Risks of America's security strategy

Immediately after the unveiling of the Trump administration's National Security Strategy (NSS), Pentagon has become a centre of heated debate over the orientation of American power abroad.

At the heart of this is Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's push to reorganise US combatant command structure to bring it in line with the strategy. These efforts, senior military officials warn, would lack regional expertise and weaken deterrence in Europe and Middle East.

Beneath these controversies, NSS principles are rapidly translating into concrete policy actions. Recently, Trump declared fentanyl a "weapon of mass destruction", a highly-securitised framing that significantly broadens the document's conception of national security threats. Together with Europe's willingness to lead a "multinational force" in Ukraine, these actions underline accelerated operationalisation of "America First".

This shift is already visible in NSS's elevation of Western Hemisphere as America's first line of defence, reflected in administration's decision to order a naval blockade of Venezuelan oil tankers and intensify pressure on Maduro government. This move signals implementation of Monroe-style doctrine, recast as the "Trump Corollary", to counter narcotics trafficking, illicit migration and China's growing economic and strategic footprint in Latin America.

But it underestimates the challenge: China is the largest trading and strategic partner of several regional countries. Through its extensive investments in energy, infrastructure and technology and sustained cultural and diplomatic engagement, Beijing has embedded itself deeply across the region.

This reality represents a major obstacle to Monroe-style approach; it remains unclear whether Washington can marshal enough economic, diplomatic and political resources to persuade regional countries into realignment and how many of them will actually be willing to do so on its terms.

Released earlier this month, the strategy articulates a momentous recalibration of American strategic priorities - moving away from decades of alliance-centric global leadership to domestic resilience and internal security, economic competitiveness and interest-based international engagement.

It marks a decisive break with past practices: longstanding security commitments are replaced by transactional arrangements, transnationalism - idea to tackle global challenges jointly - gives way to nationalism and interventionist, ideology-driven policies yield to "Flexible Realism".

While NSS emphasis on reindustrialisation and securing critical minerals addresses genuine economic vulnerabilities, its transactional posture, reduced focus on allied security and dismissive stance towards multilateral institutions could undermine transatlantic unity.

The document's non-interventionist and look-inward-to-project-power-outward approach could ease military overextension and promote domestic renewal but at the cost of ceding global leadership and disengagement with allies. This risks creating strategic vacuums and encouraging partners to seek greater independence.

Nowhere is the shift more apparent than in Europe. The NSS asks allies to assume primary responsibility for their own and regional defence. With alliances now framed as transactional and US stepping back from unconditional guarantees to European security, NATO cohesion will be weakened, emboldening Russia to exploit emerging fractures in the Alliance.

The strategy chastises Europe for migration policies, "censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition". Such a damning assessment could fuel avoidable tensions and complicate efforts to maintain a unified position against shared challenges, accelerating Europe's pursuit of strategic autonomy.

In NSS, climate change and net zero are labeled as "disastrous". This response to one of humanity's existential challenges offers short-term economic leverage to the US by boosting its fossil fuel exports and blunting China's competitive edge in renewable energy and clean technology. Yet in the long-run, it could increase partners' reliance on Beijing to advance climate action and fast-track green transition.

In Middle East and Africa, the strategy emphasises limited involvement, focusing on preventing adversaries from dominating strategic regions and securing energy routes while avoiding long-term military commitments. This reconfiguration will reduce overseas burdens but may erode Washington's credibility among partners.

The Indo-Pacific is a rare exception where the US will build alliances over its potential to remain a key economic and geopolitical battleground. Even here, engagement is confined to preserving the US "prime position" in the world economy. For peace and stability, India will be encouraged to assume a leading role including through the Quad.

Fundamentally, NSS represents a deliberate strategic redefinition rather than just a simple retrenchment. Its prioritisation of domestic resilience, selective engagement and retreat from global leadership may yield short-term dividends; it risks hollowing out alliance structures that the US spent decades building.

Frictions within Pentagon are an early indicator of this strategic gamble. The proposed overhaul of combatant commands could raise questions among allies about American reliability as a steadfast security partner, undermining US influence in key regions.

Concurrently, administration's aggressive posture in Western Hemisphere - as exemplified by the Venezuela case - could drag the US in "forever wars" - something that NSS promised to evade with potentially some serious implications for American security.

In sum, NSS codifies a historic geopolitical retreat, epitomising US retrenchment from a global leader and steward of international order to just a regional actor. More strikingly, it constitutes an inadvertent admission that decades of wars have left it economically strained and strategically exposed to cross-border threats.

By shrinking foreign commitments, this interest-driven approach may reinforce domestic resilience yet could lead to steady diffusion of American global power - paradoxically leaving the US more isolated, less credible and less influential than at any point in the postwar era.