Iran war and the future of modern conflict

The war in Iran revolved around four major issues: Iran's nuclear capability; its control over the Strait of Hormuz; the weakening or removal of Iranian uranium enrichment facilities; and the status of war in Lebanon. As the war progressed, the USA' choice of how to deal with this war was narrowed down to three options: continue with the military attack; cut a deal; or maintain the status quo (naval blockade and sanctioning Iran). The US has ultimately chosen to execute the second option of cutting a deal with Iran, and it seems that the primary reason for this was the economic pain that the international economy was suffering. Based on this, I wish to ask and then answer two questions. One, is it right to assume that the weakening international economy has forced President Trump to make a deal with Iran? Two, can we say that it will not be the economic reality, and not the military one, that will largely determine the outcome of future wars?

It would be an oversimplification to argue that a weakening international economy alone forced Trump to make a deal with Iran. A more persuasive explanation is that economic pressures, strategic realities and domestic political considerations converged to make diplomacy the more attractive option. The most immediate economic concern was the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz through which roughly a fifth of the world's seaborne oil trade passes. Since coming to power, the Trump administration has repeatedly emphasised economic performance and domestic prosperity as key components of its policy, and a prolonged Middle Eastern conflict doesn't suit this. Trump's foreign policy has also suggested a repeated pattern of applying maximum pressure followed by negotiations. This pattern appeared in his dealings with North Korea, trade disputes with China, sharing of NATO burden, and in his earlier talks with Iran. The core US foreign policy objective in dealing with external challenges has been to improve its bargaining leverage before reaching an agreement, rather than to pursue indefinite confrontation. There is little doubt that the costs of extending the Middle East conflict were becoming disproportionate to the expected gains. Overall, the deal reflects that both the US and Iran gave in to growing pressures as the latter also sought economic relief while avoiding major strategic concessions. Trump's current act of deal-making reflects a classic principle in international relations outlined by Henry Kissinger, who believed that successful diplomacy is the art of recognising the limits of military power and converting battlefield realities into political outcomes. A weakening international economy was one factor. Other factors that contributed to making diplomacy the rational choice could include strategic overstretch, the costs of sustaining conflict, domestic political considerations and Iran's own economic vulnerabilities.

From a geopolitical perspective, this war illustrates that economic interdependence constrains the use of military force, even amid intense strategic rivalry. So, is it right to argue that it will be the economic reality, and not the military one, that will largely determine the outcome of future wars? In the 21st century, economic resilience may ultimately determine which side achieves its political objectives. In fact, we are entering an era where wars will be decided by the interaction of five forms of power: 1) military power – the ability to destroy an opponent's forces; 2) economic power – the ability to sustain the war effort; 3) technological power – AI, cyber capabilities, drones and advanced manufacturing; 4) information power – controlling narratives and public opinion; and 5) industrial power – maintaining production of weapons, ammunition and critical supplies.

Recent conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine War, have demonstrated that battlefield success depends heavily on economic factors. Russia has adapted to sanctions by redirecting trade and mobilising industry. Ukraine's ability to fight has depended substantially on Western financial and military assistance. The conflict has become, in part, a contest of industrial production and economic endurance. Similarly, during the World War-II, the Allies ultimately prevailed not simply because of superior battlefield tactics but because their combined industrial and economic capacity vastly exceeded that of the Axis powers.

In contrast, economic strength may also not entirely compensate for a military failure. If a state loses its capital, has its armed forces destroyed, loses control of its territory or suffers regime collapse, its economic potential may become irrelevant. So, to conclude that military power determines whether you survive today and economic power determines whether you can continue fighting tomorrow may actually be a right assumption to make.

Carl von Clausewitz famously argued that war is "the continuation of politics by other means". But in the 21st century, one may update his observation to read that war is increasingly the continuation of economic competition by military, technological and informational means. Future wars are likely to involve sanctions and financial warfare, disruption of global supply chains, attacks on critical military and civilian infrastructure, and competition over rare earths, semiconductors and energy resources. This leads us to deduce that the future battlefield will increasingly extend into the global economy. The Iran War demonstrates that future wars will not necessarily be won by the side that inflicts the greatest destruction, but by the side that endures the longest while preserving its economic vitality and political cohesion. The conflict suggests that the decisive contest in modern warfare is no longer simply over territory or battlefield victory. Future wars may therefore be won not merely by the side that can destroy the most, but by the side that can absorb the greatest shocks while sustaining its national power.

As far as the deal is concerned, in the 60-day interim period during which it is to be finalised, President Trump is likely to face significant pressures – from the domestic audience, the war hawks in his administration, the Jewish lobby and Netanyahu himself. How well both the US president and the Israeli PM deal with the pressures and the upcoming elections in their respective states will largely determine the future of this deal. Bombing Iran back to the Stone Age was a poor maxim used by Trump. Now, standing between the rock and the hard place, both the political future of the US President and this deal virtually stand on thin ice.