and urged the Senate (led by VP JD Vance) to kill or remove the part on Israel (Section 2019) before it becomes law. MTG views the amendment as a quiet but major step toward integrating the two militaries' critical systems, which she argues weakens America's independence and puts US troops and taxpayers at risk for foreign conflicts. She frames it as "treasonous give-away rather than normal ally cooperation".

History tell us though that individual reservations hardly trump national security preferences as defined by the incumbent administration. This also points to the trajectory that the US policy has taken in the last decade or so – clearly discernible in the NDAA 2027 too. It unmistakably relates to China and hence if placed in the broader strategic context it reflects a much larger transformation in American security thinking as well as the unflinching US-Israel alliance – evident also in the ongoing Iran-US war. Since the Obama administration's "Pivot to Asia", successive US administrations - Republican and Democratic alike - have steadily redirected diplomatic, military, economic and technological resources toward the Indo-Pacific. Recent policy developments suggest substantial continuity rather than reversal

The Trump administration intensified competition with Beijing through tariffs, export controls and restrictions on advanced semiconductor technology. The Biden administration expanded alliances such as AUKUS, strengthened QUAD, deepened military cooperation with Japan and the Philippines, and imposed additional controls on high-end technologies.

Increasingly, technology – critical minerals, semiconductors, AI-driven defence systems, cyber Security, FinTech – has become another central arena of competition. These sectors have become strategic assets and thus instruments of strategic competition rather than merely commercial sectors. No doubt they are drawing protective measures in the big-power quest for dominance.

US export controls on advanced semiconductors, restrictions on AI-related technologies, investment screening and efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains indicate that economic competition is increasingly intertwined with national security considerations. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cyber capabilities and advanced manufacturing have become the primary battlegrounds for geopolitical supremacy and technological leadership between global powers. Recent conflicts in Europe and the Middle East - including the war in Ukraine and the confrontation involving Iran - have reinforced American concerns about simultaneous challenges from multiple theaters, including the perceived threats from China. Yet these crises have not fundamentally altered the long-term trajectory of US strategy. Instead, they have highlighted the importance Washington places on maintaining military readiness across regions while continuing to prioritise competition with China.

The military dimension of this strategy is equally significant. The US military demonstrated it in the abduction of the Venezuelan President early this year. It also laid siege to the Strait of Hormuz to project power beside expanding access to military facilities across the Western Pacific and increased freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.

This strategic orientation is also reflected in US defence planning documents, congressional appropriations, military exercises and alliance-building efforts. Collectively, these initiatives point toward preparation for sustained great-power competition rather than short-term crisis management.

China, for its part, interprets many of these developments as attempts at strategic containment and has responded by accelerating military modernisation, expanding indigenous technological capabilities, deepening partnerships with countries such as Russia, strengthening institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, and promoting alternative, reliable financial and trade mechanisms that reduce reliance on Western systems – platforms that are not vulnerable to geo-economic or political blackmail.

The 2027 NDAA, therefore, represents more than a defence budget. It illustrates how the US increasingly views national security through the lens of strategic competition with China. While the legislation also addresses challenges posed by Russia, Iran, North Korea, terrorism and cyber threats, its emphasis on technological superiority, defence-industrial expansion and Indo-Pacific preparedness aligns closely with the objective of maintaining a favourable balance of power vis-à-vis Beijing.

Whether this trajectory ultimately produces stable deterrence or deeper strategic rivalry remains uncertain. What is clear is that contemporary US defence policy is increasingly organised around long-term competition with China – currently branded as the villain accused of "dumping" its products across the world markets. But what goes willfully amiss in this charade of allegations is China's mass production capacity in almost all the sectors on the back of teeming millions of skilled manpower. No power – however lethal – can take this inherent advantage away from China.