Balochistan's faultlines and external exploiters

Between July 6-9, coordinated violent episodes shook Balochistan. Three major terrorist attacks against multiple targets in Ziarat, Bela-Winder, Chaghi, Khuzdar (resulting in nearly 100 deaths on both sides) and a sit-in on the outskirts of Quetta cannot be viewed as the work of a rag-tag army acting on its own. These strikes – a smaller version of Harof-1 (August 2024) and Harof-11 (January 2026) – betray a pattern growing in ferocity, hard to imagine without sustained planning, logistical coordination, and material resources.

The continued trajectory of violence reminds us of two unavoidable phenomena that Balochistan faces: an acute governance crisis lorded over by people whose legitimacy is suspect (in the public eye), and external exploiters of internal faultlines, including demands for fundamental rights.

I call the former "the mother of all ills" – a ruling architecture that rests on selection, abhors merit, relies on security as the panacea for every challenge, and hardly inspires public respect. The ensuing disconnect between the rulers and the ruled has caused multiple internal faultlines, open to exploitation by both internal and external enemies.

Regarding the events, I find it irresistible to quote what I have written earlier to provide context to "external drivers and exploiters" of Balochistan's faultlines. The latest string of insurrection at multiple locations reminds me of an India Today cover story published on 9 November 2009. One wonders if the story titled "How to Tackle an Obstinate Pakistan?" reinforced the intellectual origins of what later became known as the "Doval Doctrine" or India's "offensive-defence" strategy.

The 12 participants, including current national security advisor Ajit Doval, G Parthasarathy, Kiran Bedi, Lt Gen (retd) Satish Nambiar, Brahma Chellaney, Ved Marwah, Maj Gen (retd) VK Datta, Kapil Kak, Ajai Sahni and Amitabh Mattoo, broadly agreed that India needed a comprehensive national strategy – diplomatic isolation, covert capabilities and intelligence operations, among others.

One dominant recommendation from what was dubbed BEST (Best Experts on Security and Terrorism) stated that "Pakistan should no longer perceive terrorism as a 'low-cost, high-return' policy" and that India needed to "increase the costs for Pakistan's security establishment if cross-border terrorism continued".

It is hard to link the 2009 BEST discussions with current Indian policy. Yet, the ideas debated there later became associated with National Security Adviser Ajit Doval since 2014. Even Doval's public statements on different occasions emphasised deterrence, indicated willingness to conduct cross-border or precision strikes, and expanded intelligence and covert capabilities.

The broader discussion, especially remarks attributed to Ved Marwah, Ajit Doval, and G Parthasarathy, centred on raising costs for Pakistan by exploiting its internal and external vulnerabilities. Doval argued that an "obstinate enemy" must be brought to terms and that Pakistan's internal turmoil constrained its ability to act, while Parthasarathy argued that Pakistan's "fault lines" should be considered in Indian strategy and that the costs of Pakistan's policies should be increased.

It was also no coincidence that Prime Minister Narendra Modi – in his 15 August 2016 Independence Day speech from the Red Fort – for the first time publicly mentioned Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and "Pakistan-occupied Kashmir".

A day later, The Indian Express carried a commentary by Praveen Swami – a journalist and author specialising in international strategic and security issues, currently the National Security Editor at The Print. Swami argued that "the famous 'lose Balochistan' formulation that entered public discourse after 2014 did not emerge in a vacuum; it was broadly consistent with themes already visible in the 2009 BEST roundtable discussion."

Pakistan's sworn "enemies" had plotted to teach the country a lesson for its alleged support to Kashmiri and Afghan mujahideen-turned-Taliban as far back as the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, preceded by the Kargil conflict in mid-1999 and the Kandahar Hijacking in December that year. The Mumbai attacks in November 2009 solidified that thinking, broadly articulated in the aforementioned security workshop by India Today.

No surprise that the violence level in resource-rich and poorly governed Balochistan has turned it into much more than what Indian Occupied Kashmir endured. The province is sinking ever deeper into a continual spate of violence that entangles the security forces on one hand, and stonewalls worry-free economic activity or investment for exploiting mineral wealth on the other.

And this is not limited to Balochistan; the socio-political turmoil and economic stagnation of the last two decades, in particular, have either created new faultlines or exacerbated the existing ones: unrest in G-B, popular disaffection in Kashmir, Pashtoon grievances (articulated by PTM) in ex-FATA, and Baloch complaints (raised by nationalist politicians as well). Nearly four dozen deaths, including those of police and paramilitary forces, in terrorist attacks within 48 hours in Balochistan – Hanna Orak, Ziarat and Khuzdar – betray a pattern that cannot simply be wished away as a local insurgency. Nor is it sustainable for the economy in the longer run.

Armed groups and warlords can provide security on limited locations – as evidenced in the case of Saindak and perhaps also Reko Diq, as well as some conflict-hit African countries – but that is certainly not an advisable recipe for a nuclear-armed nation.

Economy, trade and investment do not grow under the shadow of security. Without extinguishing internal fires, you cannot stop external spoilers from further fueling those fires.